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Following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, the English law recognised 
direct protection of the right to privacy under the tort of misuse of private information 
(MOPI) by virtue of the House of Lords’ judgment in the landmark case of Campbell v MGN 
2004. The development of this emergent tort led it to acutely overlap with the subject 
matter of defamation law for two major reasons. Firstly, according to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, the interest of reputation, traditionally protected under defamation law, 
has been subsumed within the protective remit of the private life rights guaranteed by the 
Article 8 ECHR. Secondly, the false information, initially protected under the defamation 
law once it is defamatory, may also fall within the scope of the MOPI once it is private 
according to the authority of McKennitt v Ash 2006. Within this thesis, it is argued that any 
potential overlap would be practically unavoidable in the event of information being false, 
private and defamatory.  The overall contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is to 
analytically address the implications of the overlap on the defences, interim injunction and 
damages, using a multi-perspectival approach. In doing this, it seeks out to fulfil three 
objectives. Firstly, it examines the applicability of the defences of defamation in privacy 
law and the potential harmonisation between defences to achieve a coherent protection 
to the freedom of expression. Secondly, it demonstrates the effectiveness of the likelihood 
test based on Article 12 (3) Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) over the Bonnard v Perryman 
test concerning the application of interim injunction. Thirdly and finally, it analyses the 
impact of the damages awarded in order to address the reputational harms on the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
This monograph aims to conceptualise the overlap between the torts of defamation 
and privacy by providing a deep analysis and justification of this overlap. It demonstrates how 
those false publications of sexual, medical or financial information, that could cause 
simultaneous harms to privacy and reputational rights, may provoke an overlap between the 
torts of defamation and privacy. It mainly examines case-law relating to the publication of 
voluntary, discreditable, private and lawful conduct respectively.1 The thesis critically 
examines the arguments for positing the dichotomy of truth and falsity as a line clearly 
dividing the respective scopes of defamation and privacy in order to avoid their substantive 
overlap. In addition, the thesis analytically discusses the impact(s) of the overlap on defences, 
interim injunction and damages. Regarding the impact of overlap on defences, this thesis 
examines the potential application of defamation defences in privacy law in the event of both 
torts overlapping from distributive justice and local coherence perspectives.2 Given that the 
defences in defamation and privacy law seek to guarantee an effective protection to freedom 
of expression, the question of inconsistency in such defences becomes acute. This thesis 
tackles this challenge and provides a significant analysis to the possible harmonisation of such 
defences. Subsequently, the thesis considers the appropriate rules around interim injunctions 
applicable within privacy law in the event of the information at being at once  in violation of 
privacy and reputation.3 The problematic of this issue is backed to the inconsistency between 
the interim injunction rules in defamation and privacy. This thesis critically and analytically 
explores the judicial approaches towards Bonnard v Perryman’s restrictive rule (as applied in 
 
1 Mosley v MGN [2008] EWHC 687 (QB); LNS v Persons unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB) 
2 Mosley, ibid.  
3 LNS, ibid.  
2 
 
defamation) within privacy law from coherence, efficiency and feminist analysis perspectives. 
Finally, this thesis considers the impact of the overlap upon respective damages within 
defamation and privacy, and how the similarity/difference between interest in privacy and 
reputation should affect the relative size of damages given in these areas. It examines to what 
extent the stand-alone award within privacy should be afforded primacy given the fact that 
the dissemination is simultaneously in breach of privacy and defamatory. This examination 
will be achieved via analysing the basis for including damages relating to reputational harms 
within privacy claims, the justification for awarding damages based on the concept of 
vindication of privacy, similar to those applied in defamation, and the potential accumulation 
of damages awarded in defamation and privacy actions as these are raised in respect of any  
single set of private and defamatory facts being published.  
1. 1: Contextual Background and Rationale  
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) was a watershed moment in the protection of the 
right to respect for privacy in the UK.  The HRA required public authorities to act in a manner 
compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR): at the core of Article 8 
ECHR is respect for privacy – the ‘Right to respect for private and family life’. 4 The courts 
subsequently balance these Art 8 rights with the countervailing right of freedom of 
expression, guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR, using the test of proportionality based upon which 
the domestic courts struck the balance by identify the decisive factor, namely a real 
contribution of public interest, by which one of these conflicting rights outweighs the other.5 
Pace such a balancing methodology, the relationship between reputation and freedom of 
 
4 S. 6 HRA 1998; Kirsty Hughes & Beil Richards, ‘The Atlantic divide on privacy and free speech’ in Andrew Keynon, 
(eds) Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP 2016) 175. 
5 Axel v Springer v Germany [2012] 55 EHRR 6, [91]; Von Hanover v Germany [2012] 55 EHRR 15; Campbell v 
MGN [2004] UKHL 22; Re S (FC) (a child) [2004] UKHL 47; Hughes & Richards, ibid. 196. 
3 
 
expression is based upon the Article 10 (2) ECHR methodology, which states that freedom of 
expression may be restricted ‘for the protection of reputation’. 6 This means that the interest 
of reputation represents a narrowly construed exceptional restriction upon the fundamental 
right of freedom of expression, due to its paramount importance. Such a methodology, that 
affords no equal importance to the competing interests of reputation and freedom of 
expression, locates in direct contrast to the methodology required by the article 8 ECHR that 
employs a proportionality test in competing matters of privacy and freedom of expression. 
English defamation law follows the methodology of rule v. exception applied in Article 10 
ECHR rather than the methodology of proportionality applied in Art. 8 ECHR. 7 This 
methodological divergence between privacy and defamation might be less controversial and 
problematic since ECHR signatory States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation or discretion 
around deciding the measures by which to achieve compliance with the convention rights. 8 
Based on the methodology of the Article 10 (2) ECHR, English defamation law has been 
dramatically reshaped in order to afford freedom of expression wide protection through 
several defences: these include truth, honest opinion, publication relating to matters of public 
interest, and absolute and qualified privileges. 9 The relationship between defamation and 
privacy is not only predicated upon the fact that both torts represent a central issue in media 
law – the conflict between freedom of expression and privacy rights protected in such torts – 
 
6 Tanya Aplin & Jason Bosalnd, ‘the uncertain landscape of Article 8 of the ECHR: the protection of reputation as 
a fundamental human right?’ in Andrew Keynon, (eds) Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP 2016), 
265. 
7 Such a methodological divergence between the torts has been used to challenge the tortious nature of misuse 
of private information (MOPI): a cause of action under English law that protects the privacy rights articulated in 
Art 8 ECHR. See: Jojo Y. C. Mo, ‘Misuse of private information as a tort: The implications of Google v Judith Vidal-
Hall’ (2017) 33 computer law & security review 87, 91; Barbara McDonald, ‘Privacy Claims: Transformation, Fault, 
and the Public Interest Defence’ in Dyson and Goudkamp (eds.), Defences in Tort (Hart Publishing 2015) 290, 
297. 
8 Patrick O’ Callaghan, ‘False privacy and information games’ (2013) 4 J. E. T. L. 282, 303.   
9 Andrew Kenyon, ‘Defamation and privacy in an era of more speech’ in Andrew Kenyon, (eds) Comparative 
defamation and privacy law (CUP 2016) 4. 
4 
 
but also because privacy, as a value, was subject to   indirect protection under defamation 
law prior to  receiving direct protection under MOPI. The fact that some cases of defamation 
law could alternatively be cases of privacy and vice versa may make the overlap between 
defamation and privacy of paramount importance because such torts provide different levels 
of protection to the defendant’s freedom of expression. 10 This conceptual overlap of 
defamation and privacy becomes acute when the Strasbourg’s jurisprudence has shifted the 
position of reputation from being an exceptional restriction of the freedom of expression in 
Article 10 (2) ECHR, to become an aspect of private life under Article 8 ECHR. 11 The different 
methodologies applied in the English defamation and privacy torts may make the overlap 
critical because the reputational interest protected under the English law of defamation is not 
subject to a proportionality test applied to MOPI, which treats privacy as equal to the 
competing interests under freedom of expression. However, when the courts decided that 
the protected remit of MOPI may include falsehoods, traditionally dealt with under 
defamation, this overlap accomplishes a potentially problematic shift from a conceptual to a 
materialistic level. 12 This overlap represents a vital challenge to the well-established balance 
between the reputation and freedom of expression, potentially manifest in those cases where 
the claimant brings privacy action instead of defamation. 13 Many scholars, like David Rolph 
and David Partlett, argue that enabling claimants to circumvent the established principles of 
defamation law through bringing a MOPI claim, which applies a balancing methodology, could 
undermine the balance between freedom of expression and reputational interests developed 
 
10 Tamar Gidron, ‘Publication of private information: an examination of the right to privacy from a comparative 
perspective (2010) J. S. Afr. L. 271, 286. 
11 Alpin & Bosland, (n 6) 266; this approach will be discussed in Chapter 3  
12 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714.  
13 David Rolph, ’the interaction between defamation and privacy’ in Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross 
Grantham, (eds) Private Law in the 21st century (Hart Publishing 2017) 469-70. 
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over decades within the law of defamation. 14 This expansion of privacy scope may even 
challenge the existence of defamation law, since privacy law may encapsulate what was 
traditionally considered an issue for defamation.15 That freedom of expression guaranteed by 
article 10 ECHR ought not  to  be easily restricted,  given that such technically  unrestricted 
freedom of expression potentially promotes democratic values, the discovery of truth, 
enhancement of citizenship, individual development, facilitation of democratic deliberation 
and governmental accountability. 16 Furthermore, the overlap could affect the future of the 
media industry should it shift the protection of freedom of expression from the scope of 
defamation law to the scope of privacy law. 17 The media industry operates in a competitive 
and global commercial environment, adding further significance to the overlap. Media 
survival depends on the sales of publications and an imbalance between privacy and free 
speech may influence media companies’ economic revenues and, ultimately, their continued 
existence. 18 Media companies’ legal liabilities would differ depending on the cause of action 
upon which claimants rely. Moreover, the overlap may influence the economic viability of 
media outlets should the claimant simultaneously bring defamation and privacy actions and 
be awarded damages for both. Similarly, the overlap may also affect individuals’ rights since 
the legal protection for public figures (such as politicians) would be classified at a lower level 
under defamation: this is due to the difficulty of obtaining n an interim injunction to protect 
the reputation if the defendant decides to justify the defamatory publication under Bonnard 
 
14 Ibid.; David Partlett, ‘New York Times v. Sullivan at fifty years: defamation in separate orbits’ in Andrew 
Kenyon, (eds) Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP 2016), 60. 
15 Ursula Cheer, ‘Divining the dignity torts: a possible future for defamation and privacy’ in Andrew Kenyon, (eds) 
Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law, (CUP 2016), 311;  
16 Gavin Philipson, ‘Press freedom, the public interest and privacy’ in Andrew Keynon, (eds) Comparative 
Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP 2016), 138; Partlett, ibid.  60. 
17 See chapter 5. 
18 Philipson, ibid. 142-4. 
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v Perryman. 19 The overlap may also raise a problematic issue to public figures when they 
bring MOPI to truly protect their privacy rights, given that in such circumstances there could 
also be a willingness to protect even indirectly their right to reputation. 20 
The developments explained above, whether in respect of the interaction between 
reputation and private life based on Article 8 ECHR or of the recognition of false privacy within 
the ambit of privacy, 21 have ramifications for defamation actions and MOPI.  The inclusion of 
reputation within the protective remit of Article 8 ECHR might require the courts to follow 
the same methodology of proportionality to defamation claims as applied in privacy claims.22 
This means that the court might seek to balance the claimant’s reputation with the 
defendant’s freedom of expression in an equation founded upon the equality of both rights.23 
The other ramification with regards to reputational aspects of Art 8 is that the defences 
applied in defamation may require a reassessment, given that  they are built upon the 
presumptive precedence of freedom of expression in Article 10 ECHR. 24 Furthermore, the 
inclusion of reputational interest within the context of Article 8 ECHR might affect the 
justification for single rule meanings, as applied in defamation, since such rules might 
potentially ignore truly harmful infringements of an individual’s right to private life. In 
addition, the single publication rule applied in the Defamation Act 2013 s. 8 might frustrate 
justice and create an imbalance between article 8 and 10 ECHR, because each reading of the 
defamatory publication is seen to potentially harm individuals’ private lives. 25  
 
19 See Chapter 6.  
20 Ursula Cheer, (n 15) 313. 
21 See chapter 4. 
22 Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, ‘The swing of the pendulum: reputation, expression and the re-entering of 
English libel law’ (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 27, 44. 
23 This methodology has been ruled in Re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL [17] per Lord Steyn.  
24 Mullis and Scott, Ibid. 48. 
25 Ibid. 56-7. 
7 
 
Regarding the protection of false private information (false privacy) within the remit 
of privacy, such falsity-based expansions create overlaps between defamation and privacy 
actions. 26 The term ‘overlap’, which constitutes the crux of this study, refers to situations 
where two causes of action could be brought in respect of the same set of facts.27 In Terry 
(previously LNS) v Persons unknown, 28 Tugendhat J identified the situations within which an 
overlap between defamation and privacy actions could be raised; both actions could be 
brought in respect of publications relating to voluntary, discreditable, personal and lawful 
conduct, whether sexual, financial or other. In ERY v Associated Newspapers Limited, Nicol J 
agreed with Tugendhat J about the existence of such overlaps, stating that ‘a threatened 
publication may jeopardise both the claimant's reputation and his privacy’. 29 However, such 
overlaps between defamation and privacy potentially create severe legal problems, since they 
may facilitate circumventing the respective, differing requirements of legal protection 
convened by each tort.30 
The first implication of the overlap relates to what extent defences that are available 
in defamation could be applied within privacy actions.31 The judiciary left this question 
unanswered in Mosley v MGN. Herein, Eady J was receptive to a Reynolds/responsible 
journalism defence (which is now replaced by the statutory defence of publication on matter 
of public interest POMOPI) being applied in a case involving privacy.32 The same approach was 
 
26 Alistair Mullis and R. Parkes, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, Thomson Reuters 2013) 837; Richard 
Parkers, ‘privacy, defamation and false facts’ in Nicole A. Moreham & Sir Mark Warby, (eds) Tugendhat and 
Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2016)351. 
27 Tamar Gidron, ’publication of private information: an examination of the right to privacy from a comparative 
perspective (part 2)’ (2010) TSAR 271, 283. 
28 LNS v Persons unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB) [96]. 
29 [2016] EWHC 2760 (QB) [67]. 
30 Rolph, (n 13) 476-7; Gidron, (n 26) 281. 
31 Rolph, ibid.; Elspeth Reid, ‘No Sex Please, We're European: Mosely v News Group Newspapers Ltd’ (2009) 13 
Edinburgh L. Rev. 116. 120 
32 [2008] EWHC 687 (QB) at 141. 
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also mentioned in LNS v Persons Unknown when Tugendhat J referred to the possibility of 
applying the defence of POMOPI, should the claimant choose to bring a MOPI action when 
both actions overlap. 33 
The second implication of this overlap concerns the extent to which the inflexible rule 
of interim injunctions in defamation can be applied to privacy cases. 34 The interim injunction, 
generally speaking, is an interlocutory remedy made during early stages of the litigation; it 
seeks either to prevent the initial publication or to prohibit further publication. 35  There are 
inconsistent rules about the application of interim injunctions within defamation and privacy 
torts respectively.  In defamation, the use of an injunctive order, or the Bonnard v Perryman 
rule, is highly circumscribed since no injunction can be granted if the defendant decides to 
defend her publication at trial. 36 Conversely, application of interim injunction rules within 
privacy are highly flexible; an interim injunction could be granted if the applicant’s claim is 
more likely than not to be successful at trial.37 This problem was identified by Tugendhat J in 
Terry v Persons Unknown. There he ruled that the nub of the injunctive application, made 
under privacy or MOPI, was, in reality, an effort to protect the applicant's commercial 
reputation.  As this fell within the interest protected by defamation, and 'not any other aspect 
of LNS's private life', his Justice concluded that ‘in accordance with Bonnard v Perryman no 
injunction should be granted’. 38 However, Tugendhat J further justified his refusal of the 
injunctive relief with reference to the rule of Article 12 (3) HRA 1998 as applied in MOPI 
 
33 LNS, ibid. [96]. 
34 O’Callaghan, (n 8) 287. 
35 Normann Witzleb, ‘Interim injunction for invasions of privacy: challenging the rule in Bonnard v. Perryman?’ 
in Normann Witzleb & al (eds), Emerging challenges in privacy law (CUP 2014) 414. 
36 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269; Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2005] EMLR 217, [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1462, [2005] 3 WLR 281, [2005] 1 All ER 30, [2005] QB 972 [78]. 
37 Cream Holding Ltd v. Banerjee [2004] UKHL  
38 LNS, (n 27) [95 & 123]. 
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concerning a potential public interest-centred defence, since it is important to prevent the 
public from being misled.39 Conversely, the problematic nature of interim injunctions 
becomes significantly pronounced if and when reputation and privacy can be engaged in one 
case. An example was clearly identified by Nicol J in ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd: 40:  
'In the present case, I cannot agree that the nub of the Claimant's claim is the 
protection of reputation. There is a reputational element to it, but, since that is the case 
with many privacy cases, that does not take the Claimant far enough. Mr Caldecott has 
not persuaded me that the nub or essence of the claim is the protection of the 
Claimant's reputation to the exclusion of that cluster of interests which privacy is 
intended to protect’. 
The third and final implication arising from the overlap, considered in this thesis, 
relates to the damages awarded in both causes of action. There are three enquiries potentially  
raiseable with  regards to the impact of overlap on damages: the inclusion of reputational 
harms within the elements of damages awarded in privacy, the vindication of privacy rights, 
and the accumulation of damages awarded in defamation and privacy actions brought in 
respect of the same harmful publication. 
1. 2: The Research Questions  
The research questions of this thesis fundamentally relate to the implications of this 
overlap between defamation and MOPI around defences, interim injunction and damages. As 
previously explained, the problematic overlap starts with the judicial decision to protect false 
private information within the remit of privacy. The first research question that this thesis 
 
39 Ibid. [125, 128]. 
40 Ibid. [68]. 
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therefore sets out to test is ‘To what extent should privacy law protect false private 
information?’. There would be no materialistic overlap between defamation and privacy, as 
many scholars argue, if false publications were to fall exclusively within the protective scope 
of defamation, and merely true private information should be actionable under MOPI. This 
thesis, however, argues that privacy law should protect false private information, and the 
overlap with defamation is substantively and factually unavoidable in the event of 
information being false, private and defamatory. Thus, it would be logical and imperative to 
critically discuss the academic literature relating to the desirability of avoiding such overlaps 
through excluding falsity from the protective remit of MOPI.  
The main question this thesis poses relating to impact of overlap on defences is ‘To 
what extent should privacy law apply defences of defamation if both torts overlap?’. It 
therefore seeks to examine the relationship between defamation and privacy defences, one 
which should logically attain a level of harmonisation since such defences primarily seek to 
promote free exercise of expression. The thesis therefore examines the possibility of 
harmonising certain defences through unifying the requirements (elements) necessary to 
provide freedom of expression right with coherent protection. Regarding the impact of the 
overlap on the interim injunction, the question raised in this respect pertains to the correct 
applicable rule of injunctive relief within cases involving defamatory and private information. 
This thesis examines the question of whether ‘the defamation rule of interim injunction should 
be applied in privacy cases if disclosure of private information has also caused reputational 
harms?’. Concerning the impact of the overlap on damages awarded in defamation and 
privacy, the thesis explores whether damages awarded in defamation and privacy raised from 
the same publication amount to double compensation. Such a dilemma is accentuated where 
reputation and private life are deemed two aspects of Article 8 ECHR rights. There are three 
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correlated questions which this thesis examines: firstly, ‘Should privacy damages take into 
account the vindication of privacy right following the same procedures as in defamation law?’; 
Secondly, ‘Should reputational harms be included under privacy law, or, should reputational 
harms only be protected by defamation?’; Finally, ‘Are defamation and privacy damages 
cumulative should a claimant be successful in pursuing both actions?’. 
1.  3: The methodology and scope of research 
 
In order to examine the implications of the overlap between defamation and privacy, 
this research study follows a mixture of methodological approaches, combining: a doctrinal 
approach (also known as black letter legal research) and an interdisciplinary approach/socio-
legal analysis. Understanding the overlap logically demands an understanding of what the law 
of defamation is, and what the law of privacy is. This necessarily requires adopting a doctrinal 
methodology that concerns analysing the legal rules found within the statutes and cases in 
order to formulate legal doctrines. 41 The doctrinal methodology is used to clarify the legal 
rules of defamation and privacy, whilst exploring defences, interim injunction rules and 
damages. This clarifies both the inconsistency of legal rules and the problem of such 
inconsistency if and when both laws overlap. The methodology used here simply enables that 
imperative description and understanding of the law from an internal perspective; 
consequently, another methodology must be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the law to 
achieve a particular social goal. 42 Identifying the inconsistency/difference between the rules 
within defamation and privacy, as this thesis undertakes, would logically require choosing the 
right applicable rule in the case of overlap. In doing so, there would undoubtedly arise a need 
 
41 Paul Chynoweth ‘Legal research’ in Andrew Knight & Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced research methods in the 
built environment (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008) 29.  
42 Ibid. 30. 
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to refer to external factors or goals when evaluating the effectiveness of either defamation 
or privacy rules in overlapping cases. Hence, this thesis also adopts an interdisciplinary or 'law 
in context' methodology that considers multidisciplinary perspectives to inform and influence 
the outcomes of legal questions addressed in this study. 43 The interdisciplinary approach 
deploys pluralistic perspectives or disciplines external to legal theory to face the questions 
which arise pertaining to societal, economic and ethical obligations based upon relative 
distributions of power and conceptions of the public interest   in order to identify solutions 
appropriate to achieving desirable outcomes.44 Such methodology is adopted in order to 
analyse the impact of applying either defamation or privacy rules in the overlap from the 
chosen perspectives.   
This thesis examines and analyses these research questions from multidisciplinary 
perspectives, engaging coherence theory, efficiency theory, and feminist analysis. It also 
examines the overlap through legal theories, chiefly distributive justice, access to justice and 
procedural law. The justification for engaging such a variety of perspectives pertains to the 
core research questions arising from the overlap and to existing arguments proposed within 
the critical literature in respect of such overlaps. Firstly, the justification for analysing overlaps 
from a coherence perspective is predicated upon the argument that such overlaps potentially 
undermine the coherence of the whole legal system. This chapter’s argument suggests that a 
more desirable outcome emerges from the overlap between defamation and privacy if the 
analysis was based upon local than global coherence. 
 
43 Ibid. 31. 
44 William Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (Clarendon Press, 1997) 20. 
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Secondly, efficiency is a general goal of tort law, and it is used to analyse the questions 
arising from the overlap between defamation and privacy. 45 Such economic analysis may also 
prove crucial in addressing the main question of this study; that is, whether privacy law should 
protect false private information or, as many scholars argue, should only fall under the 
purview of defamation law. The economic analysis could provide a solid and convincing basis 
upon which to decide which law may provide the most efficient solution to this question. 
Efficiency could also apply when deciding upon the most desirable rules for the application of 
interim injunctions in those cases where defamation and privacy overlap. This is particularly 
pertinent in light of the critical observation that a significant body of literature regarding 
efficiency concerns itself with defamation and privacy. 
Furthermore, the relevance of feminist analysis to the questions arising from the 
overlap is founded upon the critical extrapolation that sexual disclosure may equally raise 
issues of defamation and privacy. It is thus vital to examine the research questions of this 
study from that  feminist analysis perspective which more readily permits identification of  
solutions most likely to consider the particularity of harms befalling women: it names and 
identifies, then proposes concomitant solutions to, gender-biased unequal dynamics within 
standards  applied within adjudication of sexual disclosure. Since sexuality is one of feminist 
theory's central concerns, analysing the overlapping questions using a feminist analysis 
perspective feasibly adds significant value to our discussion. Furthermore, both defamation 
and privacy deal with issues of gender as relating to the publication of matters relating to sex 
and sexuality. A feminist analysis approach is employed for the purposes of supporting false 
 
45 Further information about the desirability of efficiency in tort law see, Tsachi Keren-Paz, Torts, egalitarianism 
and distributive justice (Ashgate 2007) 42-4.  
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privacy claims and determining the right application of injunctive rules in the overlap between 
defamation and privacy.  
Alongside these interdisciplinary approaches, a variety of legal theories are explored 
in this thesis. The fact that both defamation and privacy are tortious causes of action requires 
discussion of those questions of overlap underpinning tort law theories such as distributive 
justice. This study is concerned with adopting a progressive approach to tort law in order to 
redistribute the benefits and burdens between the advantaged and disadvantaged members 
in society. Such distribution may involve enhancing the benefits of reallocating burdens from 
the latter to the former. Tort law is a valuable mechanism for distributing or allocating 
burdens (harms) caused by involuntary interactions in private settings; however, such 
distribution or allocation of losses depends on specific criteria and considerations. These 
include fault where this is based on the tortfeasor’s obligation to allocate the burdens (losses) 
caused to others based on a notion of deterrence or negative desert46. This study also takes 
into account two considerations based on which the burdens of tortious activities could be 
distributed: fairness and loss-spreading. These criteria are used to examine whether the 
judicial approach to applying defences of defamation in privacy cases could lead to a fair 
distribution of burdens. Overlap also raises issues related to civil procedures such as access 
to justice. Defamation and privacy actions are significantly expensive; consequently, it is 
relatively difficult for people of limited incomes to access means of judicially protecting their 
rights or to prevent such breaches. Libel cases have traditionally been classified as a ‘rich 
man’s tort’ due to the unaffordable costs of litigation. Access to justice, in turn, is necessarily 
considered within this work's analysis.  
 
46 Ibid. 16. 
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This thesis then applies distributive justice to examination of that research question 
relating to potential applicability of defamation defences in privacy. The relevance of 
distributive justice to the questions raised from the overlap mainly relates to the potential 
application of defamation defence of POMOPI within privacy cases where such cases involved 
an overlap. Defences ostensibly centred around protecting defendants' rights to freedom of 
expression within privacy cases, in fact constitute judicial attempts to de facto reallocate 
goods among members of society. These redistributive attempts were sought on the grounds 
that freedom of expression constitutes the same countervailing interest in both torts. Since 
publication on matter of public interest (POMOPI) depends on the reasonable belief of the 
defendant that the information in question serves the public interest, this study examines to 
what extent such belief could be reasonable if applied in privacy cases from a distributive 
justice perspective in light of the aforementioned fairness and loss-spreading factors.    
The scope of this thesis, as its title indicates, encompasses the impact of this overlap 
between defamation and privacy only as it relates to defences, interim injunction and 
damages. The impact on other issues, such as serious harm requirement, limitation periods 
and the potential chilling effect on freedom of expression resulting from the accumulation of 
legal liabilities of defamation and privacy from a single publication, fall outside of the scope 
of this thesis because of the limitations of time and scale. This thesis is ultimately concerned 
with English law because the central issue of the overlap remains problematic and under-
development in this jurisdiction. However, it comparatively deploys readings of American 
false light tort as a means by which to evaluate the case for, and then support the thesis’ 
contention that false privacy ought to be recognized within interpretation of English law. The 
divergence between English and American law in respect of the balance between the interests 
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of privacy and reputation against freedom of expression is potentially predicated upon the 
difference between the constitutional frameworks determining the legal protection of such 
rights. While English jurisdiction is heavily governed by the Strasbourg's proportionality 
methodology that equally treats the rights in conflict, the First Amendment under US law 
affords freedom of expression relative superiority or precedence in cases of conflicting 
rights.47 English defamation law, when compared with American law, is decidedly 
categorizable as a pro-claimant because since the former initially presumes falsity and malice 
in the claimant’s favour, and the onus of proving the contrary  resting upon the defendant; 
conversely,  the American law initially presumes the truth of the statement complained of 
and the absence of malice on the part of the  defendant, with the burden of proof regarding  
falsity and malice falling upon the claimant’s shoulders.48 Nonetheless, the employment of 
American law in respect of the overlap between defamation and false light undoubtedly 
assumes paramount importance within  our study, since such law recognised the tort of 
privacy and the overlap between defamation and privacy several decades before such 
overlaps were correspondingly recognised within English law. The seminal article of 'The right 
to privacy', written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in December 1890, may represent 
the starting date of the legal history of American privacy protection which was considered by 
the press as a real challenge to its free speech right guaranteed by the First Amendment. 49 
However, the actual four categories of privacy torts recognised in the Restatement of Law 
traced initially back to the seminal article ‘Privacy’ written by William Prosser, known as the 
 
47 Hughes & Richards, (n 4) 197. 
48 Russell Weaver, ‘Defamation and democracy’ in Andrew Keynon, (eds) Comparative Defamation and Privacy 
Law (CUP 2016), 84. 
49 Ibid. 166-7. 
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Dean of American tort law. 50 Prosser identified the issue of overlap between defamation and 
privacy in his seminal article in 1960. 51 He mentioned that false light tort raised in respect of 
the publicity of false information might swallow up defamation law since false light scope 
could be widened to include even what may initially fall within the protective scope of 
defamation. 52 Prosser also explained the potential overlap between false light and 
defamation based upon the shared foundation of  seeking to protect the individual’s 
reputation when the latter has been tarnished by the publicity of false allegations.53 Prosser 
consequently asked whether such overlap would allow circumvention of restrictions such as 
limitation periods and constitutionally procedural and substantive protections of freedom of 
expression developed over decades within the context of defamation. 54 Privacy torts, similar 
to defamation, may impose restrictions on free speech rights which must remain 'uninhibited, 
robust, and wide open'; thus, an overlap raises concerns about the First Amendment 
protection of public debate (providing listeners and readers crucial insights) in a democratic 
society. 55 Based on the First Amendment the American Supreme Court marked out equal 
affordance given to protection of free speech rights whether under defamation or privacy 
actions brought by government officials, heads of states and celebrities respectively. 56 The 
Restatement of Torts (second) also followed a similar approach by equally applying some of 
 
50 The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (second) Volume 3 (1977) § 652; William Prosser, 
‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review, 383. 
51 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, ‘Prosser‘s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy’ (2010) 98 California Law Review 
1887, 1891. 
52 Prosser, ibid. 401. 
53 Ibid.  400;  
54 Ibid. 401; Richards & Solove, ibid. 1900. 
55 Hughes & Richards, (n 4) 171. 
56 Ibid. 183-90. 
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the restrictions (defences) in defamation and privacy torts in order to afford freedom of 
expression equal protection under each action. 57 
This thesis is carried out via desk-based research which focuses on consulting basic 
primary and secondary resources. 58 The primary resources vary from statutes to the relevant 
cases law pertaining to defamation and privacy law. Concerning the acts, defamation acts 
from 1952, 1996 and 2013 have been deployed throughout the whole thesis, as too leading 
cases in common law regarding the longstanding rules of defamation. Given the recent 
judicial recognition of English privacy or MOPI this thesis has consulted the landmark cases as 
well as those most recent cases involving new judicial approaches as these are relevant to the 
research questions of this study. Beside primary resources, secondary resources such as 
textbooks and academic articles have been widely consulted. In support of the ‘law in context’ 
methodology, this thesis explores a spectrum of informed sources accessed through the 
library and internet websites, which have been in turn used critically to discuss the arguments 
made throughout the study.  
1. 4: The structure of the thesis 
There are seven chapters, excluding the introduction, which follow a logic of 
sequential development:  these reflect upon the overlap and its implications for defences, 
interim injunction and damages. The objective of this research is to address the core 
questions raised from the overlap between defamation and privacy so as to provide 
convincing and justified answers based on the selected framework. Given this objective, the 
thesis begins with a necessary explicatory overview of the torts of defamation and privacy. 
 
57 The Restatement of Torts equally allows applying absolute and conditional privileges in defamation and 
privacy. See chapter 5.  
58 Nick Moore, How to do Research (Third Revised Edition), 2006. 
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Accordingly, Chapter Two explores the basic structure of both defamation and privacy torts, 
explaining how the interests of reputation and privacy receive corresponding legal protection 
in the English jurisdiction, in order to provide a background to the debate underpinning core 
arguments of this thesis. The first section of this chapter explains the structure of defamation. 
It begins by elucidating the development of defamation law and its core interest of 
reputation. This section is divided into two subsections dealing with the legal 
requirements/elements around bringing libellous action, and the legal presumptions that the 
claimant is not required to prove but could be rebutted by the defendant. The second section 
of Chapter Two explores the development of legal protection of privacy. It begins with an 
overview of the meaning of privacy and gradual development of its protection from equitable 
action of breach of confidence to the current protection under the action of misuse of private 
information (MOPI). The next subsection of Chapter Two’s second section illustrates the 
structure of MOPI action from the reasonable expectation test to the proportionality test. 
Chapter Three maps the conceptual and materialistic overlaps between defamation 
and privacy. In this respect, the conceptual accounts and the judicial authorities (equally from 
English and Strasbourg jurisprudence) are presented in a manner such as to draw out these 
overlaps. The first section aims to conceptualise the overlap through analysis of three 
consecutive dimensions: the theoretical foundations that underpin the values of privacy and 
reputation, English authorities, and the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The second section, 
thereafter, maps the theoretical framework upon which the research questions of this thesis 
are analysed. Its main purpose is to provide a background for the conceptual building of the 
selected framework. Here, the argument shows that false private information or false privacy 
may constitute, materially speaking, the core of the overlap, ergo providing a bridge for more 
in-depth consideration of this issue within the subsequent chapter. 
20 
 
Chapter Four illustrates the subject matter of the overlap that relates to the judicial 
approach to protecting falsehoods within the protective remit of privacy if the claimant 
proves her expectations around keep such information private were reasonable. As explained 
previously in the Introductory literature review, many scholars argue that privacy law should 
preclude false information from falling within its protective scope to avoid undesirable 
overlap with defamation. The first section critically deals with the arguments excluding false 
information from remit of privacy. The thesis unravels the conceptual and doctrinal 
unsoundness of such arguments since the touchstone of defamation law is whether the 
information is defamatory in the first place. The issue of falsity and truth of such information 
is a matter of legal presumption that could be refuted by a defence of justification. Using 
various perspectives, the thesis explores how privacy law should protect false private 
information and explores how the current English judicial approach justifies the irrelevance 
of the truth and falsity argument. Besides the various perspectives used to argue the rightness 
of including false private information within a privacy remit, American false light tort is also 
used to provide further evidence for the thesis’ fundamental claim. Despite the different 
requirements and tests applied in false light and false privacy, it will analytically corroborate 
the thesis’ assertion that both share similar theoretical foundations as well as explicating how 
false information could undermine our privacy rights. 
Whilst Chapter Four asserts the fundamental claim that false private information 
ought to be protected by privacy and that overlap between defamation and privacy would be 
unavoidable in the event of information forming the basis of a matter being private, 
defamatory and false, the following chapters respectively deal with the impact of the overlap 
on defences, interim injunction and damages. Chapter Five builds on the question of the 
potential applicability of defences of defamation in privacy. As it will discuss, the English 
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judiciary, from Mosley v MGN 59 to ZXC v Bloomberg L.P., 60 provides no definitive answer to 
such a question – rather its judgements reflect an obvious uncertainty around  the 
applicability of defences developed in the landscape of Article 10 ECHR to the landscape of 
Article 8 ECHR, with each respective matter seeing the  application of a different 
methodology. This chapter, therefore, is divided into three sections: the first section provides 
an overview of the defences of defamation and privacy, the second section explains the 
interaction between such defences to assess the justifications of their differences, if any (such 
as publication on matter of public interest vs public interest); the third and final section  
evaluates  the soundness of importing defamation defences into privacy territory, using 
coherence and distributive justice perspectives. It emphasises the argument that any 
harmonisation of defamation defences with privacy through requiring consideration of public 
interest elements within truth and honest opinion defences may increase the coherence 
between defamation and MOPI. It does so on the grounds that their protected interests fall 
within the landscape of Article 8 ECHR on the one hand, whilst both torts also seek to 
guarantee coherent protection to the freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. 
Nevertheless, considerations of local coherence, fairness and loss spreading, as this thesis 
emphasises and this Chapter discusses, may provide convincing grounds for precluding the 
application of qualified privileges and publication of matters of public interest from privacy 
law. 
The objective of Chapter Six is to consider the impact of the overlap on the applicable 
rule of the interim injunction. Accordingly, the chapter explores at the outset the rules of 
injunctive relief in defamation and privacy; it also critically examines the justifications for 
 
59 (n 33) 
60 [2019] EWHC 970 (QB) 
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applying two rules to obtain injunctive orders prohibiting private or defamatory information. 
In this chapter, the thesis analyses in greater depth how the two tests of interim injunction 
consistently interact and where there could be dynamic, potentially tense interaction 
between such tests. A particular focus of this analysis will concern the application of local 
coherence, efficiency and feminist analysis perspectives from the perspective of affording 
priority  to privacy over the defamation tests associated with interim injunctions. Accordingly, 
the thesis analyses the impact of applying the privacy test to achieve the common goal 
underpinning the above perspectives and demonstrates, conversely, how the application of 
defamation test could cause undesirable outcomes. The final question which this thesis 
addresses, relates to the impact of the overlap around damages awarded in defamation and 
privacy. Chapter Seven tackles three correlated issues concerning such  damages: the extent 
to which the reputational harm is included within the assessment of privacy damages; the 
role of vindication in assessing damages awarded in privacy cases if harms to reputation are 
accompanied by privacy harms; and the potential accumulation of privacy and defamation 
damages if both actions were successfully pleaded. These issues are respectively addressed 
after an overview of size, purpose, and types of damages in defamation and privacy law. The 
evaluation of these issues is analysed based on the established rules in the common law as 
well as the selected theoretical framework. In Chapter Eight, the thesis concludes by critically 
describing these outcomes and aggregating them against the overall research questions 
outlined above within this Introductory chapter. Beside these outcomes, the overall 
conclusion also identifies the contribution to knowledge and highlights the scope of the 

























Chapter 2: The overview of defamation and privacy torts 
2. 1: Introduction 
An overall comprehension of scope, elements, and tests of the torts of defamation and 
privacy is a vital prerequisite to effectively map the overlap between such torts. However, the 
analysis within this Chapter is limited to the main structures of defamation and privacy since 
the detail of defences, interim injunction rules, and damages are explained in the subsequent 
chapters. Therefore, the chapter is divided into two main sections: the first section elucidates 
the well-established rules of defamation, tests and presumptions, which are a subject of 
development over centuries in English jurisdiction. 61 The second section deals with the 
emergent action relating to misuse of private information which protects the right to privacy 
in English law.  
2. 2: The overview of Defamation tort 
This section briefly elaborates on the main structure of defamation law under three 
interrelated subsections to provide a clear overview of the tort of defamation. The first 
subsection shortly explains the development, definition and purpose of defamation law. The 
second subsection points out the main elements of defamatory meaning, reference and 
publication, that the claimant must prove to proceed libellous action. The final subsection 
elaborates the legal presumptions of falsity, malice and (previously) reputational damage, 
that English defamation law presupposes for the sake of the claimant once she establishes 
the defamatoriness of allegations in suit.  
 
 
61 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd and another [2019] UKSC 27. 
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A- Definition and purpose  
The purpose of defamation law was developed over time. Initially, its focus lay in the 
desire of the Crown and Church to maintain the public order from the threats of religious and 
political discussions promoted by the printing press. Later, it gravitated increasingly towards 
the protection of 'great men's' honour; finally, by the early 19th Century, it sought to protect 
the interests of a reputation as such. 62 Bringing reputational interest within the ambit of 
defamation law provoked a controversial debate around the real meaning of reputation, and 
how a statement could cause harms to such interest. 63 The Faulks Committee defined 
defamation as ‘[consisting] of the publication to a third party of matter[s] which in all 
circumstances would be likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable 
people generally’. 64  
This definition implies a general formulation of this tort’s key components and its 
purpose. Conversely, Tugendhat J classified the defamation tort into two categories: personal 
defamation; and business or professional defamation. 65 Personal defamation is based upon 
publication harming an individual’s character or attributes established in relation to her 
alleged conscious acts or voluntary choices which include imputations of illegal, unethical, 
immoral, or socially harmful behaviour. 66 Personal defamation can be also committed by the 
imputation of non-voluntary conduct or misfortune such as insanity or diseases that 
consequently leads the claimant to be shunned, avoided, or ridiculed. 67 Business 
 
62 Lachaux, (n 61); Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and defamation (OUP 2007) 77. 
63 Thornton v Telegraph Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) [28]; Eric Barendt, ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) 
52 Current Legal Problems 110.  
64 Faulks Committee Report on Defamation (1975) Cmnd. 5909; S. Deakin, A. Johnston & B. Markesinis, Tort Law 
(7th edn, OUP 2013) 63 
65 Thornton, ibid. [33]. 
66 Ibid. [33] i &ii. 
67 Ibid. [33] ii. 
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(professional) defamation occurs if an imputation adversely affects the claimant's commercial 
reputation in relation to goods or services according to the standard required by the 
customer, patient or client. Such imputations, in turn, can deter others from providing 
claimants with financial funding or accepting employment. 68 
This dichotomy between personal and professional defamation is relevant to the 
subject of this study since, as Tugendhat J highlighted, defamatory imputations based on 
involuntary conduct and attracting no moral discredit might nonetheless precipitate not only 
libel actions but also the misuse of private information. 69  
It is necessary to highlight at the outset that the defamation tort consists of two types: 
libel and slander. Such a division is predicated upon the way the defamation is committed; if 
produced in writing and or visual representation then the defamation qualified as libel; 
conversely, the defamation is slander if it is committed orally. 70 The defamation is classified 
as a libel if defamatory allegations are reproduced in a permanent form, i.e. books, articles, 
and letters.71 Conversely, defamatory words, when made temporarily and audibly constitute 
a slander. 72 However, the publication of defamatory statements in any type of program, 
whether radio or television, have all been considered as libel. 73 The distinction between these 
two forms of defamation has a practical effect upon the respective onus for proving damages. 
If defamation equates to libel, the reputational harm had been legally presumed, and there 
is no need to prove injury to reputation, which means libel is an actionable tort per se. 
 
68 Ibid. [33] iii. 
69 Ibid. [35]. 
70 Deakin & al. (n 64) 636. 
71 Monson v Tussauds Ltd, for instance [1894] 1 Q.B. 671 Lopes L.J. held that ‘Libels are generally in writing or 
printing, but this is not necessary; the defamatory matter may be conveyed in some other permanent form. For 
instance, a statue, a caricature, an effigy, chalk marks on a wall, signs, or pictures may constitute a libel’. 
72 Deakin & al.  ibid. 638 
73 Defamation Act 1952 s. 1 abolished by Broadcasting Act 1990 s. 166.  
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However, this presumption no more exists since the claimant is currently required to prove 
the adverse impact on the reputation to consider the imputations in question defamatory 
according to serious harm requirement enacted by the Defamation Act 2013. 74 Conversely, 
slander requires the claimant to prove special or actual damage to hold the defendant liable.75 
Nonetheless, until recently there were four (now two) special categories of slander treated 
similarly to libel concerning the presumption of damage on the grounds that they are ‘either 
so obviously damaging to the financial position of the victim to the point that pecuniary loss 
is almost certain, or be so intrinsically outrageous that they ought to be actionable even if no 
pecuniary loss results’. 76 These categories are: an imputation of a criminal offence, 77 
imputations ‘calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or 
business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication’, 78 imputations of 
unchasteness or adultery regarding a woman or a girl, 79 and imputations regarding the 
claimant’s suffering from contagious or infectious diseases. In this latter category, however, 
slander only remains in cases where imputation can be shown to cause special damage. 80 
 
74 Lachaux (n 61) 
75 Ibid.  Deakin & al. (n 70) 638. 
76 Lachaux, ibid.; Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 K.B. 409; Catherine Urquhart, ‘Defamation: actionability’ (insight) 
(West Law, September 2015) 
<https://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad8289e0000016849591d6f298a29c3&doc
guid=I377FD710EDFD11E296D7C26DBBD3C972&hitguid=I377FD710EDFD11E296D7C26DBBD3C972&rank=1&s
pos=1&epos=1&td=1&crumb-action=append&context=106&resolvein=true> accessed 1 February 2019  
77 Gray v Jones [1939] 1 ALL ER 798  
78 Defamation Act 1952 s. 2. 
79 Slander of Women Act 1891 s. 1 however, this defamatory imputation has been repealed by S. 14 (1) of the 
Defamation Act 2013. 
80 S. 14 (2); Lachaux, ibid.  
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B- The elements of libel action 
There are three constitutive requirements the claimant must establish to bring 
defamation proceedings against the (harmfully) disseminated allegations complained of: 
defamatory meaning, the reference to the claimant, and the publication to the third party. 
The statement must be defamatory 
The touchstone of defamation law, historically speaking, is whether the defendant’s 
allegations could be reasonably interpreted in a defamatory fashion by the recipients; such 
interpretation depends largely to the words spoken, the context in which those allegations 
were expressed, and the recipients’ previous knowledge, values and background.81 
Elucidation must be achieved by the claimant herself in order to establish the wrongfulness 
of the defendant’s conduct. Merely abusive statements affecting the claimant’s own feelings 
or self-esteem do not fall within the protective scope of defamation even if such abusive 
statements would injure the relevant person. Abusive statements must, rather, seriously 
harm the claimant’s reputation, namely the esteem that others hold for her. 82 Such serious 
harms must be assessed and determined according to the criterion of reasonable reader. 83 
For example, words uttered when satirising politicians should not be interpreted as 
 
81 Marc A. Franklin Daniel J. Bussel, ‘The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity’ (1984) 25 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 825, 828. 
82 Lachaux (n 61); Deakin & al.  (n 70) 639. 
83 Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 130 [14]. In this case, Sir Anthony Clarke MR explained 
the reasonable reader: ‘The governing principle is reasonableness. (2) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not 
naïve, but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily 
than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking, but he must be treated as being a man who 
is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-
defamatory meanings are available. (3) Over-elaborate analysis is best avoided. (4) The intention of the publisher 
is irrelevant. (5) The article must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. (6) The 
hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. (7) In 
delimiting the range of permissible defamatory meanings, the court should rule out any meaning which, ‘can 
only emerge as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation …’ … (8) It follows 




defamatory since any ordinary and reasonable reader would understand the non-seriousness 
of such allegations; otherwise, upholding claims would constitute a disproportionate 
interference with freedom of expression. 84  
 The Supreme Court recently added, in addition to a ‘reasonable reader approach’, a 
new perspective around determining the meaning of words; the context in which the 
statement was posted ought to be taken into significant consideration. In Stocker v Stocker,85 
Lord Kerr added a new sub-category of the reasonable reader regarding social media 
publications; Kerr LJ rejected the theoretical and logical grounds for affirming the defamatory 
quality of Facebook postings since an ordinary reasonable reader would be particularly 
conscious of the nature of this conversation and the context 'casual medium' in which it was 
made. The task of determining the meaning of words, that was traditionally reserved for a 
jury, is now completely placed within the judge's discretion according to the Defamation Act 
2013. 86 Such an interpretive faculty could nevertheless still be passed on to a jury at the 
judge’s behest. Non-jury determinations have still not been deployed, based on a consensus 
that jury trial offers the most efficacious way of determining reasonable readings of 
allegations complained of. 87 The meaning that the defendant seeks to convey through her 
statements is largely irrelevant should the ordinary reader infer a defamatory meaning 
towards the claimant. 88  
 
84 Nicholas J. McBride & Roderick Bagshaw, Tort Law (2nd edn, Pearson 2005) 267. 
85 [2019] UKSC 17 [38-43]. Lord Kerr added ‘The fact that this was a Facebook post is critical. The advent of the 
21st century has brought with it a new class of reader: the social media user. The judge tasked with deciding 
how a Facebook post or a tweet on Twitter would be interpreted by a social media user must keep in mind the 
way in which such postings and tweets are made and read’.  
86 S. 11. 
87 Iain Wilson, ‘Supreme Court considers social media defamation: context is everything’ (Brett Wilson Media 
Law blog, 9 April 2019) <https://www.brettwilson.co.uk/blog/supreme-court-considers-social-media-
defamation-context-is-everything/> accessed 17 April 2019  
88 Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 [107]. 
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English common law developed three tests based on which the defamatory meaning 
of the allegations in question ought to be assessed: lowering the claimant's estimation within 
the eyes of right-thinking members of society generally, being shunned and avoided, and 
finally being subject to hatred, contempt or ridicule. The principal test for determining the 
defamatory meaning of defendants’ statements is whether such statements lower the 
claimant in the eyes of right-thinking people generally. 89 The right-thinking person and 
reasonable person standards were used as two equal measures to adjudicate upon 
allegations. In Skuse v Granada Television Ltd, 90 The Master of the Rolls (Sir Thomas Bingham) 
adopted the following criteria:  
‘A statement should be taken to be defamatory if it would tend to lower the plaintiff in 
the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or would be likely to 
affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people generally’.  
This test reflects the nature of the protected interest ‘reputation’ that is based on the 
esteem and external judgment the society holds about an individual’s character. 91 The 
ordinary reader is not only able to understand a joke where intended but s/he can also 
recognize false innuendo based on the whole context without recourse to specific knowledge. 
92 Furthermore, defamation can also be derived from an ostensibly innocuous statement if 
the reader possesses specialist knowledge known as true or legal innuendo. 93 However, the 
 
89 Sim v Stretch [1946] 2 All ER 1237; Lewis, ibid; Lachaux (n 61) [6]. 
90 [1993] WL 964057 
91 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’ (2099) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 603, 609. 
92 Lewis (n 88). 
93 Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331. 
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court must decide only a single meaning even though many distinct meanings could be drawn 
from the statement in question. 94  
This approach was criticised using the rationale that determination of a uniform 
meaning within a statement that might conceivably generate ten different meanings in ten 
different people is an absurd idea, particularly when the publisher is a national newspaper 
addressing its publication to millions of readers. 95 The reasonableness and right-thinking 
criteria might be unhelpful in some occasions such as politics and homosexuality; there, the 
court would avoid including immorality or unethicality within the scope of reasonableness or 
right-thinking standards whereas individual reputation is fundamentally based upon a moral 
or ethical judgment decided by a community. 96 According to the test of shun and avoid, a 
statement is defamatory if it leads the claimant to be shunned and avoided within society.  
Imputations of unchastity, shameful diseases and insanity represent instances of actionable 
statements within defamation law. In Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn- Mayor Pictures Ltd, 97 
the Court of Appeal held that an ordinary and reasonable person would shun and avoid a 
raped woman in the event of diminution of her social reputation and thus consideration is 
due towards potential imputations of immorality.  
 
94 Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 Q. B., [1968] 1 All E. R. 497. 
95 Thomas Gibbons, ‘Defamation Reconsidered’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of legal studies, 587, 601-2; Andrew 
Scott, ‘’Ceci n’ est pas une pipe’: the autopoietic inanity of the single meaning rule’ in Andrew Keynon,  (eds) 
Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (CUP 2016)  40. 
96 Kerr v. Kennedy (n 76); Randy M. Fogle, ‘Is calling someone ‘Gay’ defamatory? The meaning of reputation, 
community mores, gay rights and free speech’ (1993) 3 Law & sexuality, 165. 
97 [1934] 50 T. L. R. 587; Eric Descheemaeker, however, challenges the actionability of such imputations under 
defamation law since publication of such sensitive facts harms the claimant’s privacy or dignity whereas 
defamation law should protect reputational interests. He argues that unavoidable injustices might occur with 
respect to the claimant, should non-reputational considerations be smuggled into defamation law; for example, 
if an HIV test result of someone is accurately published without her consent, the victim would be left without 
redress under defamation law because truth constitutes a complete defence. Such injustice occurs because no 
principled protection is granted to the interest in question (privacy as Descheemaeker argues) in the first place. 
Eric Descheemaeker, ’Defamation outside reputation: proposals for the reform of English law’ (2011) 18 Tort 
Law Review 124. 
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Under the test of hatred, contempt or ridicule, in addition, a statement is deemed to 
sufficiently lower the defamed claimant in the eyes of right-thinking people when it exposes 
her to hatred, contempt or ridicule. The principle was upheld in the case of Berkoff v Burchill. 
98 The journalist Julie Burchill made two separate references to the actor Stephan Berkoff as 
possessing 'hideous ugliness'; these became the subject of a libel action brought by Mr 
Berkoff, and the court of appeal agreed that such statements constituted defamation because 
they exposed him to ridicule and lead other to shun and avoid him. However, the simple 
mockery 'ridiculing a man' cannot be a basis for definitively determining injury to reputation; 
rather, the action ought to be deemed the actual or potential cause of profound ridicule - 
namely 'expose him to ridicule' - in order to qualify as defamation. This test, however, might 
not provide a fair criterion for measuring diminishment of reputation, since the real injury of 
being exposed to ridicule ('hideous ugliness' in the case of Berkoff) does not lie within 
diminishment of a person’s relative standing within community opinion. Rather, it concerns 
her dignity and self-worth or image interest; these latter characteristics lie outside of 
defamation law’s protective scope as asserted. 99 
The statement must refer to the claimant  
The claimant also needs to establish that the defamatory allegations made by the 
defendant refer, whether directly or indirectly, to the claimant herself. 100 The direct 
reference poses no problem because there is no doubt that the defamatory allegations refer 
to the defamed claimant; conversely, the indirect reference requires a rigorous criterion to 
decide whether the claimant satisfies this requirement. 101 Problematic situations arise in 
 
98 [1996] 4 All ER 1008 (CA).  
99 McNamara. (n 62) 179; Geoffrey Robertson & Andrew Nicol, Media law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 127. 
100 Donal Nolan & John Davies, ‘Torts and Equitable Wrongs’ in Andrew Burrows (eds) English Private Law, (3rd 
edn, OUP 2013) 998-9. 
101Deakin & al. (n 64) 645. 
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mistaken identity cases and class-action defamation cases; in these instances, the defendant 
does not intend reference to the claimant's identity but intends a reference to another real 
or imaginary person, yet reasonable people would nonetheless understand that such 
defamatory allegations apply to the claimant. 102 In E. Hulton Co. v Jones, 103 for instance, the 
defendant was held liable for defamation of a barrister named Artemus Jones as a result of 
this name being used in the defendant’s fictional narrative story about a churchwarden in 
Peckham. The court found the defendant liable because reasonable people who knew the 
claimant might plausibly interpret the story as referring to the claimant and might 
consequently think less well of him even though he was not a churchwarden and had never 
frequented Peckham. The criterion upon which judgements concerning reference to the 
claimant within publications are arrived at is thus predicated upon whether an ordinary 
sensible person could, based upon knowledge of the circumstances, reach a conclusion that 
the defamatory publication indeed refers to the claimant. 104 
The statement must be published to a third party 
The final requirement needed to establish the defendant’s liability within defamation 
concerns the publication of defamatory words. The meaning of publication in this regard 
relates to the communication of a defamatory statement made by the defendant to a third 
party; this means no libel is committed whilst defamatory materials are made known only to 
the claimant. 105 Defamation law looks to safeguard the claimant’s right to social esteem 
 
102 McBride & Bagshaw, (n 84) 272. 
103 [1910] AC 20. The claimant awarded £1750 in this case; the same principle has been applied in Newstead v 
London Express Newspapers Ltd [1940] 1 KB 377 when Harold Newstead had been convicted of bigamy and the 
claimant who was called also Harold Newstead and was 30 years old and worked also in Camberwell sued the 
defendant for a libel because a reasonable person who knew the claimant would think that the account of trial 
referred to the claimant.    
104 Morgon v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239; Deakin & al (n 64) 646. 
105 Pullman v W. Hill Co. Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524, 527.  
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against undue prejudice and it might thereby suffice, traditionally speaking, to communicate 
the libellous words to one person in order to meet minimum requirements for publication.106 
Nonetheless, there are some occasions in which the communication of defamatory words to 
a third party cannot be considered a publication: the communication between spouses about 
another person, 107 a communication between a secretary and manager within the same 
enterprise containing defamatory words,108 and communication that does not meet 
standards of comprehensibility. 109 The existence of a limited number of recipients could 
constitute a reason to strike down the action because such limitations signal the lack of real 
and substantial tort as having been committed. In Jameel v Dow Jones Co. Inc, 110 the court 
struck down the action because the claimant abused process when the latter sought 






106 Nolan & Davies, (n 100). 
107 Wennhak v Morgan [1888] 20 QBD 635. 
108 Eglantine Inn Ltd v Smith [1948] NI 29, 23 
109 If the third party cannot understand the defamatory publication because of disability to read or to hear, there 
is no publication served the purpose of defamation law see: Sadgrove v Hole [1901] 2 K B 1. 
110 [2005] EWCA Civ 75 Lord Philips "We accept that in the rare case where a claimant brings an action for 
defamation in circumstances where his reputation has suffered no or minimal damage, this may constitute an 
interference with freedom of expression that is not necessary for the protection of the claimant's reputation.  In 
such circumstances, the appropriate remedy for the defendant may well be to challenge the claimant's resort 
to English jurisdiction or to seek to strike out the action as an abuse of process….  An alternative remedy may lie 




C- The legal presumptions 
English common law was described as inherently claimant-friendly due to the legal 
presumptions underlying the burden of proof defamation claimants are subject to. Some of 
these presumptions are open to rebuttals such as falsity and malice. 111 Whereas the recent 
development of defamation law in light of Defamation Act 2013 changed the longstanding 
presumption of damage as defamation was actionable tort per se. The reputational harm  is 
no more presumed since the claimant must prove the serious impact on her reputation 
caused by the defendant’s allegations in order to be defamatory. 112  
Presumption of falsity 
If the court upholds the defamatory quality of the imputations in question, there is a 
presumption that such defamatory imputations were false and thereby the claimant does not 
need to establish the falsity of the defamatory imputations. However, in order to avoid 
liability, the defendant could rebut such presumption and prove the truth of the defamatory 
imputations. 113 Nonetheless, the mere falsity of the defendant’s statement cannot form the 
basis for libel action unless the untrue statement lowers the defamed person in the eyes of 
right-thinking people generally. 114 The Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill states 
that ‘The burden of proving that the material is defamatory lies with the claimant. However, 
 
111 However, if the reputational damage was minimal or the claimant had a bad reputation, these could be 
mitigating factors to measure the damages. See: David J. Acheson & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, ‘the Economics of 
Weaponized Defamation Lawsuits, (2018) 47 Sw. L. Rev. 335,341. 
112 It might be mention that such claimant-friendly presumptions were considered as the chief causes of 
unacceptable chilling effects upon freedom of expression within the English jurisdiction compared with the 
American defendant-friendly jurisdiction as will be elucidated below. Acheson and Wohlschlegel, (n 111) 340. 
113 Ibid. 340-1. 
114 Geoffrey Robertson & Andrew Nicol, Media Law (4th edn, Penguin Books 2002) 80. 
36 
 
the claimant is not required to show that the material is false; there is a rebuttable 
presumption that this is the case and it is for the defendant to prove otherwise’. 115  
The Joint Committee declined to change the claimant-weighted falsity presumption in 
order to follow the defendant-friendly U. S Law. 116 To follow the American law, the falsehood 
presumption in English law was academically criticised because it produces chilling effects 
upon free speech rights because such presumption deters people from freely criticising 
matters of public concern, and it consequently places a disproportionate restriction upon free 
speech due to the difficulty in meeting the burden of proof to overcome the falsity 
presumption. 117 However, Strasbourg Court rejected this plea, and it reaffirmed the 
compatibility of falsity presumptions with Article 10 ECHR on the grounds that the defendants 
could not only avail themselves of the truth defence but also because they should bear onus 
to justify harms caused to an individual's reputational interests. 118 
Presumption of malice119 
The standard of liability in defamation tort is strict; the defendant cannot escape the 
liability of her defamatory publication by proving the absence of fault through demonstrating 
 
115 Ministry of Justice, Draft Defamation Bill: Consultation (Consultation Paper CP3/11, March 2011), Annex E 
Introduction.   
116 In US law, contrary to English law, the truth of the defendant's allegations is legally and refutably presumed, 
and it is incumbent upon the claimant to establish the falsehood of those words as well as their defamatory 
meaning. The basis of truth as an absolute defence presumes the accuracy of the defendant's allegations, 
whereby such a presumption places the burden to prove the falsehood of those allegations upon the claimant 
in bringing libel actions. See: Elizabeth Samson, ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional 
English and U.S. Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England's Modern Day’ (2012) 20 Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 771, 777.  
117 Paula Giliker, The Europeanisation of English Tort Law, (Hart Publishing 2014) 134-5. 
118 Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL v UK (28577/05) (2009) 48 EHRR SE19; Giliker, ibid. 135. 
119 The US law, contrary to the English law, adopts a fault-standard liability in respect to the defamation actions 
brought by public officials and public figures. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court decided that 
proving the falsehood and defamatory quality of a publication was insufficient to protect freedom of expression 
if the claimants were public officials. The truth defence itself could prove inadequate for the purposes of allowing 
people to voice their criticisms in subjects of genuine public interest. Thus, public officials, in order to bring 
defamation actions, are required to prove the fault within the defendant’s conduct (actual malice) in which the 
latter either knows the falsehood of her allegations or recklessly disregarded the need to corroborate the 
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plausible non-awareness of the claimant's existence at the time of dissemination. 120 Malice 
is primarily presumed once the defamatory quality of imputations becomes judicially upheld; 
however, such presumption could be defeated by proving the defendant’s absence of malice. 
One instance of this would be where defamation relates to reference to provocation, 121 
offering an initial defence that can only be overturned through proof of the defendant's 
knowledge of falsity or recklessness regarding truth/falsity provided by the claimant in a 
follow-up. In the defamation context, the defendant's previous knowledge, or recklessly 
suspicion of the falsity of defamatory publications represents the specific meaning of malice, 
which generally means an ill will, spiteful intent or improper motive. 122 The defences of 
honest opinion (fair comment) and qualified privilege, however, could rebut the presumption 
of malice. 123 These defences seek to allow people to speak their mind freely without the fear 
of being held liable for their speech. Nonetheless, the claimant could also defeat such 
defences if she or he could prove the malicious motive of the defendant's allegations. 124  
Presumption of reputational damage 
Defamation (libel) was classified as an actionable tort per se since reputational harm 
is irrefutably presumed even if no such harm occurred because nobody assented the 
 
respective truth or falsity of such allegations. it is ruled that ‘Under such a rule, would-be critics of official 
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it 
is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. 
They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."... The rule thus dampens the 
vigour and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments’. See: 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964) at 279. 
120 Descheamarker, (n 91) 626 
121 Acheson and Wohlschlegel, (n 111) 340-1 
122 Robertson & Nicol, (n 99) 110. 
123 There is also a controversial debate about the role of malice to defeat the defence of publication on matter 
of public interest. See chapter 5.  
124 Paul Mitchell, ‘Duties, Interests, and Motives: Privileged Occasions in Defamation’ (1998) 18 Oxford J.L. S.  
381; Descheamarker, ibid.  
38 
 
defamatory imputation. 125 However, section 1 (1) of Defamation Act 2013 requires that in 
order to for publication to be deemed defamatory, it caused, or will be likely to cause, serious 
harm to the claimant’s reputation. This newer definitional requirement challenged the 
longstanding view of defamation according to which reputational harms were automatically 
presumed if published statements were considered defamatory. 126  
In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd,127 Warby J radically reinterpreted the meaning of 
serious harm, in line with this new requirement, and rejected the longstanding legal wisdom 
that Libel is an actionable tort per se. His Honour held that the serious harm requirement 
raised the bar for bringing an action, and thus it required a new threshold of proof relating to 
reputational damage than that previously upheld within the authorities of Jameel, 128 and 
Thornton. 129 According to such a new interpretation, the likelihood test of S. 1(1) of 
Defamation Act 2013 requires either demonstrate this more stringent standard of serious 
harm done to their reputation, or the probability of serious harm being caused by. 130 The 
court of appeal, however, rejected Warby J’s interpretation upheld the longstanding view of 
libel as an actionable tort per se. 131  
 
125 Such presumption has been approved by the draft Defamation Bill 2011 ‘Libel is currently actionable without 
proof of actual damage. This means that if a statement can be shown to be defamatory (broadly that it tends to 
lower the reputation of the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society), it is presumed that 
the claimant has suffered damage as a result of the publication, and he or she does not need to prove that this 
is the case’ see: Ministry of Justice, (n 115) Introduction; Descheamarker, ibid. 613. 
126 Alastair Mullis & Richard Parkes, Gatley on Libel and slander (Sweet &amp; Maxwell 2013) at para. [1.5]; 
Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Why so serious? Lachaux and the threshold of ‘serious harm’ in section 1 Defamation Act 
2013’ (2018) 10 Journal of Media Law. 
127 [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB) 
128 In Jameel (n 110), a substantial tort is required to bring defamation action to vindicate the injured interest of 
reputation; therefore, the action should be struck out if damages awarded are significantly disproportionate to 
the litigation costs which also make a disproportionate interference with the Defendant’s freedom of expression 
in Article 10 ECHR. 
129 In Thornton (n 63) Tugendhat J ruled that in order to bar trivial claims, defamatory statements must pass the 
seriousness threshold according to which a statement is defamatory if other people’s attitude towards him/her 
is substantially affected in an adverse manner or has a tendency to do so.   
130 Ibid. [60]  
131 Lachaux, (n 127).  
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Courts, therefore, have refused to apply the same meaning of likelihood test as that 
utilized within S. 12 (3) HRA 1998 applied in Cream Holdings Limited v Banerjee to cases 
dealing with defamation law, since the two meanings have different purposes in different 
contexts. 132 Consequently, the meaning of likelihood test of s. 1(1) D. A. 2013 may be read as 
corresponding to that definition of tendency as applied in Thornton. 133 The presumption of 
damage there is a question of policy, premised upon empirical foundations, of what may 
ordinarily be defined as causing a loss of reputation.134 Bennett argues that Warby J’s 
interpretation of likelihood test may cause more problems instead of providing a means by 
which to preclude trivial claims. He holds that such an interpretation would affect any 
determination of the one-year limitation period traditionally commencing from the date of 
publication; according to Warby J's interpretation, this period would commence instead from 
that time when the occurrence of serious reputational harm first occurs. 135 Moreover, since 
adducing proof of serious harm may increase the costs and length of civil proceedings, a case 
cannot be made for Warby J’s interpretation serving to improve the efficiency of civil justice 
systems. 136 However, Bennett, contrary to the Court of Appeal ruling, believes that libel, 
technically speaking, is non-actionable per se tort because a claimant needs to provide some 
proof of damage even though s/he could potentially draw an inference establishing libel 
claim. 137 The Supreme Court, consistently with Bennett's view, ruled that the determination 
of serious harm requirement imposes a further threshold of adversely factual impact on the 
reputational interest beyond those envisaged in Jameel and Thornton authorities. 138 
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2. 3: The overview of Privacy tort 
This section briefly explores the development of English privacy law, and it focuses on 
the main cause of action through which privacy is nowadays protected. The emergent cause 
of action relating to misuse of private information (MOPI) represents the successful result of 
judicial and academic efforts undertaken over decades to achieve independent protection of 
the right to privacy based on Article 8 ECHR. 
A- The protection of privacy in English law  
To begin with, it is important to point out that there is no single overarching definition 
of privacy.139  Alan F Westin's definition of privacy is the right to determine when, what, and 
how personal information is communicated to others. 140 This meaning of privacy relates to 
subjective appreciation which could be widened or restricted according to the individual need 
for comprehensively achieving self-realization.141 Privacy is a significant means for achieving 
different functions: it seeks to achieve personal autonomy because it helps to avoid being 
manipulated, dominated, or exposed by others.142  Furthermore, it could also achieve an 
emotional release, since privacy protects that personal space which allows opportunities for 
emotional release from the tensions of social life. 143 Self-evaluation could be also met, 
because privacy grants the individual the exclusive power to decide what, when and how her 
private information should be disseminated. Therefore, privacy permits deciding how to 
 
139 Maria Tzanou, The Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Normative Value in the Context of Counter-
Terrorism Surveillance (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2017) 
140 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967) 7. 
141 Nicole Moreham’s definition of privacy, like Westin’s view, is built upon the individual desire to determine 
the scope of privacy and its boundaries. Moreham’s view of privacy is ‘the state of desired ‘inaccess’ or ‘freedom 
from unwanted access’. The scope of privacy, whether informational or physical, could be enlarged or restricted 
according to the individual’s wish and her desire to keep activities, events, places or information outside access, 
namely private. See: Nicole, A. Moreham, ‘Privacy in the common law: a doctrinal and theoretical analysis’ (2005) 
121 LQR 628, 635; Nicole A. Moreham ‘Beyond information: physical privacy in English law’ (2014) 73 CLJ 350. 
142 Westin, Ibid. 14. 
143 Ibid.  
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integrate experiences into meaningful patterns for the purposes of achieving self-
evaluation.144 Privacy may also allow the individual to draw her interpersonal boundaries and 
trusted people with whom the personal information is shared.145  
Daniel J Solove’s view on privacy is based on recognising four categories of privacy 
invasions.146 Firstly, privacy is breached through information collected through unauthorized 
surveillance which adversely affects the individuals’ behaviours due to the potentially chilling 
Panopticon effect. Secondly, privacy is breached in the event of private information being 
processed and analysed without consent, in turn revealing certain private facts contrary to 
the individual’s expectations. Thirdly, privacy could also be breached should private 
information be disseminated without authorization, since this allows exposure of many 
physical and emotional attributes and consequently causes potential embarrassment and 
humiliation. Finally, privacy is invaded if the individual’s seclusion (namely solitude) is 
intruded upon.  
The comparison of such views is beyond the focus of this thesis; however, one may 
deduce from such explanations that the core of privacy concept relates to the protection from 
unauthorised publication or intrusion into an individual's private life. This meaning could be 
recognised within the development of English privacy law under MOPI which may subsume 
the protection of information and physical privacy. The protection of privacy in English law 
 
144 Ibid. 
145 Contra Westin and Moreham’ enlarged approaches, Raymond Wacks argues that privacy-protective scope 
ought to be limited to the protection of private facts instead of the information giving rise to an expectation of 
privacy since privacy right is predicated upon "safeguarding of private facts". See: Raymond Wacks, Privacy and 
Media Freedom (2013 Oxford University Press) 238.      
146 Daniel J Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard 2009) 10; Daniel J Solove A Taxonomy of Privacy (2006) 154 
U. Pennsylvania LR 477, 536. 
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shifted from denying the existence of any direct protection of personal privacy through to the 
establishment of privacy tort. 
In Kaye v Robertson and Anor,147 the court of appeal mentioned the failure within 
English law to provide effective and direct protection of the right to privacy. In this case, the 
claimant, who was a well-known actor, claimed that he was interviewed and photographed 
without his consent during his stay in a private hospital recovering from his serious injuries. 
The claim was brought under causes of action relating to malicious falsehood, libel, passing 
off and trespass to the person, an interlocutory injunction was granted with regards to the 
defendant’s false allegation that the photograph had been taken and interview conducted 
with the claimant’s consent; however, this injunction did not prevent the publication of the 
claimant’s hospital photographs. The court of appeal upheld the absence of any actionable 
right to privacy within English jurisdiction. Glidewell L. J's asserted that: 148 
'it is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly, there is 
no right of action for breach of a person's privacy. The facts of the present case are a 
graphic illustration of the desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what 
circumstances statutory provision can be formulated in such a way as to protect the 
privacy of individuals' 
This principle was reiterated in Wainwright v Home Office 149 when the House of Lords 
rejected the claimant’s argument concerning the need for a general tort of privacy to fill the 
gap of absence of effective remedy to protect privacy based on the Human Rights Act 1998. 
It was also held that English law provides adequate protection for individuals from unwanted 
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intrusion into their private lives through having devised and upholding the equitable action 
of 'breach of confidence'150 because of governmental unwillingness to introduce direct 
privacy legislation, protection of privacy was judicially implemented via the equitable 
confidence action, utilizing a piecemeal and judicially dissatisfactory approach formulated in 
light of the European Court of Human Rights decisions. 151 In order to protect private 
information (privacy) under equitable action, three requirements had to be satisfied: firstly, 
the information must be confidential; secondly, it must be imparted in circumstances 
connoting an obligation to preserve confidentiality; and finally, it must be disclosed or 
otherwise used without authorization.  
B- Misuse of private information (MOPI)  
Privacy right in English jurisdiction involves two main components: confidentiality 
(secrecy) and intrusion. In Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd, 152 Tugendhat J explicated 
these respective concepts; the former refers to the unwanted access to private information 
whereas the latter to the unwanted intrusion into personal space. This bifocality underpinning 
privacy rights was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in PJS v MGN Ltd 153 when the majority 
of Lords agreed upon intrusion as forming a joint basis for privacy claims besides the pre-
established concept of confidentiality. Nonetheless, Moreham argued that the new action of 
misuse of private information focuses on only one of these aspects; MOPI protects the 
claimant from the unauthorised dissemination of private information or images 
(informational privacy). 154 She calls for recognising a separate cause of action which protects 
 
150 Ibid. [32]; Earl Spencer v United Kingdom 25 EHRR CD 105. 
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the individual from unwanted intrusion into their physical privacy, under which unauthorised 
watching, listening or recording become actionable in themselves. 155  
The focus of physical privacy actions relates to the deliberate and unauthorised 
watching, listening and recording of personal information, irrespective whether the 
information acquired in the course of such activities were disseminated. 156 The scope of 
protection of physical privacy only concerns the activities of a private nature or activities 
occurring in private places such as private residences or in bathrooms. Nevertheless, the 
protection might also cover serious physical intrusions committed within public places unless 
any such watching (spying), listening and recording activities are adjudged by the court to be 
necessary in the course of exposing wrongful behaviours. 157  
Informational privacy (MOPI) and physical privacy actions could conceivably coexist in 
respect of the unauthorised publication of intimate conversation obtained through phone 
hacking because the unauthorised publication triggers an informational privacy whereas the 
mere fact of phone hacking gives rise to a physical privacy. 158 Nonetheless, Moreham 
endorses the judicial extension of MOPI action to encompass both the informational and 
physical facets of privacy right citing Mann J’s recognition of three categories of interference 
with the right to privacy in Gulati v MGN Ltd: 159 wrongful listening (hacking), obtaining via 
private investigators and publication of private information. In this case, eight celebrities 
claimed that their privacy had been breached over years via phone interceptions conducted 
 
155 Ibid. 
156 Moreham, (n 141) 375. 
157 Nicole A. Moreham, ‘Privacy in public places’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 606. 
158 No question of a problematic overlap and double compensation once both actions are kept analytically 
distinct and independent, Moreham, (n 141) 377. 
159 [2015] EWHC 1482(Ch) [13]; Moreham, ‘Liability for listening: why phone hacking is an actionable breach of 
privacy’ (2015) 7 J. O. M. L. 155, 166. 
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by journalists employed by the defendants (Mirror, Sunday Mirror and People). 160 Mann J 
awarded damages under three heads: firstly, the fact of general hacking activities; secondly, 
the fact of obtaining private information by private investigators; and finally, the publication 
of private information obtained by wrongful hacking activities.161  
The new dimension of privacy protection in English law under MOPI involves 
observing, intercepting and recording private conversations, and domestic activities exposing 
private parts of the body unless such interferences serve a legitimate purpose in terms of 
exposing harmful or wrongful behaviours. 162 MOPI, therefore, protects those places, 
activities and information in respect of which an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
being kept private and free from intrusion. However, physical privacy is beyond the purpose 
of this study, which will focus only on informational privacy based on the unauthorised 
publication of private information since the publication is one of the defamation law’s core 
elements and eventually no overlap between defamation and privacy is conceivable in 
practical ruling without the dimension of publication. 163  
The stages of MOPI action were established within the landmark case of Campbell v 
MGN. 164 These consist of reasonable expectation of privacy test, and ultimate balance 
(proportionality) test. The failure of the first test identifying any reasonable expectation of 
 
160 Gulati, Ibid.  
161 Ibid. [12-3] 
162 Moreham, (n 159) 166-7; Moreham, (n 141) 377. 
163 It is instructive to indicate that many scholars emphasised on the capacity of MOPI to provide appropriate 
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privacy entails the end of action without taking into consideration the second test being 
conducted.165  
Reasonable expectation of privacy test 
In order to consider the defendant’s action as an infringement to the right to respect 
for private life based on Article 8 ECHR, the claimant must establish that their expectations 
around non-disclosure regarding the information were reasonable. This test represents what 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead identified in Campbell v MGN Ltd,166 as the touchstone of MOPI. 
The Court of Appeal in the landmark case of Campbell rejected the claim that disclosure of 
claimant treatment details and pictures of her leaving Narcotics Anonymous ‘would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities’. 167 The House of Lords, however, 
rejected the 'highly offensive' test on the grounds that such a test had no basis within 
Convention jurisprudence; instead, based on Article 8 jurisprudence, English courts should 
ask 'whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy'. 168 This is an objective test to determine whether and when 
information of a strictly personal nature relating to sexual, health, financial, family or 
domestic issues falls within the domain of reasonable privacy expectations. 169 The nature of 
the disclosed information plays a central role in the first stage of a privacy claim; the test of 
the reasonable expectation of privacy would often be engaged in the event of information in 
 
165 Higinbotham (formerly BWK) v Teekhungam [2018] EWHC 1880 (QB); [2018] 7 WLUK 507, in this case the 
high court upheld the striking out of a claim for misuse of private information, breach of confidence and breach 
of the Data Protection Act 1998; it was an abuse of process under the principle in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co 
because the claimant had no real prospect of success due to his failure to establish his reasonable expectation 
of privacy regarding a profile on the social media site "Facebook" revealed that the claimant had a second family, 
see para. [71]. 
166 (n 5) 
167 Campbell v MGN [2002] EWCA Civ 1373 [54-5]. 
168 Campbell, (n 5) [22], [21] and [94]. 
169 The Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB) [9]. 
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question dealing with health matters,170 personal and sexual relationships,171 and home-life. 
172 Successful engagement of this test is also connected to the form the information takes, 
such as photographs,173 text messages,174 personal opinions written in handwritten 
journals,175or a diary piece. 176  
Overall, the court, in order to determine whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, must take into consideration all the relevant circumstances. These include the 
claimant's attributes; the nature and the place of the engaged activity; the nature and the 
purpose of the publication or intrusion; the claimant's implicit or explicit non-authorisation; 
the effect of the intrusion on the claimant; the circumstances and the purposes allowing the 
publisher to have the information; the way and the form in which the information was stored 
and communicated; and the claimant’s courting of, or failure to court, publicity. 177 Based on 
the legal authorities of MOPI, Moreham identified seven categories of information or activity 
which most reasonable people would classify as private. 178 The first of these relates to 
matters concerning the physical body such as functional defects or nakedness. In Campbell v 
MGN, 179 the publication of covertly taken photographs depicting the claimant, together with 
details of drug addiction treatment, were held to constitute unjustified interference with a 
person's right to privacy. The second category concerns matter related to sexual life and 
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activity.  In Mosely v NGN, the defendant (a national newspaper) was held to have breached 
the claimant’s Article 8 ECHR rights 180 by having exposed the claimant Mosley’s 
sadomasochistic practices and other sexual activities conducted between Mosley and 
consenting adult females. The third category concerns personal relationship details. 181 The 
fourth category is relevant to the family or domestic intimacies. 182 The fifth relates to the 
suffering of grief or emotional pain. 183 The sixth is concerned with an individual's mind, its 
contents and states, for instance, emotions, fantasies or dreams. 184 The final category relates 
to the observation of an individual's daily life. 185 However, it should be noted that the mere 
correspondence to these categories does not technically qualify information for automatic 
classification as ‘private’; rather, this classification becomes operative in the event of the legal 
system ruling that exposure of the information in question would cause the individual to 
suffer embarrassment and humiliation.186 
Eric Barendt argues that the actual test for what constitutes a reasonable expectation 
of privacy –what he terms a 'ritual incantation' - is unnecessary, incoherent and redundant; 
the claimant's privacy rights under Article 8 ECHR are simply engaged when the information 
or activity in question is obviously private. 187 Barendt’s arguments are based upon evaluating 
the undesirable consequences of applying this test in English courts; he argues that this test 
cannot guarantee effective privacy rights protection for celebrities, even though their 
expectations to keep the private information were reasonable, on the basis that they have 
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demonstrably previously courted the media. 188 Furthermore, this test involves an elided 
presupposition that any claimant pursuing an action must have previously held some 
reasonable expectation of privacy even though circumstances dictate that certain claimants 
would not be in possession of any such expectation prior to privacy infringement; such lack 
relates to lack of formal capacity such as in the case of child claimants. 189 If the court depends 
on the parents’ expectations, as applied after Murray, to determine whether the child’s right 
to privacy was engaged, this could lead to unjustifiable denial of such rights simply on the 
grounds that the parents in question had courted publicity. 190 
This conclusion is not only bizarre but constitutes a very unattractive and artificial 
concept which allows carte blanche sacrifice of the child’s right to privacy on the grounds of 
parents’ previous conducts. 191 Moreover, and most problematically, a test for a reasonable 
expectation of privacy test involves a double counting of determining factors used which 
weakens the claimant’s expectation of privacy on one hand and strengthens the defendant’s 
freedom of expression on the other hand. 192 For example, both the attributes of the claimant 
and the purpose of the intrusion are factors listed within the Murray case for the purposes of 
determining what constitutes a reasonable basis for privacy expectations. However, both 
factors could be applied during the second stage of proportionality in order to assess the 
relative defendant's exercise of freedom of expression rights and whether these potentially 
 
188 Eric Barendt, ‘A reasonable expectation of privacy: A coherent or redundant concept? In Andrew T. Kenyon 
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superseding the claimant's right to privacy. In such circumstances, the exercise of free speech 
exercise would be adjudged to genuinely serve the public interest. 193 In addition, the actual 
test implies the existence of a real risk that the claimant’s right to privacy will be denied, 
subject to being unable to prove the reasonableness of their claim; this task might be 
adjudged particularly difficult in the context of an environment in which great media 
publishers operate, publishers who must advocate for expansive freedom of expression. 194 
Finally, this test might lead to the unstable and transient application of the law since the 
boundaries of private life are especially susceptible to speedy cultural and social change 
around matters such as homosexuality and bisexuality, whereby it is at the judge’s total 
discretion as to when analogous changes occur. 195 
Assessment of these arguments and the repercussions they detail leads Barendt 
towards abandoning the ‘ritual incantation’ test in favour of adopting an objective test of 
‘obviously private’ as applied in Strasbourg jurisprudence. This test allows us to decide 
whether the claimant’s right in Article 8 ECHR can be legitimately activated and whether the 
legislature is the best tool to decide and revise matters relating to privacy for the purposes of 
privacy tort.196 The rejection of the reasonable expectation test is reinforced by the 
comparison with reputation and freedom of expression rights protected within defamation 
law. The courts do not check whether the defamed individual has a reasonable expectation 
of protection for her reputation or whether the defendant has a reasonable expectation of 
exercising her freedom of expression. 197 This rejection might, in turn, open the floodgates for 
trivial claims to be brought in respect of publications describing celebrities' headaches or 
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heavy colds; nonetheless, trivial or anodyne claims could be easily avoided, as Barendt argues, 
through the imposition of a ‘non-triviality or seriousness’ requirement in order to establish 
the existence and degree of wrongful interference with privacy rights in the course of private 
information publications. 198 However, this requirement is a relevant factor which should not 
be applied along with the same principles as those tests for 'serious harm' within defamation 
law. This difference is decisive when determining whether the published information was 
defamatory for the purpose of libel law since the principle of privacy rights upon which this 
operates signifies that the individual must be able to secure this right, whether by an 
injunction or nominal damages, even though the revelation of her personal relationships or 
health information would unlikely cause serious harm. 199        
The ultimate balancing (proportionality) test 
If the claimant successfully passes the first stage test relating to the reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the court must balance the rights inherent in Articles 8 and 10 ECHR and decide 
which competing right outweighs the other. In other words, the court's judgement seeks to 
strike a balance between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression. 200 To 
strike such a balance, the court ought to weigh the public interest in maintaining confidence 
(privacy) against a countervailing public interest favouring disclosure (freedom of 
expression).201  As a counterpoint, it is germane to consider that the Strasbourg Court 
explicitly identified in Von Hanover (No. 1) a ‘contribution to a debate of public interest’ as 
the main factor in balancing the competing rights. 202 Other circumstantial factors could 
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strengthen the weight of cumulative privacy or free speech claims, such as 'the claimants 
were well known and the subject of the report' and matters relating to 'prior conduct of the 
person concerned'. 203 Therefore, the ‘public interest’ is the fundamental concept of the 
balancing process of rights in Article 8 and 10 ECHR. The defendant’s right to freedom of 
expression outweighs the claimant’s privacy right if the publication serves the public interest, 
whereas the latter right would be privileged if no public interest was served by the former’s 
publication. 204 Nonetheless, children occupy a special position within the balancing test 
because the principle of ‘in the child’s best interests’ has primacy even at the risk of adverse 
publicity due to their parents’ previous behaviours. 205 
It is established that political expression is due to stronger legal protection in comparison 
with, and superseding, rights to artistic and commercial speech. 206 In Von Hanover (No. 1), 
the Strasbourg Court decided that the unauthorized publication of daily life pictures infringed 
Princess Caroline’s right to privacy on the grounds that there existed no public interest 
grounds which would justify such interference in an individual’s private life right. 207 In ruling 
this way, the Strasbourg Court rejected broader potential interpretations of what constituted 
the public interest which might encompass information satisfying the curiosity of the public 
in relation to public figures who perform no official functions. 208 Political speech relating to 
politicians or political process could strengthen claims of freedom of expression in this 
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balancing stage. For instance, in Plon (Société) v France, 209 the Court held that the publication 
of sensitive information of politicians' health problems could be justified since there existed 
a discernible public interest in the disclosure of such information; that is, such revelations 
provide the public with an opportunity to discuss and determine the suitability of those 
politicians for taking up or continuing to perform public functions. The European Court thus 
found the permanent injunction, ordered by the domestic court to prohibit the publication of 
a book containing private information on the health of ex-president of France Mitterrand, to 
represent disproportionate interference with Article 10 ECHR. 210  
Through the subsequent cases of Von Hanover (No. 2) and Axel Springer, Strasbourg 
jurisprudence arrived at and provided more detailed criteria for performing this balancing test 
as detailed through. The former case concerned the publication of photographs showing 
Princess Caroline walking with her husband in the street during their skiing holiday; this 
photograph was published in an article about the regression of health of Monaco's Head of 
State. 211 The Strasbourg Court affirmed the contribution towards a debate over what 
constituted the general public interest which was made by: (a) the publication of these non-
offensive photos in question; and (b) the subsequent defence linking the photographs with of 
the Monaco Prince’s illness in order to publicly show how the members of royal family 
reconcile their familial duties and private life.212 The Court enlarged the notion of public 
figures to include those publicly well-known as clearly delineated from to those private 
 
209 (2006) 42 EHRR 36. 
210 Ibid.  
211 Von Hanover, (n 202) 
212 Ibid. [118]. 
54 
 
individuals who are publicly unknown and who may thus claim protection over their right to 
private life. 213  
The Strasbourg Court reaffirmed the criterion of a well-known individual as a justification to 
invade his private life within Axel Springer v Germany. 214 The case concerned publicity 
surrounding the public arrest of a famous television actor accused of possessing cocaine. The 
Court found that reporting criminal proceedings genuinely constituted a contribution towards 
a debate over the general interest. 215 In addition, the status of the subject of the publication 
has significant relevance in terms of strengthening claims over freedom of expression 
because: 216 
‘the applicant company’s interest in publishing the articles in question was solely due 
to the fact that X had committed an offence which, if it had been committed by a person 
unknown to the public, would probably never have been reported on’ 
Furthermore, the court indicated that the prior conduct of the person concerned should be 
taken into consideration when balancing the conflicting claims of articles 8 and 10 ECHR. 
Protection of private life may be reduced should the individual concerned have sought the 
limelight by revealing to the press details about her private life. 217 The Court also added the 
factors of obtaining the information and its veracity in balancing the weight of claims 
activated through article 10 ECHR versus the claims of a privacy protected under article 8 
ECHR. The court found the fact that the publisher was acting in good faith, and thereby 
provided accurate, reliable and precise information, should be taken into account when 
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balancing the conflicting rights. 218 In addition, the content, form and consequences of the 
publication were considered by the court in assessing the strength of the claims and which 
should be outweighed by the other in the process of adjudication. 219 Finally, the court 
considered the impact of sanctions imposed upon the exercise of freedom of expression and 
whether such sanctions potentially create a chilling effect on such rights220. The identification 
of these criteria was welcomed within the academic analysis and deemed a forward step in 
providing the domestic courts with detailed guidance for grappling with the task of 
guaranteeing proportionality within the process of balancing article 8 and 10 ECHR. 221 
The English HRA 1998 and domestic courts in pre-Campbell cases granted freedom of 
expression rights presumptive priority over other competing interests; in other words, privacy 
interests were interpreted as a restriction, contingently allowed, upon that freedom of 
expression necessary within a democratic society and safeguarded under Article 10 (2) 
ECHR.222   
In Campbell v MGN, the House of Lords expressly applied a new method predicated upon 
asserting and maintaining the equality of these competing rights; namely ‘the competition 
between freedom of expression and respect for an individual’s privacy. Both are vitally 
important rights. Neither has precedence over the other’. 223 In the landmark case of Naomi 
Campbell, the majority held that the defendant's publication of the claimant's medical 
treatment details and pictures of Campbell outside Narcotics Anonymous (NA) constituted a 
 
218 Ibid. [102-7] 
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221 Patrick O’Callaghan, ‘Article 8 ECHR as a general personality right? A commentary on Axel Springer AG v 
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granting injunctive reliefs; Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 609, 629 per Lord Steyn; Theakston v 
MGN Limited [2002] EWHC 137 (QB) [76-9]. 
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disproportionate interference with the claimant's right to privacy because, on one hand,  such 
publication added nothing of substance whilst on the other hand, the impact of such 
publication was sufficiently considerable because it could deter her from receiving the 
appropriate treatment. 224 Previous denials issued by the claimant about her drug 
consumption allowed for the legitimate publication of the basic fact that she was receiving 
treatment for such consumption; such interference was adjudicated to be proportionate 
since it prevented the public from being misled. 225  
The new approach of parallel analysis applied in the ultimate balancing test (proportionality 
test) between those rights inherent in Articles 8 and 10 ECHR was reaffirmed and clarified 
within the following four key principles laid out by Lord Steyn in Re S (A child). 226 English 
courts apply, consistently with the overall conventional principles underpinning the 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, such methodology in the balancing process to decide which 
right among privacy and freedom of expression should prevail. In other words, the decisive 
factor in assessing the strength of claims of privacy or freedom of expression is whether the 
public interest could be served by the disclosure of private information or by the concealing 
of such information. 227  
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2. 4: Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has provided an overview of the law around defamation and privacy, 
setting out the basic structures, tests, and minimal requirements of the traditional pleadings 
within defamation and MOPI causes of action. It has briefly elaborated on the main structure 
of defamation to explain the development, definition, and purpose of defamation. It has also 
considered the main elements of defamatory meaning, reference and publication that the 
claimant must prove for libellous action to proceed. The chapter has sought to shed light on 
the current legal presumptions of falsity, malice and reputational damage that assume 
paramount importance in the debate conducted within subsequent chapters.  In addition, the 
chapter has explored the development, structure of privacy protection in English law under 
the cause of action in MOPI. It has highlighted the main definitions of privacy within the 
literature, the differences between informational privacy (MOPI) and physical privacy, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, and the proportionality test. To conclude, this chapter 
has confirmed the scope of the overlap between defamation and MOPI, concluding that both 
the slander and physical privacy are excluded from the scope of this study because there are 
no common factors between them to raise the overlap. The verbal utterance of defamatory 
and private information is actionable in defamation law, but it is still not actionable under 
MOPI action. Consequently, it may be concluded that only libel and informational privacy may 
trigger an overlap since such types involve unauthorised dissemination of defamatory and 
private information. Accordingly, the elaboration of libel and informational privacy made in 
this chapter provides a crucial background to facilitate the task of the next chapter which 





























Chapter 3: Mapping the overlap and theoretical framework  
3. 1. Introduction 
 
This chapter maps the conceptual and substantive overlap between defamation and 
privacy. This is achieved, in the first part of the chapter, via the exploration of the relationship 
between private life and reputation, as protected interests in defamation and privacy. Firstly, 
this study examines the theoretical accounts explaining the relationship between private life 
and reputation; and how both interests conceptually interact. In this regard, the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) may provide an essential 
ground to elucidate the relationship between the concepts of reputation and private life. 
Following this, the author attempts to conceptualise the overlap between defamation and 
privacy in the English jurisdiction by providing a clarification of the conceptual and 
materialistic overlap between the torts of defamation and privacy. Having identified and 
conceptualised the overlap on which this study is grounded, this chapter proceeds to provide 
the theoretical framework against which the research questions of this thesis are tested. The 
objective of this section is to briefly explore the accounts of the coherence of law, efficiency, 
feminist analysis, access to justice, the rule of election and distributive justice. In so doing, 
the chapter introduces the theoretical foundations on which this dissertation is based. 
3. 2: The overlap between defamation and privacy 
 
As explained above, this section aims to map the overlap between defamation and 
privacy. Such overlap is not simply caused by a single set of facts which may give rise the 
actions of defamation and privacy, but it is a matter of conceptual overlap between the 
protected interests of such torts. The plan of this section starts with elaborating the 
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relationship between the privacy and reputation from the theoretical and practical 
perspectives before elucidating the overlap in the English law.   
A- The theoretical/conceptual foundations of the relationship between the interests of 
reputation and privacy  
The literature of the tort law offers three correlated accounts to conceptualise the interacting 
relationship between private life and reputation. Robert Post, who observes the link between 
reputation/dignity, offers the first account. David Howarth suggests an alternative account of 
the reputation as sociality which may consequently undermine the interest of private life if 
the social ties were broken. 228 Patrick O’Callaghan proposes the third account articulated in 
terms of the general personality right.229 These accounts provide conceptual grounds to 
encompass the reputational harms within the scope of private life. This conceptualisation is 
crucial to understand and elucidate the development of English torts of defamation and 
privacy.  
Dignity account 
Dignity, in the British legal context, constitutes one of the fundamental values 
underpinning the social order besides the democracy and the rule of law. 230 On such basis, 
Dieter Grimm argues that dignity is an absolute value existing within every right; in other 
words, every right consists of a core principle constituting ‘dignity’ in the abstract along with 
a more concrete basic right. 231 Hence, freedom of expression and privacy rights both contain 
principles of dignity. It follows, then, that in cases of conflict between two dignity-related 
rights, the principle of proportionality should be applied to adjudge which dignitary core 
 
228 David Howarth,’ Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74 MLR 845; Aplin & Bosland, (n 6) 266. 
229 O’Callaghan, (n 221). 
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principle more closely matches the needs of the law; such a right will, therefore, enjoy higher 
weight in the balancing process. 232 The key reasons of classifying privacy as a dignitary tort 
refer to the fundamental rationale of recognizing the right to privacy because the 
unauthorized publication of private information represents an affront to human dignity and 
autonomy. 233  
The dignity account provides a conceptual foundation to interpret the relationship 
between privacy and reputation. Dignity is one of the justifications to include reputational 
interest within ‘private life’ under the law because it constitutes the core principle 
underpinning the reputation and private life interests. Robert Post offers a convincing 
empirical account of the inextricable links between reputation and dignity.234 Post observes 
that the interdependence between the private and public aspect of the self might be 
paradoxical; namely, the connection between individual dignity, which is an intrinsically 
private, becomes conflated with individual reputation, which is an essentially dialogic, social 
and public issue. Post utilizes those frameworks detailing the interdependence of individual 
personality and general social perspectives originated by scholars working within the school 
of classical American sociology, i.e. Charles H. Cooley, George Herbert Mead and Erving 
Goffman. 235  
In this sociological context, dignity signifies the respect and self-respect arising from 
full membership within the society; such dignity can only be confirmed through 
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demonstrations of that respect based within the rules of civility. Rules of civility here entail 
interactions between the concepts of ‘deference’ 236 and ‘demeanour’.237 Goffman argues 
that rules of civility constitute the bindings of society, which restrain both the actor and the 
recipient; based on these rules, individuals not only confirm the social order, but they also 
constitute ritually-derived aspects of their own identity. 238 Thus, our own sense of intrinsic 
self-worth, stored in our private personality, is constantly dependent upon ceremonial 
observance of civility’s rules; furthermore, if any social ceremonial transaction suddenly 
fractures, a person’s dignity is consequently affected since each ‘individual must rely on 
others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain 
parts’. 239  
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott argue that the dignity-account, placed in conjunction 
with the concept of psychological integrity, could operate as an effective justification to frame 
protection of reputation within private-life rights. Their psychological integrity account is 
based upon the paradigm of a ‘looking glass self’ formulated by the sociologist Charles Cooley. 
240 This paradigm suggested that our judgments of self-worth or self-esteem largely depend 
upon the perceived levels of esteem and respect held by others towards us. On this basis, the 
rights of Article 8 ECHR would be undermined if the defamatory allegations affect the 
claimant’s capacity to be engaged in the society because the individual’s personal dignity and 
psychological integrity are interconnected and interdependent concepts. 241 This means that 
 
236 Rules of deference define the conduct by which a person conveys appreciation "to a recipient of this recipient, 
or of something of which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent’ See: Ibid. 709. 
237 Rules of demeanour define the conduct by which a person expresses ‘to those in his immediate presence that 
he is a person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities’ See: Ibid. 
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reputational harms caused by allegations related to the individual’s financial or professional 
status should not undermine the individual private life under Article 8 ECHR because such 
harms adversely affect the individual’s reputation classified as property or quasi-property. 242 
However, the exclusion of professional reputation from the scope of private life would be 
untenable because financial information is highly private information and it may likely attract 
a considerable degree of privacy. 243 
Sociality account 
The second conceptual account that incorporates reputation within the remit of 
private life rights is the sociality account of reputation proposed by David Howarth. Howarth 
highlights that a sociality-based account offers a conceptual basis for including the 
reputational interest within the protective scope of private life under Article 8 ECHR that 
intends to ensure the development of the individual’s personality in her relations with other 
individuals. 244 The pain of social rejection caused by the breaking of social ties (loss of 
sociality) constitutes an objective harm to the individual’s integrity, especially when such 
social bonds consist of strong ties. 245  
‘Assertions that someone is diseased and allegations of violent or sexual crime 
especially crimes against family members, are examples of accusations likely to produce 
disgust and revulsion reactions that would constitute a threat even to strong ties.’ 246 
The reputational harms, therefore, may entail damage to human abilities regarding 
the formation and maintenance of social linkages. Such harms consequently have detrimental 
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effects upon not only opportunities to access resources, but also personal well-being. 247 The 
sociality account provides strong theoretical ground for protecting the integral social bonds 
within the scope of private life. 248 Horwath links loss of reputation and loss of privacy by 
saying: ‘The loss of reputation brings with it the pain of the threat of social isolation and 
rejection. Actual social isolation and rejection, in turn, constitute further harm to something 
fundamental in human life.’ 249 It is interesting to indicate that the sociality account concurs 
with the proposition advanced by Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott that, given the defamatory 
allegations effect upon individuals’ capacities to engage within society on the grounds that 
the individual’s reputation forms part of her psychological integrity, such effects undermine 
private life rights contained in Article 8 ECHR.250   
General personality right account  
According to this account, the Article 8 ECHR represents a multifaceted and 
overlapping right of general personality that, among other things, encompasses privacy, 
reputation, informational self-determination; and one’s own image rights. 251 O’Callaghan’s 
conceptual account of general personality right is grounded within the Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany which states that ‘everyone has the right to free development 
of his/her personality, insofar as s/he does not infringe the rights of others or offends the 
constitutional order or moral law’. 252 
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The right to reputation (honour) in Germany has twofold aspects: firstly, the internal 
aspect, related to self-esteem and human dignity, representing the core of the right to 
personality; secondly, the external aspect relating to evaluations which constitute the 
professional reputation of public figures such as politicians. 253 Based upon this divide, and 
the principle of inviolability of human dignity constituting personality rights within German 
Law, tarnishing of an individual represents dignitary harm requiring redress. 254 Conversely, 
priority would be given to free speech rights when external aspects of reputation are at stake 
and the subject matter of publication pertains to issues of public interest. An exception to this 
would be when the speech amounts to abusive criticism resulting in egregious harm to 
reputation. 255  
It is unquestionable that all these three conceptual accounts of dignity, general 
personality and sociality may provide convincing grounds to justify the inclusion of reputation 
within private life. However, such accounts were a subject of criticism from various 
perspectives. The sociality account also faces the challenge of uncertainty of the scope of 
social bonds that may undermine an individual’s private life because it is uncertain whether 
social relationship of weaker ties such as work relationships, if broken, may affect one’s 
private life. 256 However, such a criticism may not deny the capacity of sociality rationale to 
explain how damage to reputation undermining our social bonds such as family and friends 
may result in a forced isolation which consequently undermines the right of private life.  
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Christopher McCrudden argues that the use of the dignity-justification might not 
necessarily provide a principled and coherent ground for judicial reasonings in the context of 
human rights because the meaning of dignity is largely context-specific, and it varies across 
time even within the same jurisdiction. 257 Moreover, dignity as an overarching value might 
not constitute a solid basis for defining rights; dignity alongside with autonomy and 
democracy are values indirectly protected through the enforcement of many rights. 258 In 
addition, the 'looking-glass self' concept upon which Mullis and Scott built their account, 
however, tends to merge the self-esteem concept that refers to the idea of thinking of oneself 
as valuable and important, with the self-concept which refers to a person's psychologically 
unified picture of themselves regardless whether such a unified self is framed as positive or 
negative. 259 For David Howarth, it is unwise to build reputational harms on the grounds of 
self-esteem since it is far from clear whether this concept could be recognized as a good that 
may be potentially undermined and consequently deserving of legal protection.260 
Furthermore, it might be, practically speaking, somewhat tendentious to claim that 
individuals’ self-esteem strictly depends on others’ evaluations – viewed empirically the 
average adult’s conception of themselves predominates over what others, especially those 
outside of the trusted kinship circles, think of them. 261 Nonetheless, the dignity account was 
endorsed by many scholars due to its solid ground emphasizing that defamation and privacy 
are dignitary torts which may undermine the individual self-esteem. 262 The uncertainty in the 
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psychological literature in respect of the concept of self-esteem cannot convincingly assume 
it is valueless. 263 Furthermore, the ‘looking glass self’ theory should not be entirely dismissed 
not only because Post's 'looking glass' was built upon a strong sociological ground, but also 
because there is no robust evidence precluding entirely the possible influence of external 
evaluations of others upon our internal evaluations. An individual’s well-being could be 
significantly damaged because of the lost opportunities caused by a lack of capacity to form 
meaningful relationships. 264  
It is unsurprising that an individual’s reputational aspect may be said to fall within the 
scope of private life, since such reputation constitutes part of the individual’s personality 
protected by that very right. Nonetheless, the main challenge around applying general 
personality rights is how to draw a distinctive line between the internal and external aspects 
when the aggrieved individual feels both aspects are simultaneously breached. In other 
words, if reputation and private life are subsumed under the personality right, it is wondered 
whether every reputational harm may undermine one’s private life, and similarly every 
breach of private life may also cause a harm to reputation. 265 The Strasbourg Court may 
provide a guideline to this inquiry. 266 The European Court used seriousness test to determine 
when the reputational harms should be included within the remit of private life. 267 In Petrina 
v Romania, Strasbourg Court held that the accusations against the applicant (a politician), that 
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held him to be an agent of the Securitate,268 were seriously grave, and capable of meeting the 
necessary threshold to trigger the rights of article 8 ECHR. 269  
This guideline, however, may not provide a comprehensive explanation of the 
relationship between reputation and privacy because only the allegations which meet the 
seriousness level may fall within the remit of private life. Furthermore, it provides no 
elucidation of whether privacy harms can encompass the harm of reputation.  Tanya Aplin 
and Jason Bosland offer an interesting answer explaining the nature of the relationship 
between reputation and privacy and how both interests may overlap. Aplin and Bosland argue 
that reputational harms may engage Article 8 rights if the defamatory imputations are related 
to one of the private or sensitive information such as sexual, medical, financial and extra-
marital affairs. 270 In such a scenario, the interests of reputation and privacy are inextricably 
interconnected that a set of false, private and defamatory facts may simultaneously bring the 
actions of defamation and MOPI.  
B- The relationship between privacy and reputation in Strasbourg’s jurisprudence 
 
The earliest interpretation by the Strasbourg court of reputation as a dimension of the 
right to privacy within Article 8 ECHR dates back to 2004. There, the applicant (a radio station), 
brought a case to the Strasbourg Court which argued that the French courts had breached 
articles 6, 7 and 10 ECHR when ruling against the applicant in defamation proceedings. These 
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concerned allegations made by the station about M Junot, a former deputy mayor of Paris, 
who had supervised the deportation of Jews in 1942. 271 The European Court upheld the 
French domestic decision, also stating that: 'The Court would observe that the right to 
protection of one's reputation is, of course, one of the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the 
Convention, as one element of the right to respect for private life’. 272 In Lindon and Others v 
France, 273 Mr L. Loucaides strongly reaffirmed this interpretation of the relationship between 
reputation and private life right. 
 ‘The right to reputation should always were considered as safeguarded by 
Article 8 of the Convention, as part and parcel of the right to respect for one's private 
life’  
In Pfeifer v Austria, 274 the link between reputation and private life was predicated 
upon the implications of reputational harm for both the personal identity and the individual's 
physical and psychological integrity. Each of these constitutes aspects of private life, the right 
to which is guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. In this case, the European Court found that the 
allegations in question, namely that the applicant was part of a hunting society and that the 
applicant's criticism of P.'s article had driven P. to commit suicide, were defamatory and 
justified the invocation of Article 8 ECHR rights since: 
The Court considers that a person's reputation, even if that person is criticized 
in the context of public debate, forms part of his or her personal identity and 
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psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the scope of his or her "private 
life"' 275 
Despite Mr. Loucaides’s disagreement with the finding of defamation concerning the 
allegations in question, his justice thoroughly supported the interpretation of the scope of 
private life to include an individual’s reputational interest. The court, however, did not 
provide further explanations regarding the link between reputational harms and dignity, as 
well as between dignity and those rights to personal identity, physical and psychological 
integrity, which constitute ‘private life’. 276 This stemmed, perhaps, from the judicial 
willingness to treat reputation as a direct and automatic aspect of a person’s private life, ergo 
there being no need to identify the link between these two notions. 277  Nonetheless, in 
subsequent cases, the Strasbourg Court denied any automatic inclusion of reputation within 
the protective ambit of Article 8 ECHR when it introduced and upheld a new threshold of the 
seriousness of reputational harm in order to engage the right of private life. This threshold 
was firstly applied in A v. Norway ,278 there, the European Court ruled that the reputational 
harm must be serious and cause damage to the individual enjoyment of the right to private 
life, namely it must be sufficiently grave for it to legitimately fall within the ambit of private 
life. The Court upheld the application and found that the publication’s identification of the 
applicant as a murder suspect was seriously harmful to the applicant’s reputation and 
‘entailed a particularly grievous prejudice to the applicant’s honour and reputation that was 
especially harmful to his moral and psychological integrity and to his private life’. 279 
Furthermore, the court found the national court failed to accord a proportionate or proper 
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weight to the applicant’s Article 8 ECHR. 280 In Karako v. Hungary, the European Court offered 
clear guidance on the relationship between reputation and privacy since the Court identified 
how reputational harms could fall within the protective scope of private life rights. 281 The 
Court distinguished in this case between personal integrity falling within the ambit of private 
life and the notion of external evaluation falling within the individual’s reputation as it related 
to financial interests and social status. Thus, reputational harms which only affect the external 
evaluations of the individual, namely her esteem as upheld by society, and do not undermine 
the individual’s personal integrity are thereby excluded from the protective scope of private 
life. 282 The Court also reiterated that the serious nature of the allegations in question 
constituted the decisive factor when determining whether the individual's personal integrity 
was indeed undermined for the purposes of engaging Article 8 ECHR. 283  
Reputation claims may fall within the framework of Article 8 ECHR if the statements 
complained of were seriously offensive that damage an individual’s personal integrity, 
whereas reputational claims related primarily to financial interests or social status fall within 
the framework of Article 10 ECHR. 284 However, in a practical sense, nothing in Karako's 
decision explains how serious allegations could affect personal integrity in a manner justifying 
the inclusion of reputation within the ambit of private life. 285 It is on these grounds that Judge 
Jociene articulated his view that the question of that relationship between reputation and 
private life had not been clearly answered within the Strasbourg Jurisprudence. Jociene thus 
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asserted that this matter should be the subject of careful future consideration and ought to 
be left open for the time being. 286  
The Grand Chamber had the opportunity to clarify its jurisprudence regarding the 
relationship between reputation and private life notion in Axel Springer AG v. Germany. 287 
The applicant, in this case, was 'Der Bild, one of Germany’s leading newspapers, in respect of 
two articles published about the star of the well-known police television series who was 
arrested and then convicted of possessing a small quantity of drugs (cocaine). The domestic 
Courts granted the actor a permanent injunction prohibiting the applicant from engaging in 
any further publications upon the ground that such publication constituted a serious and 
unjustified interference with the actor’s right of personality. The Court upheld the application 
and considered the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression as unjustifiable 
within a democratic society; consequently, the applicant’s article 10 ECHR was held to be 
unjustifiably violated. 288 The Court reaffirmed the seriousness threshold applied in A v. 
Norway to accommodate reputation within the ambit of private life as protected under Article 
8 ECHR.  
Whilst adopting the expanded definition of the private life concept, 289 the court also 
added a new qualification to explicitly exclude those reputational harms foreseeably resulting 
from the applicant’s own actions: ‘The Court held, moreover, that Article 8 cannot be relied 
on in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s 
 
286 Karako v. Hungary, ibid. Opinion of Judge Jociene [7]. 
287 (n 5) [18-23]. 
288 Ibid. at 110-111. 
289 The concept of "private life" is a broad term not susceptible to the exhaustive definition, which covers the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person and can, therefore, embrace multiple aspects of a person's 
identity, such as gender identification and sexual orientation, name or elements relating to a person's right to 
their image. It covers personal information that individuals can legitimately expect should not be published 
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own actions such as, for example, the commission of a criminal offence’. 290 Additionally, the 
European Court’s recent decision in Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary added a new qualification 
codifying reputation within the remit of private life. 291 Professional reputation had hitherto 
been excluded from the ambit of private life, despite the clear potential seriousness of 
reputational harms, since it was foreseeable and legitimate that public figures such as 
politicians would receive further criticism and close scrutiny than private individuals.  
Overall, despite the blurred boundaries between the notions of reputation and private 
life, the European Court adopted a progressive approach to accommodating reputation 
interest within this area. Their ruling accommodated reputational interests within the 
protective scope of private life where reputational harms measurably affect the enjoyment 
of the right to this private life. As previously elucidated, detrimental impacts upon the 
individual's personal identity and her physical and psychological integrity caused by 
reputation harms also clearly come under the same category of violations against 'private 
life'.  
C- The overlap between defamation and privacy in the English law 
 
Based on the inextricably conceptual relationship between the reputation and private 
life, such overlapped interests could be alternatively, but indirectly, protected under both 
libel and MOPI cause of action. Defamation law was developed to protect against those 
imputations related to personal attributes that are not only grounded in reputational injuries 
but also in transgressing the claimant’s privacy. 292 False privacy, or false private information, 
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brings the overlap between defamation and privacy from merely a conceptually unavoidable 
interaction to a problematic materialistic overlap. This section goes on to explain how both 
torts materially overlap within the English jurisdiction. The role of defamation law in 
protecting the individual’s privacy and the role of privacy law to protect the individual’s 
reputation is consecutively examined. The final sub-section examines the area of false privacy 
that constitutes this dissertation’s main research topic.  
The protection of privacy under defamation law  
 
In order to determine the meaning of imputations, defamation law developed three 
tests. An imputation is deemed defamatory if: the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the 
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, 293 the imputation exposes the 
claimant to hatred, ridicule, or contempt because of some moral discredit, 294 or it is liable to 
make the claimant shunned and avoided. 295 The claimant is thus entitled to protect her 
tarnished reputation once the (presumably false) published statement corresponds to one of 
the above criteria by bringing defamation proceedings. 296 However, it is arguable that the 
foundational principle underpinning the tests for ridicule and avoidance respectively is the 
claimant's privacy or dignity rather than their reputation. 297  
Publications exposing individuals to ridicule are defamatory since they diminish their 
sense of self. 298 Arguably, the harm caused by such publications constitutes a dignitary injury, 
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295 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934), 50 T.L.R. 581, 58 
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or injury to the individual’s self-esteem, and thus undermine privacy rather than reputation. 
Extending this line to its logical conclusion it would arguably be inappropriate to use the 
defamation law, traditionally designed to protect reputational interest, when protecting and 
vindicating the right to privacy. 299 By applying the same procedure to the test of shunning 
and avoiding, a similar outcome could be derived from it. In such a scenario, the individual 
subject to imputations of insanity and shameful diseases does not bear the burden of moral 
responsibility and thus such imputations, in fact, violate the applicant's privacy instead of her 
reputation. 300  The absence of direct protection to the right to privacy within English law-
prior to the landmark case of Campbell- has been used to justify the figurative inclusion of 
non-reputational considerations (privacy) into the realm of defamation. 301 Furthermore, 
protecting privacy under defamation law could result in unjust consequences for the claimant 
and would be significantly inconsistent with that principle of the right of privacy because in 
the course of the exercising truth defence, the individual's private information is rendered 
publicly accessible since truth constitutes a complete defence in defamation. 302  
Tugendhat J recognised the occasional protection of privacy within the realm of 
defamation in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd. 303  There, his justice recognised that 
(personal) defamation triggered by imputations to individuals of personal, involuntary 
attributes which in themselves attract no moral discredit (such as shameful diseases) 'are now 
 
299 Ibid. 156; Descheemaeker, Ibid.  
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likely to be brought under the misuse of private information, although that will not necessarily 
or always be the case'. 304 Nevertheless, his justice did not deny the reputational harms 
caused by personal defamation since such statements invariably affect ‘in an adverse manner 
the attitude of other people towards [the applicant]’. 305 This case indicates, alongside with 
Strasbourg’s jurisprudential attitude, the conceptual and material interaction (overlap) 
between reputation and privacy, that protect the latter within the former proceedings, and 
opens also, as we explain below, the door to protect reputational harm within privacy law in 
English jurisdiction. 
The protection of reputation under privacy law 
 
As explained previously, MOPI may be utilized as a means of protecting the individual's 
reputation, in addition to what is commonly understood as privacy, precisely because 
reputational harms can be included within the scope of privacy's realm. The first judicial 
recognition of reputational harms within a privacy case occurred in Hannon v NGN 306 when 
Mann J refused the defendant’s argument that defamation law should only protect damage 
to reputation. The judge refused to draw a hard line between the realm of privacy and 
reputation on the grounds that there would almost certainly be some reputational harms 
caused by a clear invasion of privacy, whilst such reputational harms cannot be adequately 
protected under defamation law due to the availability of truth as a complete defence. 307 
Mann J used the example of a publication revealing medical records, the nature of which 
caused embarrassment to the applicant, where no dimension of public interest lay within such 
disclosure. Such publication, in respect of details the claimant had reasonably to be kept 
 
304 Ibid. [35]. 
305 Ibid. [29 & 35}. 
306 [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch) 
307 Ibid. [29]. 
77 
 
private, constitutes a clear invasion of privacy and causes damage to the individual’s 
reputation. 308  
It would be instructive to consider here Tugendhat J's distinction between personal 
and business defamation. Personal defamation caused by imputations of specific personal 
and involuntary attribute attracting no moral discredit, such as shameful disease, is likely to 
be brought under privacy law (MOPI) on the grounds that the domain of health information 
falls primarily within the right to privacy. 309 Both Tugendhat J and Mann J thus utilize the 
same example but approach it from parallax points. Tugendhat J focused on the defamation 
of the person caused by the publication of medical records whereas Mann J focused upon the 
breach of privacy caused by such publication. It is clear to say that such publication could 
simultaneously cause damage to the individual's privacy and reputation interests. Based on 
this reasoning, Mann J's conclusion that reputational harms could be caused by privacy 
invasion is logically sound because empirically verifiable damage to reputation could be 
caused by publishing personal information (medical information). Eric Barendt displayed 
scepticism about the authoritative ruling of Hannon v NGN regarding the capacity of privacy 
law to protect reputational harms because Mann J's decision was made regarding the 
defendant's application to strike out the actions at a preliminary stage rather than a full 
trial.310 Nonetheless, this argument may not substantively challenge Mann J’s overarching 
conclusion that damage to reputation could be one of the elements subsumed under 
damages awarded in privacy law, and hence that the claimant should be free to instigate 
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defamation proceedings, privacy proceedings, or both actions where an overlap between 
defamation and privacy exists. 311  
Four years later, in August 2014, Mann J had another opportunity to reinstate his 
position towards the relationship between privacy and reputation, this time at a full trial. 
Mann, J found the leading broadcasting channel BBC liable for invasion of Sir Cliff Richard's 
right to privacy in respect of the defendant's coverage of the raid of police over the claimant’s 
house. 312 Mann J awarded the claimant £210,000 in general damages (£190,000 in 
compensatory damages, and £20,000 in aggravated damages) relating to the invasion of 
privacy. 313 The loss of the claimant’s reputation constituted one of the factors based upon 
which damages were assessed; others included distress, damage to dignity, damage to health, 
and loss of control over the use of private information. 314 Mann J rejected the defendant’s 
argument that reputational harms fall solely within the province of defamation since ‘it is 
therefore quite plain that the protection of reputation is part of the function of the law of 
privacy as well the function of the law of defamation’. 315 Controversy emerged among 
scholars in respect of Mann J’s stance towards the relationship between privacy and 
reputation despite such approach is potentially reconcilable with Strasbourg approach. 316 
Hence, Paul Wragg argues that conflating reputational concerns with privacy harms in order 
to remedy the perceived deficiencies in defamation law would result in egregious chilling 
effects on press freedom because it could be deprived from the protection offered under 
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defences in defamation law. 317 This view, however, may be unjustified because both privacy 
and reputation are aspects protected under Article 8 ECHR that should be equally treated and 
valued with the conflicting freedom of expression protected under Article 10 ECHR. 318 
Freedom of expression should not have free licence over reputational interest and a 
reconsideration of the truth defence may be needed in light of Strasbourg’s jurisprudence on 
Article 8 ECHR. 319 Furthermore, Mann J’s approach is endorsed by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd. 320  In this case, the Supreme Court ruled 
that reputational harms could be subsumed within the harms protected in privacy law 
because the concept of privacy has a wider capacity to subsume reputational interest. 321  
False privacy (false private information)  
 
In what represented a key development in privacy law, judicial recognition of what is 
called false privacy exposed potential difficulties relating to the interactions between the 
defamation and privacy torts. The concept of false privacy refers to claims in which the 
claimant reveals the falsity of the private information or refuses to comment on its truth or 
falsity.322 In the English jurisdiction, it is well established that the dichotomy of truth and 
falsehood constitutes an irrelevant issue under privacy law. Once the information is formally 
private, it could be protected under privacy law (MOPI) regardless whether it is true, false or 
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mixed information. 323 In McKennitt v Ash, 324 the court decisively included the issue of falsity 
within the scope of MOPI. In this case, the claimant Loreena McKennitt, a known folk musician 
from Canada, claimed that the first defendant Niema Ash, the claimant’s ex-friend, had 
published a book containing personal and confidential information. This included details 
about the claimant’s personal and sexual relationships, her personal feelings towards a 
deceased fiancé, her health, and her diet. The claimant argued that publication of these 
details constituted a breach to her privacy and confidence, and she sought a declaration to 
this end along with an injunction and damages. 325 The court’s initial ruling found that the 
claimant had a reasonable expectation to keep this information private and confidential. It 
thus ordered an injunction to restrict further publications of the same or similar information 
and awarded the claimant damages for her hurt feelings and distress. 326 The Court of Appeal 
upheld the initial judgement and dismissed the defendant’s appeal. 327 The Court rejected the 
defendant’s argument, namely that privacy claims should not be brought regarding false 
statements, on the grounds that falsity should fall within the field of defamation law. When 
determining the scope of MOPI Longmore LJ emphasised that truth or falsity are irrelevant 
concepts.328 
The judicial affirmative approach towards false private information was also 
reaffirmed in P v. Quigley. 329  In this case, the defendant, Mark Quigley was permanently 
restricted from publishing any information related to the claimants’ sexual and private 
conducts, behaviours, thoughts or desires within the defendant’s new novel in which the 
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claimant appears disguised. Eady J found that publication of sexual activities, regardless of 
their truth or falsity, could be harmful and thus constitute an unacceptable infringement of 
the claimant's rights under Article 8 ECHR. 330 In Cooper v Turrell,331 Tugendhat J also 
reiterated the same approach and decided that under MOPI the unauthorised publication of 
private information may breach an individual's privacy, irrespective whether the information 
was true, false or mixed. In this case, the claimants, a public company and its executive 
chairman Mr Cooper, successfully sought an injunction, delivery up and damages through 
three related actions of libel, breach of confidence and MOPI. As far as MOPI was concerned, 
Tugendhat LJ decided that the claimant, Mr Cooper, was entitled to damages once his privacy 
rights had been invaded by the unlicensed dissemination of his private information. This 
violation applied whether the private information could be verified as being completely or 
partly true or false. 332  
Such an expansive approach to privacy is consistent with the justification of privacy 
protection seeking to protect the individual dignity, autonomy and control of individuals’ 
private information. 333 Judged within in the context of confidentiality and privacy, it is 
apparent that falsity should not constitute an obstacle to the protection of information once 
it is related to personal and private life. Dignitary interests can still be injuriously affected by 
disseminating false information. 334 The core purpose of privacy rights is to protect the 
claimant’s right to control the disclosure of her private information, namely the ability to 
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decide whether, when and to whom such information ought to be revealed. 335  Such an ability 
is logically affected by unauthorised disclosures of private information, regardless of whether 
the disclosed information is true or false. Furthermore, privacy can be breached by disclosing 
false private information because the truth is technically not a defence in privacy action. The 
nub of privacy lies within its protection of information's intrinsically private nature; hence, its 
truth or falsity has no valence within the realm of privacy. 336  
Such a judicially-driven development, however, situated the defamation and privacy 
torts in conflict with each other since the former operates on the dichotomy of truth and 
falsity. 337 False, private and defamatory information could be protected not only by 
defamation law, but also now by privacy (MOPI). Conversely, true information, if private, may 
be protected by privacy law; but not by defamation law, since there is no legal wrong in telling 
the truth about an individual. 338 The capacity of privacy law to protect false private 
information was an expropriating manoeuvre by MOPI, upon the territory of defamation. 339 
This thesis, however, endorses this development and argues that the dichotomy of 
truth/falsity may not prevent the occurrence of the overlap between defamation and privacy 
torts since their protected interests, reputation and privacy, are conceptually intertwined.  
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3. 3: The theoretical framework   
This section explores the theoretical framework based upon which the research 
questions of this thesis are analysed. It encompasses a variety of perspectives that may enrich 
the analysis of the overlap and it impact on defences, interim injunction and damages. 
A- The quest for Coherence of law 
Coherence enjoys a great value because it assumes undeniable importance within all 
fields of knowledge since coherence entails being intelligible, logical, well interconnected and 
well expressed; conversely, lack of coherence leads to unintelligibility and disarticulation.340 
Ronald Dworkin argues that the lack of coherence resulting from inconsistency rationales 
within the legal system, would affect its moral authority or legitimacy. 341 As highlighted by 
Dworkin, the coherence of the legal system may also lead to the achievement of valuable 
targets such as equality, legal certainty (predictability) and obeying the law. 342 Coherence 
depends upon whether the law attains a supportive structure; this includes strong support 
between statements, connections between supportive chains, reciprocal justification 
between statements, and conceptual cross-connections. 343 Joseph Raz describes coherence 
as a systematic or uniform account of mutually supportive and interdependent principles, 
resulting in a systematic interconnection of all parts. 344 Schiavello concurs with Raz regarding 
the structural view of coherence; he argues that the concept refers to harmonization between 
the fundamental principles of the legal system and the judicial decisions. 345 Ken Kress 
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341 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 166; John McGarry, ‘The possibility and value 
of coherence’ (2013) 34 Liverpool Law Rev. 17, 21. 
342 McGarry, ibid. p. 23-25. 
343 Raimo Siltala, Law, Truth, and Reason: A Treatise on Legal Argumentation (springer 2011) 58; Aleksander 
Peczenik and Robert Alexey, ‘The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality’ cited in 
Siltala, 56-57. 
344 Raz, (n 340) 293, 315. 
345 Aldo Schiavello,’ On ``Coherence '' and ``Law'': An Analysis of Different Models’ [2001] 14 Ratio Juris 233,237 
84 
 
identifies three issues required to determine coherence, comprised of consistency, monism 
and internal unity. 346 Firstly, consistency means the absence of internal contradiction or 
logical dissonance between norms and judicial decisions of the legal system. 347 This broadly 
means that legal rules can be considered coherent when free from contradiction. For 
example, rules related to one legal system should not impose different outcomes regarding 
one set of facts. 348 Inconsistencies, in practice, are recommended to achieve coherence in 
the long run, since gradually solving these inconsistencies is better than forcing consistencies 
through hoc solutions. 349 Secondly, the concept of monism has three versions of monism: 
strict, moderate and non-master principle monism. 350 Finally, unity or internal architecture 
means that the strength of connections between principles conceivably reflects degrees of 
coherence. Thus, if the abandonment of a principle(s) entails relinquishment of all other 
principles, this suggests strong internal interdependency and consequently strong 
coherence.351 
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The argument behind excluding protection of false information from the scope of 
privacy thus rests upon retention of the global coherence of legal system. 352 According to 
such argument, defamation should be the arena of false information whereas privacy the 
arena of true information; no overlap could be produced between both torts and 
consequently, no incoherence in law could manifest. 353 Global coherence focuses on the legal 
justification underpinning judicial decisions when they cohere with the totality of established 
law. 354 This view foregrounding the centrality of intersystem coherence is associated with 
Sartorius and Dworkin. Sartorius commented on the concept of judicial creativity, in which 
judges become free legislators in complex cases, because the scheme of interpretation 
underpinning judicial decisions should remain based upon a proper harmony with the whole 
legal system. 355 Dworkin has a similar view towards the adjudicative integrity; his theory 
requires judges to consider public standards as a coherent set of principles and implicit norms 
within their interpretative processes.356 Dworkin argued for integrity, and by extension 
coherence, with his work thus reflecting a strong monism. 357 
Local coherence, in contradistinction to global coherence, refers to coherence within 
a specific field or area of law rather than the whole legal system. There are many arguments 
supporting the primacy of local coherence over the global equivalent. Firstly, there are 
principles related to special areas of law which are sometimes incoherent with principles 
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attached to other areas of law. By this measure, attaining a global coherence based upon 
general principles within a decision is implausible, even if this logic results in inconsistency. 
358 Secondly, achieving area-specific coherence is a more achievable and feasible task for 
judges due to human limitations in terms of knowledge and time. 359 Thirdly, global coherence 
could be considered as a default aim, one which is gradually achievable. 
Principles and norms of the relevant field of law should be considered first, if these do 
not help to support, a decision in hard cases related fields of law should be examined, and 
then standards pertaining to the whole legal system become the subject of consideration in 
this case. 360 Furthermore, legal justifications could be reached between three fields of law; 
this can neither be considered as local nor as global coherence. 361 Finally, global coherence 
undervalues the degrees and implications of pluralism in principle and practice. Pluralism 
does not necessarily lead to incoherence; sound principles can be consistently applied within 
the law resulting consequently in pockets of coherence. 362 For these reasons, such area-
specificity potentially maintains the coherence of privacy law as well as that of defamation.  
Such an approach consisting of what may be termed area-specific coherence is adopted to 
defend not only the inclusion of false private information within the remit of privacy law, but 
also the inapplicability of libel defences in privacy law. Beyond this, this thesis examines the 
question of interim injunction rules as applied in the overlapping cases.  
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B- The economic analysis (Efficiency)   
Efficiency as a general goal of tort law could be used to frame questions arising from 
the overlap between defamation and privacy. 363 Economic analysis may thus prove crucial in 
addressing the main question of this study; that is, whether false private information should 
be protected by privacy law or should only fall under the purview of defamation law. 
Economic analysis could provide a solid and convincing basis upon which to decide which law 
may provide an efficient solution to this question.  This framework of efficiency is also applied 
into the subsequent questions regarding the potential application of defamation defences 
within privacy cases. Efficiency could also apply when deciding upon the most desirable rules 
for the application of interim injunctions where defamation and privacy overlap.  
There are two interpretations of underpinning 'efficiency' as defined within the legal 
context. 364 Firstly, an efficient legal rule simply means, according to Pareto, one which 
induces behaviour to make a person better off, or no one worse off. Secondly, efficiency, 
according to Richard Posner, means wealth-maximization based upon a cost-benefit analysis; 
wealth in this context refers to the monetary compensation or equivalent variations for 
members of society. Efficiency could not only occur through a minimization of the transaction 
costs but also through maximizing wealth or the 'size of the pie' when two interests 
interact.365 We may take an example from nuisance law; a factory located next to living area 
engages in activities resulting in higher profits and damages to its neighbours. Since increased 
production entails higher levels of damages, so efficiency subsequently proposes a solution 
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that maximizes the wealth and minimizes the damages. 366 Calculations should clearly also 
consider the social value of a risk-creating activity. 367 In other words, the social value which 
itself partially forms the basis for an actor’s very engagement in risk-creating activity ought to 
be calculated within any assessment of activity benefits compared with costs when evaluating 
the sum reasonableness of that activity. 368 Therefore, a legitimate (socially valued) and 
efficient (cost-justified) action is not, from an economic analysis perspective, negligent and 
wrongful because of its desirability. Nevertheless, such desirability is insensitive to 
distributive considerations since it would leave a victim (injured party) without remedy.  
The economic analysis seeks to induce socially optimal activity where the benefits of 
increasing activity levels are not outweighed by the social costs caused by such activity. 369 If 
the social costs of an activity were externalised, the actor’s incentives to perform such 
beneficial activity would be increased up to the point where no benefits are produced. 
Conversely, social costs are internalized when actors are held liable for injuries caused by 
increasing their activity. 370 Liability rules, from an economic perspective, could, therefore, 
result in efficient behaviour stemming from disincentivizing activities whose social benefits 
are outweighed by their social costs. 371  
In the context of defamation law, such economic analysis suggests that socially 
optimal publication depends upon liability choice standards; in other words, the incentives of 
publications significantly depend upon liability systems whose principles are affirmed within 
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the courts. 372 Under strict liability standards, such incentives would be optimal since the 
publisher would internalize the potential social costs by ensuring the accuracy of potentially 
libellous publications. A liability based on fault standards would result in the careless 
publication of potentially harmful material once publishers meet the relevant standard of 
care, irrespective of social costs caused by such publications. 373 The social benefits of 
information depend not only on their subject matter (such as that relating to political issues) 
but also on their accuracy. True statements are more socially valuable than false information, 
thus the social benefit of speech increases with the probability of the speech’s accuracy. 374 
Relaxing the standard of liability, however, could not only increase the publications 
incentives, and consequently the probability of true information in the market, but also 
increase the social cost of false speech. This may undermine the social benefits of true speech 
in the long term.375 Furthermore, the over-publication of false information could also 
undermine public trust in the media and make defunct their societal watchdog role; a 
decreased trust in media’s ability to report accurately consequently decreases its incentive to 
track public figures’ wrongdoings.376  
Based on such analysis, defamation law ought to increase incentives for socially 
efficient behaviour on the part of publications for the sake of upholding that watchdog 
function of media upon which a democratic society is, at least in part, predicated.  Economic 
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analysis of informational privacy suggests that the concealment of private information 
potentially reduces a specific market’s efficiency if such concealment suppresses awareness 
of undesirable deficiencies; conversely, the flow of such information may promote the 
efficiency of that market.  
Posner argues that protecting private information might lead to market inefficiencies 
since the social costs of such concealments outweigh their benefits. 377 To take an example 
from personal life, one major social cost of concealing personal deficiencies between 
prospective spouses would be the length of courtship between them; this social cost may 
consequently lead to an undesirable inefficiency in the market of marriage. 378 Such 
undesirable inefficiencies could be perpetuated if the seller conceals deficiencies of products 
and increases the social costs of such marketplace fraud. However, to induce efficient flows 
of useful information within the market, an economic analysis of informational privacy 
differentiates between true and false private information. Flows of true private information 
may constitute an efficient solution, should the social incentive of private information 
availability outweigh the individual interest in concealing it. 379 The opposite applies in the 
event of such private information proving false: an individual’s interest in keeping such 
information concealed here would presumably exceed the social benefits of releasing such 
information to the market. 
C- Feminist analysis 
As feminist studies in this field have elucidated, tort law was historically premised 
upon male norms to the consequent detriment of women as subjects entitled to equal 
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protection under the law. 380 The ostensibly neutral mechanisms offered by tort law to protect 
individuals’ rights might imply a gender bias since such existing arrangements treat male 
harms as de facto worthier of protection. In this regard, feminist analysis changed its view 
dramatically on privacy law from a protective means of dominant positions that men possess 
in society to an effective means, as this thesis argues, to protect the vulnerable positions of 
women in society. 381 A feminist approach permits a challenge to such biases and aims to 
redistribute burden and benefits for the sake of men and women alike; it is therefore 
particularly attentive to areas related to sexual harms where women suffer disproportionally 
in comparison with men. 382 A feminist approach militates against the sexual double standards 
constitute one of society’s culturally and socially ossified prejudices when women, in 
comparison with men, face inordinately negative judgement around their conduct relating to 
matters of sexuality. 383 This standard refers to those socially biased criteria by which 
consequences of sexual conducts are assessed and in respect of which women are 
consequently socially disadvantaged in relation to their male peers. 384 Such discriminatory 
standards provide a powerful impetus for feminist scholars to examine those legal rules, such 
as privacy and defamation, protecting individuals from the harmful disclosure of sexual 
information in order to make legal protection more effective in respect of biased standards.385  
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The relevance of feminist analysis to the questions arising out of the overlap between 
defamation and privacy stem from the fact that each tort may be specifically raised in respect 
of sexual disclosures concerning women. For example, in Mosley v MGN, the unauthorised 
publications made by the media related to sadomasochistic activities with five dominatrices 
in the claimant’s private flat. 386 In Terry v Persons Unknowns, the applicant unsuccessfully 
sought a super injunction preventing any publication relating to his adulterous relationship 
with Vanessa Perroncel; the latter sent a letter to the court in order to strengthen the 
injunctive application. 387 Following the judicial rejection of their respective privacy rights-
based arguments, wild media coverage ensued. Perroncel expressed her sadness during an 
interview regarding this outcome. 388  
D- Access to justice 
Patrick O’Callaghan argues that privacy law must enjoy a ‘breathing space’ when 
considering false private information published in conjunction with true private information. 
If privacy protection was only concerned with the publication of completely true private 
information, it would preclude many victims from accessing justice. 389 However, access to 
justice potentially not only entails legal protection of rights but also the promotion of access 
to courts and other legal services in the first instance for those seeking adjudicative reliefs.390 
The fact that both actions of defamation and privacy are extremely expensive and leave even 
powerful litigants out of pocket potentially undermines O’Callaghan’s argument that 
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enlarging privacy law to cover a mixture of true and false information could in of itself increase 
access to justice.  
Defamation and privacy actions are significantly expensive; consequently, it is 
relatively hard for people of limited incomes to access means of judicially protecting their 
rights or to prevent such breaches. Libel cases have traditionally been classified as a ‘rich 
man’s tort’ due to the unaffordable costs of litigation. 391 For example, after a failed libel case 
Richard Desmond, had to pay a bill of £1.25 million. 392 Elsewhere, in Jones v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd, 393 even though the claimant of a successful libel action, Martyn Jones MP, 
was awarded a modest sum of damages of £5,000; but the defendant faced a bill of legal costs 
totalling £520,000. England and Wales were classified as an extremely expensive places to 
bring libellous litigations compared with 12 European countries. 394 Such costs deter many 
defamed victims, facing well-resourced media opponents, from suing these powerful 
organisations due to the potentially high expenses combined with the risk of litigation. 395  
Litigants in privacy cases face also a similar challenge in respect of the legal costs. 
Many claimants, especially those of limited means as well as media organisations, are 
significantly deterred from bringing legal proceedings around privacy, or conversely from 
defending themselves against such proceedings, due to the highly expensive costs. 396 In the 
leading case of privacy, Mosley v MGN, even the successful outcome for the claimant ended 
up with him out of pocket. Mosley spent £510,000 on legal fees but was left with a net bill of 
 
391 Culture, Media and Sport Committee - Second Report: Press standards, privacy and libel (session 2009) para. 
235.  
392 Ibid. para. 236. 
393 [2007] EWHC 1489 (QB) cited in ibid. 237. 
394 Culture, Media and Sport Committee - Second Report, (n 393) para. 248. 
395 Ibid. para. 239.  
396 Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions - First Report: Privacy and Injunctions, (2012) Costs and access to 
justice 138.  
94 
 
£30,000 after receiving £420,000 from the defendant as taxed costs and £60,000 as 
damages.397 The average privacy case at full trial may cost more than £270000, whereas the 
minimum cost of obtaining an interim injunction ranges between £15,000 to £25,000. 398 In 
this instance, the nature of privacy cases and the increasing amounts of information required, 
whether from the claimant or defendant, significantly contribute to these sizable litigation 
fees. 399 The expense and complications attached to seeking justice, either through redress or 
mounting a defence, within the civil justice system may be reasonably considered as 
constituting a significant barrier for the disadvantaged and creating opportunities for the 
wrongdoers to escape legal liability. 400  
In order to overcome this obstacle by increasing the accessibility of courts, and 
enabling powerless litigants to protect their rights, legal aids were introduced. 401  The legal 
aid was established within English law since 1949, providing financial support relating to cases 
brought within both criminal and civil justice systems that would otherwise result in gradually 
heavier expenses. 402  Nevertheless, this increase of legal aid expenditures was the subject of 
political debate. These debates led to the subsequent passing of the Access to Justice Act of 
1999, 403 and, more recently the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Offenders Act 2012. 
The result, in this case, was a shrinking of budgets allocated for assisting with civil complaint 
suits and the abolition of legal aid for most civil cases.404 Nevertheless, many alternatives 
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were created to help disadvantaged litigants to get access to justice; these include conditional 
fee agreement and damages-based agreement.  
E- The rule of election 
The overlap between defamation and privacy axiomatically raises a question 
concerning the potential accumulation of the monetary awards of defamation and privacy 
actions, if the claimant gained both. Compensatory damages, gain-based damages and 
exemplary damages are the three types of financial remedies that could be awarded to 
recompense the harms in defamation and privacy law.  405  English law has a settled rule that 
compensatory and gain-based damages are alternative remedies; that is, no accumulation of 
such damages is permissible should both remedies arise in respect of the same wrongful act, 
and the claimant is therefore required in such circumstances to make an election between 
them. 406 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments, 407 asserted 
that financial remedies may be divided into two categories: they are either alternative or 
cumulative remedies. Alternative and inconsistent remedies cannot be awarded together to 
redress the harm caused by a single wrong; thus, the claimant needs to elect one of the 
alternative remedies, either gain-based or compensatory damages, even though he may be 
able to claim both remedies. Contrary to the settled notion of alternative remedies, 
cumulative remedies may be both awarded without a need of election; however, there is a 
limitation around cumulative remedies that proscribes any double recovery for one loss. 408 
Compensatory and gain-based damages, however, raised in respect of different wrongful 
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acts, are non-alternative but cumulative; no election, therefore, is required in such a 
situation.409  
F- Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice is a mechanism that seeks to achieve a fair distribution of burdens 
and benefits among the members of society. 410 It is based upon geometric norms and seeks 
to proportionally allocate goods among members of society. 411 This distribution is grounded 
within Aristotelian notions of utilizing mathematical proportions to justly determine 
distribution outcomes. 412 Distributive justice, therefore, depends on three generic issues: to 
whom is justice owed, what are matters of distribution, and the patterns of distribution. 413 
This study is concerned with adopting a progressive approach to tort law in order to 
redistribute the benefits and burdens between the advantaged and disadvantaged members 
in society. In order to examine the reasonableness of a given activity, the distributive justice 
offers crucial insights via the factors of fairness and loss spreading. The behaviour/activity 
could be categorised as reasonable if it would achieve a fair distribution of benefits and costs 
among the participants.  
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Fairness   
The fairness imposes, as Gregory C. Keating argues, that the participants, who stand 
to benefit from a given activity, should equally bear its potential costs and risks. 414 Fairness 
requires the relocation or rearrangement of the burdens relating to advantageous activities 
onto those who reap the benefits of such activities for several reasons. 415 Firstly, it is 
inequitable for actors to reap the advantages of valuable activities and leave their burdens to 
be borne by strangers unrelated to that activity. Secondly, it is also categorically unjust to 
divide participants into burden-enduring participants and benefits-enjoying participants. 
Finally, it is unfair to concentrate the costs of a mutually valuable activity onto a specific 
handful of participants while the advantages of such activity are publicly shared and widely 
spread. Fairness, therefore, demands a reciprocity between enjoying the benefits and bearing 
the costs of a given activity. 416 Using this logic, that under a fairness rationale it would be 
deemed outrageously unfair to require those victims who gain no benefits from a specific 
activity to bear its burdens (costs). 417 The potential application of the defamation defence of 
publication on matter of public interest may require scrutinization of the benefits and the 
costs relating to the publication of private and defamatory information in order to determine 
whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable.     
Loss spreading  
The idea of loss spreading, as a goal of tort law, focuses on reducing the impact of 
accident losses on bearers rather than simply reducing the size of the losses themselves. 418 
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Imposing liabilities upon a defendant adequately capable to bear and pay damages to the 
harmed party and thereby spreading such damages on other bearers was considered as the 
goal of compensation and loss spreading. A prime example of this includes the bearing of 
losses, through revenue-collection, by taxpayers in the case of damages being paid by a 
governmental agent following a tortious claim. 419 Tsachi Keren-Paz argues that the loss-
spreading mechanism, from an egalitarian perspective, might be a preferable criterion to 
assess the reasonableness of the behaviour if the disutility is scaled down from a significant 
unexpected loss to a predictable loss. 420 The morality of loss spreading is grounded within 
‘meeting the needs of individuals and seeing a reduction in the negative effects of losses as 
worthy goals’. 421 This distributive notion may help to determine whether it is reasonable to 
exempt the media from liability of invading others’ privacy right by virtue of POMOPI defence 
which may consequently and unjustifiably, as this thesis argues, impose the costs of harmful 
activities caused by the media, who reap their benefits, on the shoulders of the victims of 
such publications.   
3. 4: Concluding remarks 
 
This Chapter has mapped the overlap between defamation and privacy, and the 
theoretical framework which provides the lens through which this study’s research questions 
will be examined. This Chapter has introduced the conceptual foundations of dignity, sociality, 
and general personality right accounts that in turn conceptualise the relationship between 
the interests of reputation and privacy in order to explain the overlap between defamation 
and privacy in English law. This is important to evaluate the recent judicial approaches to 
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applying defamation rules within privacy cases which involve reputational considerations. In 
order to provide a further conceptualisation of the overlap, this Chapter has also discussed 
the relationship between privacy and reputation in Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. This 
consequently brings to light the crux of the quandary within English law relating to False 
privacy (false private information). This Chapter has thus identified and explained how privacy 
could indirectly be protected under defamation law and how reputation may concurrently be 
protected under MOPI. This Chapter has also introduced the framework used to analyse the 
impact of the overlap upon defences, interim injunctions and damages. It has provided an 
overview of various perspectives. These include coherence lens; economic analysis 
(efficiency); feminist analysis; access to justice; procedural rule of election; and distributive 
justice perspectives. The chapter explicates how each of these lenses could benefit, enrich 
and promote understanding the considerations at stake resulting from the overlap between 
defamation and privacy.  In summary, this chapter has provided a greater understanding of 
the problems resulting from the English courts’ decision to include false private information 
within the protective scope of MOPI. The concept of the overlap between defamation and 
privacy, as this thesis concludes, is beyond the mere set of facts which may allow the 
claimants to bring simultaneously the legal proceedings of defamation and privacy torts. It is, 
above all else, a matter of conceptual interaction between the private life and reputation, 
which represent the protected interests of such torts. Based on the accounts of dignity, 
sociality and personality right, the right to privacy could be truly undermined by the adversely 
external evaluations of others. The reputation, based on the esteem held by others, may also 
be undermined by the unauthorised publications of private information. The interwinding 
relationship between the private life and reputation may lead the publication of private 
information or defamatory information to inextricably cause dual effects on privacy and 
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reputation. The development of English torts of defamation and privacy (MOPI) may provide 
a practical evidence confirming the conceptual overlap between the interests of private life 
and reputation, which may be protected under each single tort. However, the overlap was 
not narrowed on a conceptual level, but it attains, as this chapter elucidates, a materialistic 
level when the falsehoods, if private, could be protected under MOPI action. This 
development triggers a controversy among scholars because it would undermine, as certain 
scholars argue, the coherence of legal system and increase the uncertainty and circumvention 
of certain legal rules in defamation law. These arguments and the counterarguments, 





































Chapter 4: False privacy: Avoidance of the overlap or Keeping the integrity of privacy law 
4. 1: Introduction  
The term of false privacy refers to the publication of private information the claimant 
either reveals its falsity or refuses to comment on its falsity and truthfulness. While English 
law clearly recognised the protection of falsehoods within the remit of MOPI, false privacy 
has provoked vivid criticism in the literature of media law because of the materialistic overlap 
between defamation and privacy law. Many scholars provide different arguments seeking to 
exclude falsity from the remit of privacy in order to avoid the overlap with defamation. In this 
chapter, the arguments presented in pursuit of the literature concerning the soundness to 
include or exclude the falsehoods from the protective scope of MOPI will be brought together 
in order to provide an argumentative answer to the research question of this chapter 
concerning to what extent privacy law should protect false private information. This thesis 
advances new arguments, based on the theoretical framework previously outlined, to support 
the current legal approach of English law of privacy that protects true, false and mixed private 
information. The structure of this chapter is built on the arguments advanced to exclude 
falsehoods from the remit of MOPI and the arguments of this thesis that emphasises on 
including the falsehoods within the scope of MOPI. The first section critically explores the 
arguments made against the current approach in the English jurisdiction. This section will 
bring together the various supporting arguments to preclude the falsity from its protective 
remit of privacy law. The second section, by contrast, articulates the arguments supporting 
the inclusion of falsehoods within the remit of MOPI. This section advances supportive 
arguments based on multiple perspectives encompassing the American false light tort, local 
coherence, efficiency, feminist analysis and the access to justice, to explain the doctrinal 
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necessity and theoretical soundness of including false and mixed private information within 
the remit of privacy.  
4. 2: Critical analysis of excluding false private information from the scope of privacy law  
False privacy has provoked strong criticism in the literature of media law about the 
conceptual and doctrinal soundness of including false private information within the 
protective remit of MOPI. Many arguments were advanced to explain the doctrinal and 
conceptual unsoundness of including false information within the protective scope of privacy. 
These arguments are mainly based on the ramifications of false privacy on MOPI and 
defamation torts. The main reason for such academic opposition relates to the willingness to 
avoid the undesirable overlap with defamation. In this section, I outline and critically discuss 
such arguments in order to elucidate, as the thesis emphasises, the shortcoming and 
deficiency of excluding the protection of falsity from the scope of privacy law. 
A- The argument of breach of confidence 
The historical relationship between the equitable action of breach of confidence and 
the misuse of private information action provided a ground to preclude the falsity from the 
scope of privacy. It is undoubted that each action ostensibly serves different and distinct 
purposes; the equitable action of breach of confidence seeks to protect information based on 
relationships of trust and confidence, whereas MOPI seeks to protect the individual's dignity, 
autonomy and control over her private information. 422 Such differences, however, should not 
preclude the law from being applied and developed consistently and coherently. 423 Based on 
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this rule, the falsehoods should be precluded from the protective scope of MOPI because such 
type of information is also excluded from the protective remit of the equitable breach of 
confidence since the issue of falsity and the issue of confidentiality are inconsistent. David 
Rolph highlights that no breach of confidence was raised in respect of a publication of false 
information simply because the falsehoods may not constitute a subject of confidentiality. 424 
For instance, in Khashoggi v. Smith, the claimant, a public figure, failed to obtain an injunction 
restraining the defendant, a former housekeeper, from disclosing and publishing confidential 
information obtained during the defendant’s previous job. 425 The refusal was justified 
because the threatening disclosure contained true allegations of criminal offences despite the 
existence of defendant’s obligation of confidence. Sir David Cairns distinguished between the 
defamation and breach of confidence actions; whereas the former constitutes the protection 
from false defamatory statements, the latter protects true confidential information.  
The inconsistency between falsity and confidentiality was reiterated in Interbrew SA v 
Financial Times Ltd. 426 Here the court decided that, in order to establish the claimant’s duty 
around identifying confidential information as one of the requirements of a breach of 
confidence action, concepts of falsity cannot be reconciled with confidentiality. Lightman J 
said, ‘There can be no right of confidence on the part of the claimant in respect of the 
doctored information i.e. the false information’.427 
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This argument, however, may lose its strength if the information were related to 
private life because such information could be confidential, even if it is false. In this respect, 
there is no logical and fair reason to deny the confidential nature of the information because 
of its falsity. 428 It is illogical, for instance, to prohibit an individual from restraining a 
publication containing intimate information of her sexual life obtained by her ex-partner 
during the marital period, simply because such a publication encompasses inaccurate 
information. Furthermore, there would be no difference in the injuries inflicted by a non-
consensual publication of confidential information upon those interests that are protected 
under breach of confidence regardless of whether such information was true or false. Paul 
Stanley rightly denies the difference within the disclosure of true or false confidential 
information concerning the medical and sexual matters, as in each situation an action of 
breach of confidence is potentially legitimate and viable under the law: 429  
 ‘Suppose, for instance, that in the course of treatment a patient is tested for HIV, and 
the test is positive. The doctor discloses what she believes to be the patient’s HIV status to 
the press…. It can make no difference that the test has yielded a false-positive result. Or 
suppose the press obtain intelligence that a celebrity has been seen having sex in a hotel with 
a mistress and publish a story about it. Can it make any difference that the celebrity in 
question was actually having sex with his wife? …. Intuitively, in none of these cases ought it 
to make any difference that the information is not accurate’. 
Legal authorities in English jurisdiction have followed such a pragmatic, flexible 
approach that brought and maintained false confidential information within the ambit of 
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breach of confidence. For example, in the first instance of the landmark cases of Campbell v 
MGN, 430 Morland LJ rejected the defendant’s submission that a proof of inaccuracy 
pertaining to the private assertions in question would undercut the premises of the action – 
namely the right to protection and redress against unauthorised publication-based disclosure 
of confidential information - by saying: 431 
 ‘I reject as absurd Mr Browne's submission that because there are some errors of detail 
in the Mirror's revelation that Miss Campbell was attending therapy sessions at 
Narcotics Anonymous, for example as to the length of time that she had been attending 
such sessions, the information lost the mark of confidentiality’. 
If the protection of confidentiality necessitates that the information it concerns be 
true, this would be inconsistent with the underpinning purpose of confidentiality. In such 
circumstances, the claimant would be required to disclose which information is true and 
which is false in order to protect the confidential information.432 The same principle was 
reiterated in the leading cases of McKennitt v Ash. 433 In this case, Eady J refused to establish 
the legal protection of confidentiality on the basis of truth or falsity. If the claimant must spell 
out which information was true and which information was false, this would make such legal 
protection illusory and ineffective; since the touchstone of confidentiality is to protect the 
disclosed information. Based on these understandings, there would be no logical objection to 
bringing a breach of confidence action in respect of information adjudged confidential; 
irrespective of whether this information is true, false or mixed. 
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The confidentiality and privacy are profoundly linked and interconnected if the matter 
of the information is related to health 434 - and this can also be extended across other types 
of private information. Based on the rule that privacy and confidentiality actions to be 
developed with consistency and coherence, irrespective their different features, this may 
support the argument that falsity can be protected by privacy law. 435 Thus, it would be 
significantly inconsistent to protect an individual’s confidentiality in respect of non-
consensual disclosure of false information regarding their health issue(s), and then preclude 
such information from the scope of privacy.  
B- The implications of false privacy on MOPI 
With the legal recognition of MOPI as a direct cause of action to protect privacy right 
in English jurisdiction, many scholars argue that the protection of false information within the 
remit of MOPI may bring inconsistency among the requirements of such action. To begin with, 
Brian Pillans argues that the label of Misuse of Private information may preclude false 
information from falling within its protective scope, because false or non-existent 
information, logically speaking, cannot be actionable as such type of information could not 
be misused in the first place. 436   
Such an argument may not be tenable since the misuse concept under MOPI could 
take different forms, such as wrongful publication or revelation of private information and 
phone hacking. 437 The misuse concept refers to the unauthorised discovering, retaining, 
disseminating and hacking, watching, listening and recording of private information. 438 The 
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mere dissemination of private information without consent constitutes interference with the 
individual’s right to ‘control the dissemination of information about one’s private life’ 
regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of such information. 439 In addition, MOPI, based on 
the legal precedents, is used as an umbrella to protect privacy rights from tortious 
infringements whether related to unauthorised publication or intrusion into individuals’ 
private life. 440 A further implication between falsity and MOPI relates to the requirements to 
satisfy the first test in MOPI concerning the reasonable expectation of privacy. Paul Stanley 
and David Rolph question how a heterosexual individual could have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in respect of the publication disclosing their homosexuality. 441 Put differently, a 
reasonable person would expect the right to keep their true sexual orientation private, and 
any false information about her sexual orientation would not be reasonably expected to be 
published in the first instance.  
It is right that the test of reasonable expectation involves a degree of subjectivity 
depending on the assessment of the claimant that may cover a massive range of information. 
However, such expectation must be objectively reasonable to successfully engage the first 
stage of MOPI action. 442 In Murray v Express Newspapers Plc, 443 the Court of Appeal 
determined the factors that should be taken into account when determining the 
reasonableness of the claimant’s expectation in MOPI:  
‘They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which 
the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose 
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of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, 
the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for which 
the information came into the hands of the publisher’. 
The private nature of information is the touchstone to determine to what extent the 
claimant's right of Article 8 ECHR was breached irrespective whether the private information 
is true, false or mixed. 444 By relying on Stanley’s example that the claimant cannot have a 
reasonable expectation to keep her information concerning homosexuality private if she was 
heterosexual in the first place; one could argue that the claimant can reasonably expect the 
information concerning her sexual orientation must be private irrespective whether it was 
heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual orientation.  
In addition, there is nothing in the Article 8 ECHR necessarily limits the scope of private 
life to only true information. In PG v. UK, the Strasbourg Court decided that ‘Private life is a 
broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court has already held that the 
elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life are 
important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8’. 445 Moreham’s definition 
of privacy could also reaffirm such argument because the unauthorised publication of private 
information, whether true, false or mixed, could infringe what is defined as the individual’s 
freedom from unwanted access or their desire to be inaccessible. 446 In contrast to the 
arguments outlined by Rolph and Stanley, the publication of false information concerning 
sexual relationships still constitutes an intrusion into private life even it had never taken place 
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because such information related to individual’s sexual orientation are clearly and obviously 
private. 447  
C- Implications of a tort of false private information on defamation 
 
Whereas the falsity, as many authors argue, is the subject matter of defamation, there 
is no reason to create another cause of action to deal with publications involving false 
information. Brian Pillans and John Hartshorne call for a new tort of creation or misuse of false 
(private) information. 448 The scope of this action would encompass not only the publication 
of false private information but also any publication of private information in respect of which 
no approval was granted by the claimant whether the information were true or false.449 
However, Pillans and Hartshorne also argue that such a suggestion may be redundant since 
there are strong similarities between publication or creation of false private information and 
defamation.  The first similarity relates to the falsity of the information that is presumed in 
both causes of action. In other words, since the concept of implied falsehood is central to the 
claim in both actions, this may weaken the justification for creating a new action to rectify 
such falsity because the claimant could instead use the well-established tort of defamation to 
remedy harms caused by the publication of false allegations.450 Undermining of the law’s 
coherence is arguably one of the main consequences arising from the overlap between 
defamation and privacy. In order to maintain the global coherence of law, the protection of 
false information should be reserved to the law of defamation whose rules were established 
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prior to the recent law of privacy. 451 The global coherence lens requires the recent law of 
privacy to take into account the pre-existing legal rules of the whole legal system. David Rolph 
argues that in order to maintain the coherence of the whole legal system, there must be an 
assessment of privacy’s impact upon other existing causes of action protecting dignitary 
rights, such as those relating to defamation. Attention is, therefore, due to avoid the 
subversions of the balance between interests in conflicts that underpin those actions. 452 
Cheer also concurs with Rolph that the overlap between defamation and privacy would 
undermine the law’s coherence because of the inconsistency of interim injunction rules 
applied in both laws. 453  Cheer outlines that the recognition of false privacy would undermine 
the coherence of defamation law already protecting a claimant from the wrongful publication 
of false information: 454 
'Proper regard for the coherence of the law suggests that a novel cause of action 
for invasion of privacy, in whatever form it takes, should be available only in respect of 
a true matter, with defamation imposing liability for false matter'.  
Rolph also explains and justifies the separation between the scope of defamation and 
privacy on the basis of truth and falsity dichotomy: 455 
‘Because its principles are designed to protect a fundamentally different legal 
interest, reputation, defamation law does not readily accommodate privacy protection 
as one of its aims or rationales. Defamation law should prevent people making false and 
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disparaging statements about others in public; privacy law should allow individuals to 
control what true, but private, information about them is disseminated in public and 
what remains private. Any privacy protection afforded by defamation law was or should 
be incidental or indirect at best. The fact that recent reforms have arguably reduced or 
removed privacy protections from defamation law does not mean that the principles of 
defamation law as they now stand under the national, uniform defamation laws are 
somehow deficient. Properly understood, it is not the function of defamation law to 
protect a plaintiff’s privacy’.  
The second main similarity between false privacy and defamation relates to the nature 
of harms caused by the publication of false information. Hartshorne argues that in both 
publications, whether false private or defamatory information, the harmed party would suffer 
similar types of harms; in other words, the claimant would experience similar distress and 
embarrassment. The publication of false information, under both defamation and false 
privacy, would lead others to form a misleading impression about the claimant’s 
personality.456 Furthermore, based on similarity with regards to the nature of the harm 
caused, Hartshorne also argues that personality harms caused by false portrayals could be 
effectively corrected through a judicial decision serving both compensatory and vindicatory 
purposes. 457 O'Callaghan agrees with Hartshorne about the similarity of the injuries caused 
by defamation and false privacy, but he adds that such similarities could also be recognised 
in comparing the concepts of defamation and the false light in US law. 458 The undesirability 
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of such overlap is related to the difficulty in establishing a claim to privacy for public figures 
because there could be a hidden motivation to protect their reputation interest behind every 
privacy claim. 459 In other words, privacy claims based on false facts might affect the integrity 
of privacy law itself since protecting the claimant’s reputation rather than privacy might stand 
as a real motive of privacy proceedings as Tugendhat J concluded in LNS v Persons 
Unknowns.460 
This argument, however, is predicated upon an unconvincing basis since defamation 
law refutably presumes the falsity of an allegation once the defamatory meaning of 
allegations in question was proved. 461 The presumption of falsity is justified due to the 
difficulty of proving the defamatoriness and falsity of an allegation in the same time; however, 
such falsity could be rebuttable if the defendant successfully raises the defence of truth. 462 
Thus, all defamatory statements are presumably and refutably false, but not all false 
statements are defamatory. It is the claimant’s task to prove the defamatory meaning, based 
on the relevant tests pertaining to such purposes, of the allegation in question.463  
Rolph acknowledges as convincing the assertion that not every untrue statement is 
defamatory; however, he suggests that such a problem may be bypassed through a variety of 
defamatory tests that could be able to cover a broad range of false statements which could 
be actionable under one of those tests. 464 The variety of tests determining the defamatory 
meaning of a statement would provide significant protection against publications of false 
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information on the grounds of covering a wild quantity of falsehoods. This suggestion, 
however, is flawed because not only would it leave the aggrieved party without legal remedy 
to redress harms caused by false private but non-defamatory information; but also, because 
it may cause further doctrinal problems to defamation law itself as being explained below.  
Firstly, the concept of defamation would be doctrinally distorted since defamation 
tests would be overly extended to include harmfully false information. 465  Eric 
Descheemaeker casts doubt on the justifications of the inclusion of the ‘ridicule test’ and 
‘shun and avoid test’ within the remit of defamation law, because such tests cannot 
determine meaningfully what should be regarded as defamatory.466 Descheemaeker claims 
that no reputational harms could result from a publication exposing the claimant to ridicule 
because she suffers a humiliation to her self-esteem and dignity rather than harm to her 
reputation in the eyes of others. 467 He also asserts that the same criticism could be levied at 
the second test of ‘shun and avoid’ under which allegations of shameful diseases and insanity 
were considered defamatory. Such involuntary allegations, as Descheemaeker argues, ought 
to be actionable under privacy law rather than defamation law because it is the claimant’s 
privacy, self-esteem and self-worth that would be violated instead of her reputation. 468  
Such an approach may not only undermine the doctrines of defamation, but it would 
also undermine the concept of privacy. The inclusion of non-reputational (private) 
considerations within the protective remit of defamation affects the protection of privacy 
itself because it allows the fragmentation of privacy protection through different and 
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irrelevant causes of action that could also prevent justified treatment of alike cases rather 
than constituting a coherent and principled system. 469 If defamation law was used to protect 
‘privacy’ interests disguised within a deserved reputation interest, an unjust outcome may 
result, since truth constitutes a complete defence in defamation law, as a publication of true 
information cannot harm a deserved reputation. 470 This result would defeat the purpose of 
protecting privacy, which is inherent in law governing the disclosure of private information, 
because it may allow the disclosure of private information without proper justification based 
upon the defence of truth. However, privacy law considers truth and falsity as an irrelevant 
matter in terms of affecting the individual's right to control the dissemination of their private 
information. For example, such right to control may be significantly affected by the 
publication of a person's HIV status irrespective of whether the medical result in question was 
factually true or false. 471 The main justification for protecting non-reputational (private) 
considerations within the protective scope of defamation, as Descheemaeker explains, refers 
to the absence of direct actions protecting privacy rights in English law. 472 
Such justification could be somewhat loosely grounded within the emergence of MOPI 
as a properly suitable cause of action locate private information within its protective scope 
irrespective whether such information was defamatory. Furthermore, there is a practical 
need to include falsehoods within MOPI scope since publications causing the claimant to be 
only shunned and avoided would hardly meet the new requirement of serious harm since 
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such words would neither cause nor tend to cause serious harm to reputation since they 
relate to involuntary behaviours. 473  
However, Descheemaeker’s arguments were predicated upon the unconvincing 
ground because he separates privacy and reputation interests and argues that private 
(dignitary) information cannot involve reputational considerations. It is established, 
conceptually speaking, that both privacy and reputation are dignitary interests and the harms 
to privacy or reputation could be classified as dignitary harms. In addition, based on 
Descheemaeker example of HIV status, the practical difficulty of drawing a hard line between 
privacy and reputation in respect of the publications of medical records on sexual 
conditions.474 Mann J refused, as a matter of principle, to eliminate the reputational harms 
from the realm of privacy on the grounds that the victim’s reputation would undeniably suffer 
some sort of damage resulting from the negative public attributes.475 Furthermore, in Cliff v 
BBC, 476 the reputational harms were taken into account in assessing damages in privacy 
cases, since the protection of reputation was considered as a common function of defamation 
and privacy law. The Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the function of privacy law as an 
alternative means to protect reputational harms beside the primary function of defamation 
law which protects also such harms. 477  
The inability of defamation law to protect all false information (including false private 
information) unless such information is categorised as defamatory under defamation tests, 
motivated Patrick O'Callaghan to advance other justifications to explain the lack of protection 
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for false private information within the scope of defamation. O'Callaghan argues that living 
within interconnected societies may constitute a basis for accepting the offensive and 
distressing harms caused by the dissemination of false private information; as long as 
reputational interests are not adversely affected in the eyes of (those legally deemed) right-
thinking members of society. 478 O’Callaghan points out that such sacrificing approach would 
be compatible with European Convention of Human Rights because the margin of 
appreciation afforded to signatory States may likely take into account the legal protection 
afforded to false information under defamation law and this protection may be considered 
as an adequate remedy. In other words, harms caused by false private information cannot be 
deemed comparable to those harms caused by serious true privacy violations related to 
personal identity that require legal protection, since such harms may significantly undermine 
the individual’s fundamental aspects of her personality. 479   
It appears that O’Callaghan only values the importance of reputation and the necessity 
of legal protection to the reputational interest if wrongly tarnished; whilst he unjustifiably 
undervalues the harmful impacts and consequences of the publication of false private 
information. Consequently, the latter is excused and justified because of the necessity of 
social interactions; whereas the former should merit the attention of law if reputation is 
seriously harmed, as defamation law is subjected to objective checks. 480 In addition, 
O’Callaghan’s argument extrapolated from the State’s approach argues that what might 
appear a wide margin of appreciation supporting the adequacy of remedies (with regards to 
defamation) to protect false privacy might be overstated. That is, a signatory State may not 
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have a broad appreciation of rights in respect of serious interference within private life. 481 
Such a margin of appreciation should not be used in a manner leading to violation of the 
State’s positive obligations as these arise under Article 8 ECHR. In the context of privacy versus 
freedom of expression, the Strasbourg Court framed damages as a remedy for wrongful 
interference with Article 8 rights as satisfying the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 
ECHR. 482 This means that the signatory States, based on a margin of appreciation, are free to 
choose positive methods in order to secure their compliance with that very obligation. 483  
However, the margin of appreciation should not be extended towards accomplishing 
a complete denial of any legal remedy for false privacy. O'Callaghan's argument may imply 
some extension in violation of the State's positive obligation to ensure Article 8 rights around 
respect for private life, because such obligations impose on signatory States the requirement 
to enact positive measures which seek to secure, not deny, effective protection for privacy 
against wrongful interferences in matters between private parties. 484 Thus, it would be highly 
inconsistent with the State's positive obligation to secure the right to respect private life if 
dissemination of personal information related to sexual activities was permitted, simply 
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because of its falsity and non-defamatory contents, despite such activities involving the most 
intimate aspect of private life.      
D- The undesirable overlap between defamation and privacy 
The overlap between defamation and privacy and its undesirable effects on well-
established rules of defamation law arguably represent the main anomaly caused by the 
protection of false private information within the remit of privacy. Such undesirable effects 
regarding the circumvention of defences and of the interim injunction rules of defamation are 
discussed in the next chapters, but here the debate turns on whether such overlap could be 
avoided if only defamation law protected from falsehoods as many scholars argue.485  
The recent development of privacy law subsuming reputational harms within its 
protective remit may produce a substantive overlap beyond the ramifications of false 
information. Scholars, such as Thomas Gibbons and Andrew Kenyon, argue that defamation 
law should be reformulated to redress the evaluation based on false information, instead of 
focusing on protecting a reputational interest. 486 In order to ensure the coexistence of 
defamation and privacy torts which unavoidably protect reputation, Kenyon suggests 
redirecting defamation law from protecting the interest in reputation to the interest of not 
being evaluated on the basis of false facts; whereas privacy law should protect the interest of 
not being evaluated on basis of private facts. 487 This means that defamation law seeks to 
redress the harms caused by the wrongful dissemination of falsehoods which must require 
the claimant, as Gibbons and Kenyon argue, to prove not only the falsehoods following the 
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US law, but also the harms caused by such falsehoods rather than initially presuming them.488 
In other words, they claim that defamation law should follow what Eric Descheemaeker 
describes as Bipolar model which requires two existing elements constituting a tortious cause 
of action: an identifiable instance of wrongful conduct which violates the claimant’s right as 
defined under the law (the publication of false information); and a distinct loss causatively 
emergent from this initial wrong (reputational harms).489 
This plenty of literature suggests removing the protection of falsehoods from the 
privacy remit in order to avoid the overlap and its implications on the coherence of 
longstanding tort of defamation. However, this removal, in turn, may undermine the 
coherence of privacy itself, because the claimant should indicate which private information is 
true and which false while the law of privacy exactly seeks to prevent such type of discussion. 
Moreover, such a suggestion might be ineffective in terms of protecting private information 
adjudged partly true and partly false. 490 For instance, In WER v REW, Gross J granted 
injunctive relief preventing the dissemination of an item about the applicant’s extra-marital 
relationship published to REW’s email-subscribers. 491 The applicant refused to discuss the 
truth or falsity of the information in question because such a revelation, in any event, would 
be harmful to the applicant and his family. Furthermore, Gross J accepted the applicant’s 
justification for refusing to discuss the truth or falsity of such private information, since such 
a discussion primarily serves the media non-parties who ‘are, naturally enough, going to make 
what they can of the information supplied to them’. 492 
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There would be a fundamental misconception to reserve the protection of falsehoods 
upon the law of defamation because the falsehoods could be addressed by alternative actions 
such as malicious falsehood and negligence. 493 The touchstone of defamation law is whether 
the information was defamatory; like the law of privacy that protects only private information 
irrespective of its truth or falsity. 494 Based on such analysis, there would be unavoidably 
substantive overlap between defamation and privacy if the information was defamatory and 
private, as the fourth group of cases of Tugendhat J’s taxonomies in which information related 
to voluntary, lawful, personal and discreditable conduct could in turn equally provoke actions 
of defamation and privacy alike. 495 
Cheer suggests a forward-looking approach that seeks to merge the defamation and 
privacy torts into one form of the civil action emphasising on remedies rather than the nature 
of the words published. 496 The basis of such union is grounded within the shared roots of 
dignity and autonomy values inherent in defamation and privacy, and an overlap between 
them would seriously threaten their doctrinal purity in respect of interim injunction rules. 497 
Cheer’s suggestion seeks to follow a unified criterion granting an interim or final injunction in 
respect of publications containing defamatory, private, or both materials to avoid this 
overlap. However, it is immaterial whether the information is defamatory or private when 
issuing an injunctive order if no serious emotional distress was caused or likely to be caused 
by the publication. 498 Cheer uses the example of the new Act of Harmful Digital 
Communications 2015 (HDCA 2015) in New Zealand to support the statutory merging of 
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defamation and privacy, on the grounds that the Act’s principles are sufficiently relevant to 
the determination of protective scopes around defamation and privacy. 499 Although it is not 
the intention of this thesis to discuss the details of HDCA 2015, nevertheless, it discusses the 
soundness of merging defamation and privacy in a unitary action.  
However, it would not be possible to apply Cheer’s suggestion within the English law 
because it would require a radical change of the tests of defamation and privacy. 500 There 
would be a complete change to the law of defamation and its well-established rules because 
the individual must prove the falsity of the statement complained of, and its serious 
emotional distress in order to obtain an interlocutory injunction to prevent the publication of 
what is now defamatory information. 501 Furthermore, such a suggestion would be also 
implausible because it would encompass other causes of action such as negligence, malicious 
falsehoods, deceit, breach of confidence and harassment. Finally, and most importantly, 
Cheer’s suggestion keeps the dichotomy of truth and falsity as one of the core criteria upon 
which the interim injunction may be granted. 502 This dichotomy is not only irrelevant issue in 
the law to privacy, but this dichotomy might itself constitute another intrusion into private 
life. 503  
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4. 3: The supportive arguments of including false private information within the scope of 
privacy law 
The arguments expressed in the previous section failed, as this thesis emphasises, to 
comprehensively build a conceptual and doctrinal ground to justify the exclusion of the 
falsehoods from the scope of privacy. This thesis turns now to provide its own arguments 
which support the protection of false private information within the remit of privacy law.  
A- The argument of American false light 
One of the arguments advanced to exclude falsehoods from the protective remit of 
privacy is the similarity between the nature of harms caused by defamation and false privacy 
under which the claimant would suffer a misleading impression about her personality. 504 O’ 
Callaghan used the false light argument to support the similarity between harms of 
defamation and false privacy since the same argument has also been advanced between 
defamation and false light torts in US law. 505 The essence of this argument relates to the 
needlessness of recognising the false light tort if its protected interest and harms are typically 
similar to the interest and the harms protected by defamation law. Furthermore, Prosser and 
other scholars point out that the substantive overlap between false light and defamation is 
highlighted by the fact that both torts protect the same interest of reputation. 506 Such overlap 
is the main reason for rejecting false light within many American States. 507 For example, the 
 
504 Ibid. 102. 
505 O’Callaghan, (n 8) 293; Bruce A. McKenna, ‘False Light: Invasion of Privacy’ (1979) 15 Tulsa. L. J. 113; John W. 
Wade, ‘Defamation and the Right of Privacy’ (1963) 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1093. 
506 Prosser (n 50) 400; Edward J. Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ 
(1964) 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 991; Raymond Wacks, The protection of privacy (Sweet & Maxwell 1980) 171; Robin 
Baker Perkins, 'The Truth behind False Light - A Recommendation for Texas' Re-Adoption of False Light Invasion 
of Privacy' (2003) 34 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1199. Such overlap between false light and defamation was the main 
reason to reject false light tort in many States, such as Minnesota, north California and Texas.. 
507 The false light tort is recognised in the common law of 43 States, whereas only 10 States did not recognise it. 
However, California State decided to dismiss it if the same facts could be actionable under defamation law. See 
Nicole Moreham & Tanya Aplin, ‘Privacy in European, civil and common law’ in Nicole Moreham & Sir Mark 
Warby (eds) The law of privacy and the media, 3rd edn, (OUP 2016) 107. 
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Texas Supreme Court, in Cain v. Hearst Corp, explained the reasons for rejecting false light 
tort: ‘(1) it largely duplicates other rights of recovery, particularly defamation; and (2) it lacks 
many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for defamation, thus unacceptably 
increasing the tension that already exists between free speech constitutional guarantees and 
tort law’.508 
O’Callaghan argues that the false light tort may be predicated upon, conceptually 
speaking, unsolid ground because there are some significant doubts about the protected 
interest in this tort. 509 Put differently, O’Callaghan questions how the law could recognise the 
protected interest within false light concerning our own views of ourselves, without 
producing chilling effects on freedom of expression. He argues that it would be hard to 
identify the authentic selves that were publicly mischaracterised by false light. O’Callaghan 
builds his argument upon the work of the American sociologist Erving Goffman, who holds 
that it is difficult to distinguish our authentic selves from the illusion created by our 
performances within specific social stages with differing audiences before whom an individual 
performs. The social façade or persona created by individuals' performances may also depend 
on the social impositions, constraints or socio-cultural interpolations society produces as 
these correspond to that individual's social class or occupation (i.e. politician or teachers). 510 
O’Callaghan argues that it might be difficult to pin down the authentic self and distinguish it 
from the social front or façade because our life, as Goffman points out, would become 
troublesome if we ought to reveal our authentic self each time it differs from this front. 511  
 
508 Cain v. Hearst Corp. (Tex. 1994). 878 S.W.2d [579]. 
509 O’Callaghan, (n 8) 293. 




Based on this argument, O’Callaghan concludes that our social front or reputation 
would be adequately remedied by defamation law. If our reputation and authentic self were 
wrongly mischaracterised, the efficacy of applying false light might be in doubt on the grounds 
that the law would find it difficult to formally distinguish the authentic self from the illusion 
produced by our social role. 512 Therefore, defamation law has a stronger basis to protect our 
reputation (social front) than the tort of false light. However, this argument, despite its 
sociological premise, cannot deny the fact, as this thesis emphasises, that our privacy could 
be undermined by the dissemination of false information. This thesis uses the convincing 
arguments advanced in the literature of false light tort to support the inclusion of falsehoods 
within the remit of privacy. First, however, it would be imperative to compare the American 
false light with the English (false) privacy.   
Comparing the American false light tort with the English privacy law  
The American false light is one of the four types of privacy torts recognized in the 
American jurisdiction by the Restatement of Law, second (torts) under §.652E. 513  Privacy 
may be invaded via a false light if:   
‘One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before 
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
(a) The false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person, and  (b) The actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
 
512 Ibid. 296. 
513 The four types of privacy recognised by the Restatement of Torts (Second): § 652 B- Intrusion upon Seclusion. 
§ 652 (C) Appropriation of Name or Likeness. § 652 (D) Publicity Given to Private Life. § 652 (E) Publicity, which 
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. The original formulation of those types was suggested by 
William L. Prosser within his memorable article ‘Privacy’. Prosser, (n 50) 389; J. Clark Kelso, ‘False Light Privacy: 
A Requiem’ (1992) 32 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 783, 790.  
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disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which 
the other would be placed’. 
Based on this article, the liability under false light tort requires a successful satisfaction 
of the following four elements: publicity, falsity, highly offensiveness, and malice. The first 
requirement, which the claimant has to prove, relates to the form in which an invasion of 
privacy takes place: the false light tort must reach the public at large through publicity, 
regardless of the form of communication whether oral, written or otherwise, to constitute an 
actionable invasion of privacy. The mere publication of information by the defendant to a 
single person or a small group of persons cannot qualify as publicity; that is, it does not mean 
the threshold of reaching a large public needed in order to consider specific dissemination of 
information as false light. 514 English privacy law, by contrast, considers an unauthorized 
communication of private information even between the defendant and few people as a 
misuse of private information. 515 
Secondly, the falsity of publicity is the subject matter of the false light invasion of 
privacy even though such false information is unrelated to the claimant’s private life. 516 The 
falsity requirement has a significant role in assessing the existence of other related 
requirements because the degree of falsity may increase or decrease the probability of the 
statement's offensiveness, and the likelihood of actual malice with which the statement was 
made. 517 Such a requirement, however, is completely inconsistent with the English privacy 
 
514 The Restatement of Torts, Second, § 652D, comment a. 
515 Burrell v Clifford [2016] EWHC 294 (Ch) Richard Spearman Q. C. awarded damages of £5000 in respect of a 
letter containing private information sent by the defendant to an editor of a national newspaper without the 
claimant permission and any further publication. 
516 The Restatement of Torts, Second § 652E comment a  
517 McKenna, (n 505) 120. 
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law that requires the private nature of information in question whereas truth or falsity is 
irrelevant matters in privacy. 518 
Thirdly, the falsity made by the publicity is insufficient to constitute a false light unless 
such falsity is adjudged highly offensive to a reasonable person that could include false private 
and non-private information. 519 The highly offensive test requires that a significant 
misrepresentation of the claimant's character, history, beliefs or activities was caused by the 
false publicity. 520 On that point, English law takes the view that a publication of falsity itself 
is unable to give rise to privacy invasion unless such publication engages the test of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The English test of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
is broader than American test of highly offensive, because as the House of Lords identified in 
Campbell v MGN, that English test is not only much simpler, clearer, and less strict but it also 
prevents a kind of confusion with proportionality test. This is because the highly offensive test 
implies the issue related to the balancing stage of privacy regarding a degree of intrusion into 
private life. 521  
Finally, false light requires the claimant to prove that the defendant was malicious, 
namely she or he recognized the falsity or recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of the 
subject matter of publicity in the suit. 522 This requirement was initially applied by the 
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill in respect of which the constitutional considerations 
applied in defamation, designed to protect the freedom of the press, should also be applied 
 
518 McKennitt v Ash (n 12) 
519 The Restatement of Torts, Second at § 652E illustration 4; John Hartshorne, ‘The protection of Prosser’s 
privacy categories within English tort law’ (2014) Torts Law Journal 37, 46. 
520 The Restatement of Torts, Second at § 652E comment C. 
521 (n 5) [22 & 135]; Hughes & Richards, (n 4) 178. 
522 However, the American Law Institute admits the possibility to hold a non-malicious publisher liable under 
false light tort only on the basis of negligence of falsity see:  The Restatement of Torts, Second § 652E (Caveat).   
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within false light tort brought by private litigants where the challenged information involves 
matters of public interest. 523  
In this case, the defendant published certain false information about the claimant and 
his family who, having been held hostage by three escaped convicts and released without 
harm, later became the subject of a Broadway play. A national magazine (Time) published a 
photo in an article describing the details of the family’s daily life and it falsely showed the 
exaggerated sufferance of the family members. 524 The claimant brought false light 
proceedings given such falsifications were not defamatory to allow bring defamation 
proceedings against the newspaper. The Supreme Court held that the mere proof of the falsity 
of the story was insufficient to recover damages using a false light tort; rather, the claimant 
has to prove further the actual malice of the defendant by indicating that s/he either knows 
the falsity or exhibits a conscious disregard towards the potential truth or falsity of the story. 
525 The main rationale for imposing the defamation constitutional restriction of malice 
requirement in false light action was the willingness to mitigate the chilling effects potentially 
inflicted upon freedom of expression. 526 Free speech rights promote a robust exchange of 
ideas and opinions in cultural, social, scientific and political domains so that it may encourage 
a self-governance and a functioning democracy. 527   
 
523 (1967) 385 U. S. 374. 
524 Ibid.  
525 Ibid.  
526 The difference between actual malice and common law malice has been explained in Cantrell v. Forest City 
Publishing Co. (1974) 419 U.S. 245, the latter is 'frequently expressed in terms of either personal ill-will towards 
the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights [and focuses] on the defendant's attitude 
toward the plaintiff's privacy'.' In contrast, the former refers to 'the truth or falsity of the matter published'. 
Joseph A. Page, American tort law and the right to privacy, in Gert Bruggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi & 
Patrick O’Callaghan (eds) Personality rights in European tort law (CUP 2010) 60. 
527 Time, (n 523). 
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However, in Gertz v Ropert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the constitutional 
requirement of actual malice had been revoked from defamation proceedings against media 
defendants if the claimant was a private individual.528 On that basis, it is for the States to 
decide the standard of liability in defamation law where the claimants are private individuals. 
Thus, it is an unresolved question of whether actual malice is a binding requirement in false 
light tort because of the Supreme Court in Cantrell v Forest City Publishing Co. left this matter 
to the States to decide which standard of liability is applied in false light cases. 529 English 
privacy law, in contrast, does not require actual malice to be proven by the claimant. 
However, malice could be relevant to the defamation defence of publication on matter of 
public interest (POMPOI) if applied in privacy. 530 
How false light can support false privacy? 
Despite of the differences between American false light and the English false privacy, 
the false light tort may provide conceptual foundations that explain how the dissemination 
of falsehoods could undermine the right to privacy. The unauthorised dissemination of highly 
offensive/private information may represent an infringement of privacy right because 
injurious misrepresentation through placing an individual before the public in a highly 
offensive false light may consequently undermine our privacy, namely ‘our concern over 
accessibility to others’. 531 False light/privacy undermines our self-determination, which 
 
528 Gertz v Ropert Welch, Inc. [1974] 418 US 323, 340. 
529 Ibid.; This is why the Restatement of Law, Second (torts) under §. 625E Caveat states that: ‘The Institute takes 
no position on whether there are any circumstances under which recovery can be obtained under this Section if 
the actor did not know of or act with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the matter publicised and the false 
light in which the other would be placed but was negligent in regard to these matters’. It might be interesting to 
mention that 10 States apply the principle of Gertz v Ropert Welch, Inc. whereas 14 States apply the principle of 
Hill v Time, Inc. in false light cases. Moreham & Aplin, (n 507) 109. 
530 This issue is explored in the next chapter. 
531 Nathan E Ray, 'Let There Be False Light: Resisting the Growing Trend against an Important Tort' (2000) 84 
MINN L REV 713, 745; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, (1980) 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 
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means the self-ability to regulate its own affairs that is a kind of privacy, which would cause 
the aggrieved party either to withdraw from society as being publicly forced to confront a 
misleading image of herself or to defend such offensive falsehoods.532 Undermining self-
determination could affect privacy on the grounds that unauthorised false publicity might not 
only force an individual into seclusion but also thwart the free exchange of ideas and the 
formulation of informed decisions based on independent and critical thinking that privacy 
seeks to promote. 533  
False light/privacy may result in a wrongful loss of privacy because such dissemination 
represents a harmful interference in an individual’s ability to control that dissemination of 
private information crucial to regulating how the public perceives and responds to them. 534 
Furthermore, it represents an egregious method for invading privacy because, an individual 
could be compelled to reveal the truth of what she would keep private to refute the falsity of 
such dissemination. 535 For instance, if A, who is sterile, is publicly accused of impregnating B, 
A would lose their privacy in being forced to reveal his sterility (private information) for the 
purposes of refuting such false accusations536. Moreover, the dissemination of believable 
falsehoods may intrinsically harm an individual’s very sense of herself by re-fashioning it 
within the social field and their self-relation. 537   
 
532 Ray, Ibid. 746; McKenna (n 505) 115 
533 The effect of false light on political and democratic system adds a further justification to recognise false light 
tort. Ray, ibid. 744. 
534 Wade L. Robison, False light in Larry May, C. T. Sistare & Jonathan Schonsheck (eds) Liberty, equality, and 
plurality (Lawrence, Kan. University Press of Kansas 1997) 184. 
535 Ibid. 185. 
536 Pierre Le Morvan, Information, privacy and false light, in Ann E. Cudd and Mark C. Navin (eds) Core concepts 
and contemporary issues in privacy (Springer 2018) 86. 
537 Robison, (n 534) 185.  
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Based on this analysis, there are convincing arguments, conceptually speaking, to 
include the falsity within the protective remit of MOPI because the dissemination of highly 
offensive/private falsehoods may undermine the core of the right to privacy. However, there 
is an argument against the recognition of false light/privacy that could potentially cause 
chilling effects on the freedom of expression, because there are social benefits to participate 
in risky activities that seek to promote the democratic discourse and encouraging truth-
finding. 538  
This argument, however, could be overstated and untenable since the false 
information, constitutionally speaking, is particularly valueless, and carries no First 
Amendment credentials. The truth may be thwarted in the event of citizens being 
misinformed, and inaccurate information advances no wide-open debate regarding matters 
of public interest. 539 Furthermore, it is unlikely that false light/privacy liability could, in turn, 
produce chilling effects upon the willingness of powerful media to deliver information within 
the public space. Rather, such entities with vast resources and influence must be responsible 
for privacy losses caused by publications. 540 In other words, deploying false light/privacy 
action may promote freedom of expression because it encourages people to exchange ideas 
and participate in a public debate with less apprehension around the prospect of powerful 
media freely exposing individuals to public but uncomfortable and embarrassing scrutiny. 541 
Media publication of what is shown to be false information would diminish their credibility 
 
538 O’Callaghan (n 6) 293; Patrick O’Callaghan, Refining Privacy in Tort Law (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 
2013) 119; Hartshorne (n 322) 109; Rolph (n 352); Hartshorne, (n 519); Hillary Young, ‘Anyone… in any medium’? 
The scope of Canada’s responsible communication defence’ in Andrew Keynon (eds), Comparative Defamation 
and Privacy Law (CUP 2016) 35. 
539 Ray, (n 531) 732.  
540 Perkins, (n 506) 1230; it is interesting to mention that George Keating argues that fairness perspective could 
impose a similar consequence on defendants who make profits from tortious conducts and it is highly unfair to 
leave the victims without remedy, further discussion on this perspective will be made in the next chapter.  
541 Ray, (n 531) 733-4. 
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and the public’s confidence. 542 Journalists failing to face any legal liability resulted from 
violating others' private interests would, therefore, be potentially inconsistent with the ideal 
and re-enforced role of the free press in serving political and social purposes in a democratic 
society.543   
False privacy, therefore, may have little influence upon freedom of expression 
because dissemination of false information without legal liability would adversely affect the 
public confidence in the reliability of the press and media and their role in a democratic 
society. 544  Based on the above, the formulation of the false privacy action may help to 
promote freedom of expression because it might lessen the irresponsible, unfair, and 
sensational publications involving inaccurate and harmful information that consequently 
compromise media credibility amongst the public. Moreover, false privacy may encourage 
creating justice because it would be truly unfair to protect the freedom of expression with 
regards to powerful media entities with huge resources at the cost of privacy of individuals. 
By virtue of the analogy between false light and false privacy, the recognition of false privacy 
within English law may be justified since the publication of false private information may not 
be actionable under defamation law unless the publication itself bears a defamatory meaning. 
In other words, whilst it may be correct that every defamatory statement that holds a person 
up to hatred, ridicule, or contempt would also be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities,545 not every highly offensive statement could be defamatory.  
 
542 Ibid. 734. 
543 The effects of false speech will be further discussed in the next sub-section of efficiency. 
544 Haider Jinana, ‘English false privacy vs. American false light: forward steps to reduce harmful disinformation 
and increase press reliability’ (2020) 6 Under Construction @ Keele Journal https://view.joomag.com/under-
construction-journal-issue-61-under-construction-journal-61/0961761001586888761  
545 Wade (n 505) 1121-6 
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B- The argument of local coherence lens  
The scholars, who oppose the protection of false private information within privacy 
law, argue that the coherence of law would be undermined if false information, which is the 
subject-matter of defamation law, is included within the protective scope of privacy. Such 
inclusion would allow the claimant to circumvent the restrictive rules applied in defamation 
in respect of interim injunction or defences made in the sake of the defendant. 546 In other 
words, the recognition of false privacy would undermine the well-established law of 
defamation and its balance between competing interests of reputation and freedom of 
expression. Privacy and defamation have different structures, protected interests, defences 
and interim injunction rules. 547  The dichotomy of truth/falsity was posited as the key-
solution to keep coherence with respect to the protective scopes of privacy and defamation 
law. Based on such views, the English judicial development concerning false privacy is 
considered as unacceptable progress because it leads to a problematic overlap with 
defamation and consequently results in an undesirable incoherence with regards to the whole 
legal system.548   
The question raised at the outset is whether defamation and privacy are separate 
branches of law because local coherence focuses on a specific field rather than the whole of 
the law. 549 Cheer advances an argument which seeks to keep the law from falling into an 
undesirable incoherence caused by the overlap between defamation and privacy. Such an 
argument is based upon merging both torts under a unitary action, which aims to provide the 
 
546 Robert Stevens, Damages for wrongdoing in the absence of loss, in Jason N E Varuhas & N A Moreham (eds) 
Remedies for breach of privacy (Hart Publishing 2018) 112-3; Hartshorne (n 322); Rolph (n 352); O’Callaghan (n 
6). 
547 The details of differences between defences and interim injunction rules will be discussed in the next 
chapters.   
548 See chapter 3.  
549 Raz, (n 340) 310. 
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victim of harmful publications with appropriate remedies, whether in terms of monetary 
awards or interim injunctions. 550 Cheer’s suggestion shifts the emphasis from the nature of 
harmful publications within defamation and privacy towards the remedies for the harms 
irrespective of whether such harms were caused by defamation or privacy invasion. Through 
a local coherence lens, such suggestions ground defamation, privacy and other causes of 
action protecting the victim from harmful publications within one unified area or specific field 
of law.  
However, Cheer’s assessment of potentially merging defamation and privacy under 
one action based on the shared roots of dignity and autonomy might be overgenerous as 
closely scrutinizing defamation and privacy causes of action would lead to identifying clearly 
recognisable differences which prevent any chance of merger. Firstly, defamation and privacy 
differ on the nature of protected interests: the former protects the interest of reputation 
whereas the latter protects the interest of privacy. 551 Secondly, defamation and privacy differ 
in terms of the tests applied to decide whether the published information is defamatory or 
private. 552 Finally, the structure of defamation law, based on legal presumptions and 
correlated defences, differs basically with the structure of privacy based on the balance 
between private/public interests. 553  
If defamation and privacy are different and separate areas of law, the question is how 
could the coherence of defamation and privacy be promoted? The dichotomy of truth/falsity 
was used to maintain the coherence of privacy and defamation law where true information 
 
550 Cheer (n 15) 321. 
551 Rolph (n 452); Such difference could not be undermined by the fact that reputation may be tarnished by a 
publication of defamatory and private information as well as privacy might be invaded by a publication of private 
and defamatory information. See chapter 3.   
552 See chapter 2.  
553 The details of defences in defamation and privacy will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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ought to form the subject of privacy whilst defamation should protect false information. 554 
The question raised in this regard is whether such dichotomy truly preserves the coherence 
of defamation and privacy. The answer to such questions requires scrutiny and a careful 
explication of core elements of both torts in order to conclude whether falsity increases 
defamation’s coherence and truth increases privacy’s coherence.  
Mere falsity as an aspect of published information is insufficient to bring defamation 
proceedings; such information should initially be defamatory (based on defamation tests), in 
order to bring such action whereby the question of the falsity of such defamatory statements 
is legally presumed and can be conversely refuted using a truth defence. 555 The touchstone 
of defamation is whether the information in question is defamatory, and the question of 
falsity and truth is a question of legally refutable presumption upon which a defence via proof 
can be predicated. 556 Similarly, the touchstone of privacy is whether the information in 
question is private; and the question of truth and falsity constitutes an irrelevant matter. 557 
Furthermore, there is no principled reason to restrict the protection of false information 
within defamation law which excludes it from the scope of privacy. 558 For instance, false 
statements could also be protected by other causes of action such as malicious falsehood559 
and negligence. 560 Thus, defamation law cannot protect false private but non-defamatory 
information because it does not satisfy the requirement of defamatory meaning and it is 
 
554 Rolph (n 352); O’Callaghan (n 6); O’Callaghan (n 538); Hartshorne (n 322). 
555 Rolph, ibid. 
556 Giliker (n 171) 134-4; The justifications of truth defence will be explained in the next chapter. 
557 McKennitt (n 12) [79]; O’ Callaghan (n 6) 300. 
558 Barendt (n 310) 89. 
559 Joyce v Sengupta [1993] 1 WLR 337 (CA). 
560 Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296. 
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illogical to prevent the victim of such disclosure from having legal recourse by forcing her to 
bring an irrelevant cause of action.  
To overcome this logical argument, Rolph found in the diversity of defamatory tests 
available within defamation law a real protection covering wide quantity of false private 
information. There, the non-reputational considerations could be deemed defamatory 
although the claimant suffers no reputational loss such as defamation based on the shun and 
avoid test and the ridicule test. 561 However, such argument would undermine the coherence 
of the defamation as being merged with privacy considerations because, as Descheemaeker 
argues, defamation law ought to protect the only reputational interest and such tests protect 
in fact the claimant's privacy rather than reputational interest. On the other hand, the 
coherence of privacy law would be significantly undermined because the truth constitutes a 
complete defence in defamation whereas the question of truth/falsity is irrelevant in the 
privacy protection. 562  
With respect to both writers, both arguments are based on an unjustified 
presumption; Rolph’s and Descheemaeker’s arguments are grounded upon the premise that 
private information cannot be defamatory and defamatory information cannot be private; 
whereas privacy and reputation cannot be distinguishably separated in a manner which 
affirms loss of privacy to have no reputational ramifications and loss of reputation no privacy 
ramifications. 563 If the information in dispute is not only false-private but also defamatory, 
there would be no fundamental problem with such overlap and duplication of actions because 
each cause of action in defamation and privacy has different protected interests and different 
 
561 Rolph (n 352). 
562 Descheemaeker (n 97) 
563 See chapter 3. 
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elements if successfully satisfied. In such circumstances, multiple causes of action could be 
brought in respect of the same set of facts such as the overlap between tort and contract. 564   
By contrast, the exclusive protection of false private information within defamation 
law in order to maintain its coherence would, as previously argued, significantly undermine 
the coherence of privacy law itself.  Restricting the scope of privacy only to true private 
information would be inconsistent with the core of privacy protection itself because the 
claimant would be forced to affirm the truth of the private information published without 
their authorisation. In other words, forcing the claimant to discuss the truth or falsity of 
private information would be incompatible and inconsistent with the very reasons behind 
formally protecting privacy in the first instance. Such involuntary discussion and affirmation 
of the truth or falsity of private information interfere with the dignity, autonomy and right to 
control to dissemination private information based on which privacy law was recognised. 565 
Furthermore, the dichotomy of truth/falsity between privacy and defamation may cause 
further interferences with the claimants’ privacy, because by bringing privacy action the 
claimant endorses the truth whether totally or partially of the published private information 
is true and such endorsement would open the doors for further invasions of privacy566. Such 
compelling revelations renders the right to privacy incoherent because the victim of 
unauthorised publication of private information finds herself:  
‘compelled to expose details from his private life which he did not want to become 
public in the ensuing court procedure, because it may be necessary to reveal the private 
 
564 Ray (n 531) 751. 
565 Campbell (n 5) [51] per Lord Hoffman; Philipson, (n 16) 160. 
566 WER (n 490) [13].; Raz, (n 340) 286. 
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truth in order to prove that the journalist's report was untrue. This leads to new reports 
about his private life (as revealed in the trial)’. 567 
Such inconsistency, as this thesis argues, would be negated and consequently, the 
coherence of privacy law would be promoted in the event of false private information being 
protected by privacy. The question of privacy law's coherence imposes significant scrutiny 
regarding the nature of the information that should be private irrespective whether it is true, 
false or mixed. Shifting the emphasis from the truth/falsity dichotomy of the publications and 
placing it on the nature of the information (defamatory/private) would promote the 
coherence of both defamation and privacy law. The focus upon the nature of information 
would promote the coherence of law via increasing the consistency of each tort, but also by 
reflecting a monism and unity between its parts. Such strong monism and unity may, in turn, 
increase the privacy law's coherence from local coherence perspective. 568 Privacy law may 
reflect a strong monism if its touchstone relates to the private nature of information because 
the true, false and mixed information will be equally protected. Furthermore, emphasising 
the nature of the information may also strengthen the connections between true, false and 
mixed information protected by privacy law because of their private nature; this may reflect 
a strong unity of those parts falling within the scope of privacy. 569  
The same could be also said in respect to the coherence of defamation that would be 
significantly promoted if the emphasis is placed on the nature of the information protected 
by defamation law, namely defamatory nature, rather than the falsity of the information. 
 
567 M Prinz, 'Remedies against an Infringement of Privacy: The Effect of Sanctions and Compensation and their 
Proportionality, Council of Europe Conference on Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy, Strasbourg, 
23 September 1999, cited in Hartshorne (n 5) 114. 
568 The idea of monism and unity has been discussed in chapter 3. 
569 Kress, (n 351) 666. 
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Similar to privacy law, the truth or falsity of the information is an irrelevant matter to its 
defamatory nature and the fact that the information is true cannot alter the injurious effect 
of defamatory information, nor can the fact that the information is false to render the 
information as defamatory, as explained within the Australian case of Ainsworth v Burden: 570 
‘The objective truth or falsity of the matter complained of is irrelevant to its defamatory 
nature. To say of a solicitor that he is dishonest is injurious to his reputation (and thus 
defamatory of him), and it does not become less injurious because the statement is 
true. To say of a member of the Bar (irony aside) that he is universally regarded as the 
best advocate in Sydney is not injurious to his reputation and does not become injurious 
because the statement is false. That there is simply no relationship at all between the 
defamatory nature of a statement and its truth or falsity is well illustrated......’.  
Therefore, the claim that falsity is the touchstone of defamation law and that privacy 
could undermine the coherence of law, and defamation law, may be overstated. In addition, 
even if such a claim was right, there is no principled reason to prioritize the coherence of 
defamation law over the coherence of privacy. Therefore, privacy should protect private 
information regardless of whether it is true, false or mixed if one seeks to promote the 




570 Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 [88] this case is brought from Australian jurisdiction due to its 
relevance to the issue of decision. 
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C- The argument of efficiency 
The aim of this subsection is to examine to what extent protecting false private 
information under only defamation or privacy law is justified from an economic analysis 
perspective. The claim that false private information should be protected only by defamation 
law will be examined and then the focus will turn to the efficiency of that claim. From an 
economic analysis perspective, an activity may be socially optimal when its benefits at the 
highest level are not outweighed by the social costs imposed by such activity571.  Information’s 
optimal social value may be produced when its social value to everyone outweighs its 
production costs. 572 Based on such analysis, protection of false private information under 
defamation law would lead to an inefficient market outcome, because defamation rules 
would externalise the costs of publishing false information unless they are defamatory. 573 In 
other words, because the touchstone of defamation law is the defamatory nature of 
information, the publication of false private information would be increased until no benefit 
is produced from such publication – the social costs based upon injuries caused by such 
activity (reputational harms) are internalised (risk of liability under defamation law). The 
publisher would continue to publish false private information so long as such information is 
not deemed defamatory – which means no liability costs could be imposed in respect of 
publishing false but non-defamatory information.  
Such outcomes might consequently be deemed unjustifiable from an efficiency 
perspective because of the significant social costs caused by the publication of such false 
private information. The over-publication of false information may generate additional social 
 
571 Shavell, (n 396) 40-1; Acheson & Wohlschlegel, (n 111) 349 
572 Shavell, (n 365) 139. 
573 Acheson & Wohlschlegel ibid.  
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costs relating to public trust in the media. 574 The claim that defamation law should protect 
false private information would incentivize the publication of falsehoods, due to the 
externalisation of liability costs of such non-defamatory information under libel law. 
However, such incentives could decrease (in the long term) the self-governance benefits of a 
free press in a democratic society because the public would be distrustful of media’ 
publications whose role is to offer responsible and fair reporting that keeps institutions 
accountable. 575 The diminution of the public’s confidence in the free press would thus also 
undermine the media’ function as a watchdog in a democratic society to observe and expose 
public figures’ wrongdoings because only very few people will trust the accuracy of such 
publications, and there might be concomitant incentives for public figures to engage in 
wrongdoing. 576 Such harmful ramifications, whether in respect of privacy loss or the public's 
confidence in the media, outweigh the short-term benefits of unchecked freedom of 
expression. Defamation law thus constitutes an inappropriate legal mechanism for achieving 
efficient outcomes within the information market because it cannot deal with the publication 
of false information unless such information is defamatory. 
By contrast, privacy law may achieve an efficient outcome through internalizing social 
costs of publishing false private information by imposing liability on the publisher. The social 
costs of spreading false private information outweigh the benefits of such disclosure because 
only the disclosure of true and useful information in the marketplace could be justified on the 
grounds of concealment leading to inefficient consequences. 577 The flow of false private 
information is unjustified from a cost/benefit perspective because its concealment may 
 
574 Acheson & Wohlschlegel, (n 111) 381. 
575 Ibid; Ray (n 531) 734. 
576 Acheson & Wohlschlegel, ibid. 382. 
577 Posner, (n 377) 406. 
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outweigh the potential and short-term benefits for the media. Protecting false private 
information under privacy law would not only prevent or remedy the privacy loss of 
individuals, but it would also increase public confidence in media outlets and promote the 
public's trust in their publications. Privacy law may, therefore, provide an appropriate 
mechanism for achieving the efficiency goals because it may allow the disclosure of true 
private information that serves the public interest, and prevent or discourage the disclosure 
of false private information under which publication no public interest could be served. 578  
Overall, the claim that only defamation law should protect the unauthorised 
publication of false private information may be deemed unjustified from an efficiency 
perspective. Rather, such a claim would increase the flow of harmful falsehoods in the market 
of information without instituting any legal mechanism that forces publishers to internalise 
the social costs of their risky activities. 579 Consequently, privacy law would form the best 
mechanism for internalising such costs and allow only the disclosure of information that 
serves the public interest.  
D- The argument of feminist analysis  
Feminist analysis perspective could help to examine the plausibility of claims that (as 
many scholars argue) only defamation law should protect false private information. Such a 
claim has allowed leaving false private but non-defamatory information without legal remedy 
due to freedom of expression restrictions and the necessity of living within an interconnected 
society that oversensitive individuals must accede to. 580 Carole Pateman argues that the 
individuals' rights to control their private information cannot be removed from conceptions 
 
578  McKennitt (n 12) [79]. 
579 Acheson & Wohlschlegel, (n 111) 349. 
580 O’Callaghan (n 6) 300-1; Rolph (n 352). 
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around the body, and the giving up of such control under employment or marriage contracts 
commodifies human beings for their personal services because the levels of personal 
autonomy and the individual’s ability to work and control their body are inseparable. 581 Based 
on such view, the feminist analysis considers that the unauthorised disclosure of private 
information is treating people as commodities and results in hierarchical relationships 
between employer/employee, and husband/wife instead of equal relationships between such 
individuals. 582 If the false information were the exclusive arena of defamation law, this would 
create and reproduce subordinate relationships because the unauthorised publication of false 
private information may undermine the individual’s control over their private information 
that cannot be separated from the concept of autonomy. 583 This is highly objectionable from 
a feminist perspective because it would allow the commodification of the individual through 
harmfully manipulating access to their private information without providing the harmed 
party legal recourse outside of that made available through the limited scope of defamation. 
Restricting the protection of false private information to the scope of defamation 
would not only deny justice to victims but it may disproportionately affect the victims' ability 
to gain an adequate redress because the main remedy available in defamation law is 
monetary award whereas the issue of compensation is invariably marginal in cases involving 
females victims. 584 The main remedy able to provide real relief, from a feminist perspective, 
is the super-injunction, whether in its interim or permanent forms, because it can prevent 
harms from occurring in the first place. By contrast, the contention that false private 
 
581 Carole Pateman, ‘Self-ownership and property in the person: Democratization and a tale of two concepts’ 
(2002) 10 the journal of political philosophy, 20.  
582 Richardson (n 385) 156. 
583 Ibid. 155; Descheemaeker (n 97). 
584  Richardson (n 385) 159. 
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information should be protected by privacy law would, as this thesis argues, not only provide 
the victims with adequate legal action to remedy the unjustified harms but could also provide 
female victims with real protection for their privacy rights. Concretely speaking, the possibility 
of granting injunctive relief under privacy law whereas such relief is hardly available in 
defamation law. 585  
E- The argument of access to justice 
The argument that this thesis emphasises is that the overlap between defamation and 
privacy may increase access to justice due to the possibility of granting injunctive relief under 
privacy law whereas it is rarely granted under defamation law. 586 There is no doubt about the 
fact that defamation and privacy proceedings are extremely expensive to the extent that 
litigants in possession of modest incomes are practically prevented from seeking legal 
remedies. For example, Sir Cliff Richard was ‘substantially out of pocket’ because he spent 
more than £3 million to protect his privacy right after an unjustified invasion by the BBC who 
agreed to pay him £2 million as legal costs beside £210 000 as damages. 587 Such problem 
became more complicated and difficult after the statutory instrument (2018 No.1287) 
decided to implement s.44 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LAPSO) 
2012 under which success fees (SF) based on conditional fee agreements (CFA) are no longer 
recoverable in defamation and privacy actions. 588 Such an approach was developed in 
response to the legal obligations imposed on the UK government under MGN v. UK, in which 
 
585 The rules of injunction applied in privacy and defamation will be discussed in the relevant chapter.  
586 The difference between interim injunction rules in defamation and privacy will be discussed in the relevant 
chapter. 
587 Ashleigh Rainbird, ‘Cliff Richard settles BBC case for half the £4.5million he spent on legal fees’ Mirror 
(London, 3 SEP. 2019)  
588 CFA or alternatively called (no win no fees) is an agreement between client and lawyer based on which the 
latter' costs are payable only in successful cases. In order to avoid financial risks of unsuccessful cases, Solicitors 
charge a success fee that is an uplift on their legal costs between 20-100% recoverable from the losing party.  
Conditional Fee Agreement Order 2013 Art.3.   
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Strasbourg Court found that success fees represented disproportionate interference with the 
defendant’s rights of freedom of expression under Art. 10 ECHR. 589 That is, it may remain 
practically impossible for less well-off litigants to face the legal costs of defamation or privacy 
law. Observing such similarities between defamation and privacy law from this perspective, 
in respect to the difficulties that powerless litigants face in relation to legal costs, may trigger 
a scepticism towards O’Callaghan’s argument that enlarging the protective scope of privacy 
could increase access to justice. O’Callaghan claims that protecting the unauthorised 
publication of true and false information (mixed) under privacy law would increase access to 
justice, whereas restricting privacy to merely true private information would prevent a 
significant number of victims from accessing justice. 590 There might then be no practical 
difference for disadvantaged litigants when bringing defamation or privacy proceedings if 
both actions are subject to the same restriction of CFA and SF. 591 This would be highly 
inconsistent with the civil justice aims that seek to provide citizens with a right to action 
around protecting their legal entitlements. 592 Furthermore, such practical lack of access to 
justice may be deemed inconsistent with the state's role in facilitating the wronged party's 
exercise of the right of action to remedy wrongdoing and impelling a wrongdoer to provide 
such remedy. 593 O’Callaghan refrains from including the false private information within the 
scope of privacy in order to avoid the undesirable overlap between defamation and privacy 
without considering whether including false private information within the scope of privacy 
 
589 The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice Mr David Gauke, ‘Defamation and Privacy Costs 
Protection, House of Commons Hansard’ 29 November 2018 https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-11-
29/debates/18112922000014/DefamationAndPrivacyCostsProtection accessed on 5 September 2019.   
590 O’Callaghan (n 6) 286. 
591 The actions of malicious falsehood, breach of confidence involving publication to the general public and 
harassment, where the defendant is a news publisher, is also subject of the success fees restriction made in 
Statutory Instruments 2018 No. 1287 (C. 92). 
592 Genn, (n 390). 




might increase access to justice. 594 However, privacy law might, on balance, provide a better 
option when compared with defamation law due to its provision of injunctive relief. The 
reason for prioritising such relief, from an access to justice perspective, is the relative legal 
costs of such relief when compared with those in defamation and privacy proceedings. 595 
This option would significantly decrease the subsequent trial costs in respect of actions 
seeking to remove unauthorised, published private materials. 596 If this is right, the overlap 
between defamation and privacy might provide the victim with a more accessible option to 
justice when compared with other options requiring inordinate financial resources. 
Accordingly, the inclusion of falsity within the protective remit of privacy would increase the 
opportunities for claimants to access justice through obtaining interim injunctions that are, 
practically speaking, less expensive than the cost of defamation and privacy actions. 
4. 4: Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has examined the main question of this thesis relating to what extent privacy 
law should protect false private information (false privacy) as this represents the core of the 
overlap between defamation and privacy. In order to assess where the balance may strike, 
the chapter has critically considered the arguments objecting to the recognition of false 
privacy. It has considered those arguments which seek to exclude false information from 
falling within MOPI’s protective scope in order to prevent the overlap in the first place, as well 
as the justifications for claims in the latter regard that focus on the implications for 
defamation and privacy torts themselves. This Chapter has also considered the arguments for 
the recognition of false privacy and has evaluated the doctrinal and conceptual grounds for 
 
594 O’Callaghan (n 6) 286. 
595 See the sub-section of access to justice in chapter 3. 
596 Mosley v Google Inc. [2015] EWHC 59 (QB) 
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excluding falsehoods from the scope of MOPI. This chapter has concluded that an overlap, 
such as those between defamation and privacy which in fact is grounded in key conceptual 
foundations, is difficult to avoid through (as many scholars have argued) simply retaining the 
dichotomy of truth and falsity. In addition, this chapter discussed in rigorous detail the 
implications of excluding false private information from the scope of MOPI from different 
perspectives. By using a framework incorporating local coherence, efficiency, feminist 
analysis, and access to justice to examine the feasibility of excluding = false private 
information from falling within the scope of privacy, this chapter concluded that: firstly, the 
correlation between MOPI and the equitable action of confidence, by contrast to scholars like 
David Rolph, may provide a strong basis to include the falsehoods within the scope of both 
actions since the confidentiality, rather the truth of the information, is the touch-stone of 
breach of confidence. Secondly, there is no inconsistency between falsehoods and MOPI 
because the reasonable expectation test may be applied irrespective whether the information 
was true or false. Thirdly, the mere falsity cannot be a basis to include false private 
information within the scope of defamation law because the touchstone of defamation is 
whether the information was defamatory. This means that the recognition of false privacy 
may not only keep the coherence of privacy law since it protects the information once it is 
private; but false privacy would also keep the coherence of defamation law because the latter 
will only protect the information related to truly reputational considerations. Finally, the 
overlap between defamation and privacy may be materially unavoidable once the 
information in suit were false, private and defamatory. In particular, the Chapter concludes 
that the protection of false private information within privacy law is predicated upon a solid 
ground equally from doctrinal and conceptual perspectives. The chapter has provided 
effective evidences to support current legal standing of false private information. This chapter 
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has shown how the American false light may support false privacy since the dissemination of 
falsehoods may undermine the core of privacy interest related to exclusive control of the 
dissemination of private information. The local coherence lens may also provide a significant 
insight to support the recognition of false privacy because it may ensure not only the 
coherence of privacy law, but it can also protect the coherence of defamation law. This study 
has thus far used efficiency and feminist analysis perspectives to reinforce the current 
standing of false privacy. Applying such arguments may increase the efficiency of privacy law 
since it would reduce the dissemination of falsehoods (socially harmful activities) and increase 
the press reliability. The chapter has also concluded that the extending of privacy scope may 
not necessarily increase access to justice, as argued in the literature, because defamation and 
privacy actions are significantly expensive. Consequently, it is relatively hard for people of 
limited incomes to access means of judicially protecting their rights or to prevent such 
breaches. The overlap between defamation and privacy torts would be unavoidable if the 
false information were private and defamatory at the same time. The question in this regard 
is whether such an overlap between privacy and defamation would allow application of 
defences associated with the latter into the former. In other words, if the overlap is factually 
unavoidable due to the information in question being private and defamatory, would it 
therefore be feasible to apply the defences of defamation law within privacy proceedings in 
order to preclude the claimant from circumventing the legal protection of defendant’ rights 


























Chapter 5: The impact of the overlap on defences in defamation and privacy 
5. 1: Introduction 
As seen above, the overlap between defamation and privacy is unavoidable once the 
information is false, private and defamatory. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the 
impact of such unavoidable overlap on the application of defences. The fact, that both torts 
equally take into account the legal protection of the conflicting right of freedom of expression 
besides the protection of the interests of reputation and privacy, may shed lights on the 
coherence of the free speech protection if such torts overlap. In this regard, there are two 
correlated questions that may be triggered from the overlap concerning the reciprocal 
applicability of defences in defamation and privacy. This thesis examines to what extent the 
defences of defamation should be applied in privacy cases if these torts overlap. The analysis 
of the overlapping cases provides no definitive response to this question, but merely some 
judicial attempts reflecting a receptivity to apply some of defences in defamation, such as the 
defences of qualified privileges and the publication on matter of public interest, in privacy 
cases because such cases equally involve harms to the claimant’s privacy and reputation 
interests. This thesis argues that a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among the 
members of society must be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
behaviour if the defence of publication on matter of public interest must be applied in the 
overlapping cases. Via applying the criteria of fairness and loss spreading within the 
distributive justice theory, this thesis argues that the journalist’s belief should not be seen 
reasonable if her exemption of liability may cause unfair distribution of the Media risky 
activities among the members of society. The coherence of law may also be relevant to 
examine the appropriateness of borrowing the defences of honest opinion and qualified 
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privileges from the law of defamation to privacy. This thesis advances the argument of the 
inconsistency of applying defences based on the presumption of malice in privacy law.  
The second question relates to the potential impact of the overlap on unifying or 
harmonising the defences in these torts. In doing so, this thesis tackles with this question by 
exploring the similarity (s) and critically examining the difference (s), if any, between the 
defences in such torts; and whether such differences are justified. This thesis argues that the 
overlap may provide grounds for harmonising the defences of the truth with public interest, 
and the honest opinion with the freedom to criticize. It is imperative to start with a summary 
of the defences of defamation and privacy law to facilitate mapping the consistency and 
inconsistency between them in order to examine their reciprocal applicability and 
harmonisation.  
5. 2: Overview of defences in defamation and privacy 
In the context of tort law, the presence of all elements of a specific cause of action 
established by the claimant may not be conclusive to definitively determine the liability of the 
defendant, because the latter may dislodge such liability by proving one of the recognised 
defences. The defence refers to the rule which relieves the defendant of liability despite the 
presence of all elements of the tort. 597 In this section, I outline the main defences in 
defamation and privacy that may be alternatively applied if the defamation and privacy torts 
overlap. However, this thesis precludes many defences that provoke no implication from the 
scope of this study, because they are equally recognised in defamation and privacy such as 
consent, estoppel, change of position. release, limitation and res judicata. 598  The limitations 
 
597 Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-Smith, ‘Central Issues in the Law of Tort Defences’ in 
in Andrew D. Dyson and James Goudkamp (eds.), Defences in Tort (Hart Publishing 2015) 3. 
598 Mark Warby and Victoria Shore, ‘Justifications and Defences’ in Nicole A. Moreham & Mark Warby (eds), 
Tugendhat and Christie: The law of privacy and the media (OUP 2016) 472; Eric Descheemaeker, 'Mapping 
Defamation Defences' (2015) 78 Modern Law Review, 641. 
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of this study also exclude other defences in defamation such as operators of websites, peer-
reviewed statement in a scientific or academic journal and innocent publication. 599 
A- Overview of defamation defences 
Truth (justification) 600 
Truth is a complete defence in defamation law, in respect of which the action would 
be dismissed if statements complained of were substantially true. 601 A truth defence is 
established if the defendant proves that the sting of libellous allegations was essentially 
true.602 In order to avoid liability, the defendant has the onus to prove the truth of the 
allegations complained of because English law supposes it is difficult for the claimant to prove 
falsity. 603 Two rationales explain why the truth is non-actionable in English defamation law. 
The first rationale is that English law priorities the value of truth over the value of reputation 
interest; therefore, once substantial truth of statements complained of were proved, the 
reputational harms are justified. 604 The relationship between truth and defamation is, as 
Robert Stevens argues, based on the principle of equal freedom that states it is lawful to speak 
the truth, even if the speaker was malicious, because truth itself implies a genuine interest to 
all the public. 605 The second rationale to justify truth defence is that no injury is inflicted on 
reputation interest by publishing true statements. Therefore, the truth implies, on one hand, 
non-existence of reputational injury in the first place, and, on the other hand, only deserved 
 
599 See chapter 8 (conclusion). 
600 Defamation Act 2013 s. 2 (4) has abolished the common law defence of justification as well as justification 
defence in section 5 defamation Act 1952 and replaced them by the statutory defence of Truth. 
601 S. 2 (1) Defamation Act 2013. 
602 Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772; [2003] EMLR 218 [34]; McBride & Bagshaw, (n 
84) 280. 
603 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127 [92]; Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 397; Paula Giliker, (n 117) 
134. 
604 Decheemaeker, (n 598) 651. 
605 Robert Stevens, Damages for wrongdoing in the absence of loss in Jason Varuhas & Nicole Moreham (eds) 
Remedies for breach of privacy (Hart Publishing 2018) 106; Descheemaeker, ibid. 650. 
153 
 
reputation is entitled to legal protection. 606 The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, 
however, makes an exception to the truth as a complete defence because it prohibits the 
defendant from using such defence if she or he was malicious in publishing statements 
surrounding criminal convictions. 607 
Honest opinion (fair comment) 608 
The honest opinion defence exempts the defendant from liability if the words 
complained about are recognised as an expression of opinion or comment which is honestly 
made without malice. 609 This defence seeks to provide free speech rights with an effective 
and strong legal protection because it significantly gives individuals a guarantee to make 
honest expressions of opinion. 610  An honest opinion is not actionable simply because it 
represents the defendant ‘s interpretation of what has previously been asserted as primary 
facts by someone else and this interpretation bears no authority on recipients to believe in 
its meaning. 611  
According to the Defamation Act 2013, three conditions ought to be satisfied by the 
defendant in order to avail from the statutory defence of an honest opinion. Firstly, the 
statement complained about needs to be a statement of opinion. 612 Deciding whether words 
complained of are statements of fact or of opinion is a difficult matter, because a statement 
whether of fact or opinion depends on the whole context of the publication. 613 However, if 
 
606 Chase, (n 602) [33]. 
607 The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 s. 8; Reynolds, ibid. 
608 Defamation Act 2013 s. 3 (8) abolished the common law defence of fair comment as well as section 6 
Defamation act 1952.  
609 Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013’ (2014) 77 MLR 87, 92; 
Descheemaeker, (n 598) 652. 
610  Spiller v Joseph [2010] UKSC 53 [86]; Mullis & Scott, ‘ibid. 91. 
611 Descheemaeker, ibid. 653. 
612 S. 3(2) Defamation Act 2013 
613 Mullis & Parkes, (n27) 430-3. 
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the defendant failed to prove the facts upon which her comment is based, the statement 
complained of cannot be an expression of opinion. 614 Secondly, the statement complained of 
should explicitly or implicitly indicate the basis of the opinion. 615 This requirement is to allow 
the recipient judging whether the comment, based on supporting facts, is well-founded. 616 
Finally, the opinion complained of should be held by an honest person either on the basis of 
facts which existed at the time of the publication of statement complained of, or before it if 
that fact was a privileged statement. 617 The opinion honestly made is no longer required to 
be a matter of public interest, because such opinion represents only the individual viewpoint 
on the matter of publication. 618 The requirement of a lack of honesty means, practically 
speaking, that the defendant has no honest belief in the truth of the statement (opinion) 
complained of. 619 In other words, malice may defeat the defence of honest opinion if the 
defendant did not genuinely hold the opinion expressed. 620 Malice must be proven by the 
claimant, but this task might be difficult in many cases because malice in this context depends 
on the defendant’s lack of belief in the truth. Nonetheless, the defendant’s failure to mention 
or prove a factual basis for the opinion may indicate the malice or dishonesty of the opinion 
complained of. 621 
Absolute privileges  
The law places a complete immunity from being sued in order to let people speak 
freely without fear. 622 Absolute privileges, therefore, refer to the occasion in which the maker 
 
614 Spiller, ibid. [5]. 
615 S. 3(3) Defamation Act 2013 
616 Spiller, (n 610) [3]. 
617 S. 3(4) Defamation Act 2013 
618 Mullis & Scott (n 609) 93. 
619 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] EWHC 159 (QB) [24]. 
620 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2000] HKCFA 86; [2001] E.M.L.R 31 [79]; Spiller, ibid. [67]. 
621 Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 458. 
622 McBride & Bagshaw (n 84) 289. 
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of the defamatory statement is completely immunized from legal liability. Absolute privileges, 
like the truth, enjoy also a complete immunity irrespective of whether such statements were 
true or false and whether the maker of such statements was motivated by malice. 623 There 
is a public policy to be wholly free from liability for publication of defamatory words, and such 
public policy is linked to freedom of expression considerations that have absolute priority 
over the interest of reputation. 624 There are a variety of absolute privileges, 625 such as 
parliamentary privileges,626 publications ordered by the parliament,627 judicial privileges, 628 
communications made in respect of judicial proceedings, 629 fair and accurate reports of 
judicial proceedings publicly heard, 630, fair and accurate reports made in respect of public 
meetings proceedings,631 and executive privileges made between the state's official members 
in respect to their official duties. 632  
Qualified privileges 
Defamation law initially presumes malice once the defendant has passed defamatory 
statements to a third party, but such presumption could be rebutted if the defendant proves 
the right circumstances under which the statements complained of had been communicated. 
633 However, the claimant may dislodge the defence of qualified privilege (replication of 
 
623 The malice is defined as the improper motives that intent to injure the claimant; whereas the express malice 
refers to the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of the statement or her reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the statement. Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston & Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law, 
(7th edn, OUP 2007) 669. 
624 ibid.; Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 461. 
625 For the purpose of this overview, it is unnecessary to state all absolute privileges due to their variety. Such 
detail may be found in Mullis & Parkers, ibid. 468-529. 
626 Article 9 Bill of Rights 1688. 
627 S. 1 & 2 Parliamentary Papers Act 1840. 
628 Seaman v Netherclift [1876] 2 CPD 53, 56. 
629 Waple v Surrey [1998] 1 WLR 860. 
630 S. 14(3) Defamation Act 1996. 
631 S. 7 and Para. 9 of Schedule Defamation Act 1952. 
632 Chatterton v. Secretary of state for India [1895] 2 QB 189. 
633 See chapter 1. 
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malice) by proving affirmatively that the defendant was malicious.634  Qualified privileges are 
applied in situations under which the defendant may be exempt from liability of passing a 
defamatory incrimination, based on specific reasons that defeat the legal presumption of 
malice. 635 They refer to the communications made in respect to the nexus of duties and 
interests in which the communicator’s conducts are subject of investigation. 636 Based on such 
privileged circumstances surrounding the publication, there is a prima facia presumption that 
the defendant was not malicious. However, such presumptions could be rebutted if the 
claimant positively proves that the publication was activated by malice. 637 
The rationale of qualified privileges refers to the public interest in allowing people who 
were under the duties or interests to communicate frankly and freely if the communication 
was made with good faith. 638 Qualified privileges, like honest opinion, could also be defeated 
if the defamer was malicious. The malice in these privileges could vary from a general meaning 
of ill-will or improper motives, to an actual or expressed malice; namely an absence of honest 
belief. Improper motives mean that the defendant uses the privileged occasions to injure the 
claimant, and in such a case, the defendant would lose the immunity of liability given in 
respect of qualified privileges. 639 Such immunity would also be lost if there is an absence of 
 
634 Descheemaeker, (n 598) 664 
635 Ibid. 
636 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘A man must take care not to defame his neighbour’: the origins and significance of 
defence of responsible publication’ (2015) 34 university of Queensland Law Journal, 239,242.  
637 McBride & Bagshaw (n 84) 291; Descheemaeker, ibid. 242. Nonetheless, there is no single case law supports 
this possibility, because it would be too difficult for the claimant to prove how a privileged defendant has been 
activated by malice in making the statement complained of. Descheemaeker (n 597) 665. 
638 Horrocks v. Lowe [1975] A.C. 135 per Lord Diplock; In Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130,  for instance, the 
court found that the defendant, who was a director of Scottish Petroleum, was protected by qualified privilege 
when he showed the chairman of the board a letter containing defamatory allegations about the claimant, who 
was a managing director of Morocco branch of the same company, because if such allegations were correct 
then, there would be a duty for the defendant to show such letter to the chairman who also would have an 
interest in such a letter 
639 Horrocks, ibid.; Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 733. 
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belief in the truth of the statement complained of. 640 Such absence makes a conclusive 
evidence of expressed malice, because such malice may undermine the justification of 
qualified privileges (namely there is no legitimate interest in protecting a deliberated 
publication of false and injurious information). 641 Furthermore, immunity would also be lost 
if the defendant was reckless in respect of the truth or falsity of the statements complained 
of, because such recklessness may equate with knowing the falsity of those statements. 642 
Publication on a matter of public interest (Reynolds defence) 
The Defamation Act 2013 in section 4 has abolished the common law defence known 
as the ‘Reynolds defence’ and replaced it with a new defence of publication on a matter of 
public interest. 643 The Explanatory Notes of the Act stated that the new defence is based on 
and inspired by the common law defence of Reynolds. 644 The publication on matter of public 
interest defence consists of two requirements (tests): the publication matter must relate 
whether totally or partially to the public interest (public interest test); and the defendant’s 
belief that the publication serves the public interest must be reasonable (responsible 
journalism test). The first test, as a matter of law decided only by the judge, could be a 
controversial one simply because there is no one exhaustive test to definitively determine the 
concept of public interest. 645 This task could be difficult with the fact that no definition of 
public interest was provided by the new Defamation Act 2013. However, the court of Appeal 
 
640 Horrocks, ibid. 
641 Mullis & Parkes, ibid. 734. 
642 Horrocks, ibid. 
643 S. 4(6) Defamation Act 2013.  
644 Alexander Economou v David de Freitas [2018] EWCA Civ 2591 [76]; Jameel & Another v Wall Street Journal 
Europe [2006] UKHL 44 [146] Baroness Hale; Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 535; Weaver, (n 49) 89; Mullis & Parkers, (n 
26) 533; Eric Descheemaeker, ’Three errors in the Defamation Act 2013’ (2015) 6 JETL 24, 34; Eric 
Descheemaeker, ‘Truth and Truthfulness in the Law of Defamation’ in Anne-Sophie Hulin, Robert Leckey & Lionel 
Smith (eds) Les apparences en droit civil, (Yvon Blais 2015) 13; Eric Barendt, ‘Freedom of Expression in the United 
Kingdom under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2009) 84 I LJ 851, 854. 
645 Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 643-8. 
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in Reynolds case law offers general guidance to determine the scope of public interest in a 
responsible journalism defence that mainly includes activities related to political life, public 
administrations or institutions and elections. 646 In Flood v Times Newspapers, the Supreme 
Court held that publication on police corruption and its investigation in a proper manner 
constitutes a real public interest justifying the first requirement of the Reynolds defence. 647 
However, it is argued that political matters, practically speaking, are the main subjects of 
publications that meet the requirement of public interest applied in Reynolds defence. 648 
Public interest requirement should be decided by considering the whole story and there is no 
necessity to prove the existence of general concern in respect of all the pieces of the 
publication. 649 The second part of the statutory defence of POMOPI requires that the 
defendant had a reasonable belief that the statement complained of was in the public 
interest. 650 This requires the court to take into account all the circumstances of the case and 
assess if the editorial allowance was appropriate. 651 To achieve such a goal, the court must 
assess whether the steps taken in gathering and publishing the publication were responsible; 
namely, to what extent the defendant was reasonable to believe in the truth of the allegations 
complained of.652 Lord Nicholls stated a non-exhaustive guideline of ten factors by which the 
court could assess whether the publication complained of met the standards of responsible 
 
646 Reynolds (n 603) [176] per Lord Bingham. 
647 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11 [69]. 
648 it could be interesting to indicate that the Reynolds test of public interest is between two extreme tests 
judicially rejected: the first, which is too subjective or a newsworthy test that requires too easy threshold based 
on audience target; whereas the second extreme test which is too objective was 'needed to know' because its 
threshold could be too onerous. Mullis & Parkes, ibid. 645. 
649 This means that editorial discretion plays a significant and exclusive role in deciding how the story ought to 
be introduced. Flood, (n 652) [132]. 
650 S. 4 (1) b Defamation Act 2013. 
651 S. 4 (2 & 4) Defamation Act 2013; of Defamation Act 2013, Explanatory Notes: section 4 para. 29; Flood, Ibid. 
[79] Lord Philipps emphasised; Hunt v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1220 (QB) [12] Eady J has identified 
these two elements by saying: ‘Verification involves a subjective and an objective element. The journalist must 
believe in the truth of the defamatory allegation and that must be a reasonable belief to hold’. 
652 Reynolds, ibid. Jameel (N, 651) [53]; Economou (n 644) [84]; Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 649.  
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journalism. 653 The court has the final word to decide what the responsible journalism 
standard is which can vary from case to case according to its circumstances. 654 
The role of malice in POMOPI provokes a hard debate between scholars on whether 
POMOPI is an extension of qualified privilege, or a new independent defence to decide 
whether the malice should play a role in such a defence. Paul Mitchell argued that the 
Reynolds defence is an extension of qualified privilege in which malice has a significant role, 
because this defence requires not only that the publication was responsible and in the public 
interest, but that the publisher should also not be malicious. 655  
However, there might be other motivations that should be considered, such as 
bringing the misconducts of public figures to light and holding them accountable for such 
misdeeds. 656 Malice, practically speaking, may be relevant matter to POMOPI if it refers to 
the concept of lack of honest belief in truth – whether in the sense of knowing the falsity of 
the allegation, or reckless disregard about the truth or falsity of defamatory allegations. This 
is because such defence requires due diligence and reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of 
the information in question and such requirements (if met) mean an implicit refutation of 
 
653 The ten factors are: '1. the seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is 
misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 2. The nature of the information, and the 
extent to which the subject-matter is a matter of public concern. 3. The source of the information. Some 
informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind or are being paid for 
their stories. 4. The steps are taken to verify the information. 5. The status of the information. The allegation 
may have already been the subject of an investigation which commands respect. 6. The urgency of the matter. 
News is often a perishable commodity. 7. Whether comment was sought from the defendant. He may have 
information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the defendant will not always be 
necessary. 8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the story. 9. The tone of the article. 
A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact. 
10. The circumstances of the publication, including the timing' see: Reynolds (n 603) per Lord Nicholls.  
654 It is useful to indicate that the reasonableness test applied in s. 4 D. A 2013 and responsibility test applied in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd are materially similar because they share the same rationale to hold a fair 
balance between the competing interests of freedom of expression and reputation. Economou, ibid. [86]. 
655 Mitchell, (n 124) 20. 
656 Ibid.  
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express malice. 657 POMOPI excludes not only the express malice, but also dishonest 
behaviours (such as phone hacking and bribery) because the propriety of the defendant's 
conducts, as Lord Hoffman, expressed, 'is built into the conditions under which the material 
is privileged'. 658 Therefore, it could be odd to imagine a malicious publisher with a responsible 
behaviour because the defendant’s proof of her responsible behaviour may implicitly and 
consequently indicate the absence of express malice. 659 
B- Overview of privacy defences  
 
In the context of privacy, different defences could be raised to justify the disclosure of 
private facts. While public interest, which is the main defence applied in privacy, is explained 
in detail, this introduction explains briefly the defences of waiver of the right and public 
domain. If an individual sought the limelight or courted publicity by voluntarily making her 
personal and private information publicly accessible in order to become a public figure, she 
may waive her right to privacy. In other words, no legal protection is available when 
involuntary intrusion into her private life occurs, because her previous disclosure may imply 
consent to waive her privacy. 660 In Axel Springer AG v Germany,  661 the Strasbourg Court 
recognised this doctrine to a large extent when it found that the claimant's prior conduct with 
the media should be taken into account in assessing the claimant’s ‘legitimate expectation’ 
to protect his private life that would be effectively reduced in certain cases. One could 
 
657 Ibid. 
658 Jameel (n 56) [46]. 
659 Descheemaeker, (n 636) 246 
660 Warby and Shore, (n 598) 479; Phillipson, (n 16) 150. 
661 Springer, (n 5) [101]; This approach provoked some lively criticisms because it would open gates to invade 
individual private lives without any public interest justifying such invasion at all. Gavin Phillipson argues that 
waiver doctrine would deny the claimant's reasonable expectation towards her private life in the first place; 
furthermore, this approach would also wrongly equate between voluntary and involuntary disclosure of 
personal information.   In addition, the voluntary revelation of private information ought to be considered as an 
exercise of the individual control over her private life, not an abandonment of it. See: Phillipson, ibid. 151; Warby 
and Shore, ibid. 
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observe that there is a kind of overlap between the consent and waiver doctrines, because 
voluntary disclosure of private information through the media might be considered as implicit 
consent to publish information of the same nature and seriousness,662 as well as an 
assessment of public interest in the subsequent disclosures. 663   
Public domain, principally speaking, has no effect on the legal protection to the 
protected interest in the new action of misuse of private information. This is because privacy 
might be harmed by further unauthorised publications of private information entered in the 
public domain that follows on from previous unauthorised publications. 664 However, the 
public domain might affect the usefulness or effectiveness of an interim injunction remedy to 
ban intrusive information that already existed, was published, or known by the public. In 
Mosley v. MGN, Eady J declined an interim injunction order to prevent a newspaper from 
publishing personal information related the claimant’s sexual life, because the fact of being 
viewed many thousands of times would render the order meaningless. 665 However, in CTB v. 
NGN, 666 Eady J refused to dismiss the interim injunction previously granted to prevent the 
defendants from disseminating information identifying the claimant and his sexual 
relationship with the second defendant. The judge rejected the defendant’s argument that 
no purpose is served by the previous anonymity injunction due to the availability of such 
information on the Internet. 667 The judge found, contrary to the case of Mosley, the 
injunction may still serve a legitimate purpose to protect further publication of private 
 
662 Theakston v MGN [2002] EWHC 137(QB). 
663 Warby and Shore, (n 598) 479. 
664 Ibid. 493. 
665 Mosley, (n 33) [32]  
666 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Imogen Thomas [2011] EWHC 1232 (QB) 
667 Ibid. [14]. 
162 
 
information concerning the claimant’s sexual relationship which could be leaked by the 
second defendant. 668  
Privacy law protects individuals from unjustified intrusion into their private lives 
whether such intrusion made by visual images or verbal means; and each exposure of private 
materials represents new distressing and harassing intrusion. 669 Considering this approach, 
granting an injunction might be useful and effective relief to Mosley, because it would prevent 
him and his family from suffering further distress and harassment caused by new readers and 
viewers of his private and distressing story. 670 In PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd, 671 
therefore, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss an interim 
injunction order preventing the defendant from disseminating details of PJS’s extra-marital 
relationships with two women, due to the public availability such private information on 
Internet after being published in different foreign jurisdictions. The Supreme Court found that 
the interim injunction application is based on the private nature of information, not on their 
confidentiality or secrecy – which might be significantly affected by a public publication in 
domestic or foreign jurisdictions. The Court recognised how such injunction is useful to 
protect the claimant’s family, wife and children, from being a target of the press as well as 
the potential and subsequent intrusions into their private lives. 672 The public domain should 
have no impact on the grant and continuity of interim injunction orders if the requirements 
of Art. 12(3) HRA are satisfied. 673  
 
668 Ibid. [19] 
669 Ibid. [24]. 
670 Mosley, (n 33) [27 & 32]. 
671 PJS, (n 154) [57]. 
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English law shows that the notion of public interest could include different and 
sometimes overlapping categories of speech that, as Gavin Phillipson argues, significantly 
strike the balance in favour of freedom of expression or more precisely the freedom of the 
press, similar to the American approach. 674 Democracy requires a free exchange of 
information in political, economic, social, artistic, intellectual and educational spheres; 
however, the political debate has to be prioritised over other speeches in a democratic 
society. 675 In Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd, 676 for example, Tugendhat J found 
that there is a public interest in reporting details of a sexual relationship between people 
working in the same public organisation and exercising official functions; the public interest 
lies in publicly discussing proper or improper standards in public service. The court must 
decide how public interest may be served: whether by publishing private facts or by 
concealing them. 677 Public interest is an elastic concept which could be enlarged or narrowed 
according to the circumstances. However, in Von Hannover v Germany, 678 the Strasbourg 
Court ruled a general standard to strike the balance between the competing rights in Article 
8 and 10 ECHR which ’lie in the contribution that the published photos and articles make to a 
debate of general interest’. Furthermore, in Axel Springer v Germany, 679 the Strasbourg Court 
added other criteria that may strike the balance between private life and freedom of 
expression such as: how well known the person concerned is, what the subject of the report 
is, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the method of obtaining the information and 
 
674 Phillipson, (n 16) 136-7; Paul Wragg, ‘The Benefits of privacy-invading Expression' (2013) 64 N. Ir. Legal Q. 
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its veracity, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and the severity of the 
sanction imposed.  
Revealing hypocrisy or preventing the public from being misled is one of the forms of 
speech falls within the public interest exception. 680  The truth may be the core of public 
interest when the public had a false image or was deliberately misled on a specific matter. It 
is in the public interest to correct such falsehoods and address those misled by reporting the 
truth. 681 In Mosley v News Group Newspapers, Eady J emphasised that the truth is not a 
‘trump card’ to invade the privacy of others, saying ‘Nor can it be said, without qualification, 
that there is a public interest that the truth should out’. 682 Similarly, in Hannon v NGN, Mann 
J said that ‘Telling the truth in a privacy case can be wrongful’. 683 Furthermore, in Campbell 
v. MGN, 684 Lord Hope pointed out that the right of the public to know that they had been 
misled by false information has a priority over the competing private interests, and hence 
correcting the false impression made by Campbell’s previous publicity lies within the public 
interest exception. However, the truth should be confined within the narrower basis of 
misleading the public, and it should not be an independent ground to invade the intimate and 
private territories of others. 685 If Naomi Campbell refused to answer the question of her drug 
dependency, which was the core of public interest justification, 686 there would have been 
press scrutiny to explain the reasons for such refusal. This is why  John William Devine argues 
that hypocrisy is an important means to protect the private life of public figures who are under 
press scrutiny and need more effective protection for their privacy due to the unlimited 
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environment of media.687 That is to say, privacy law should arguably be hypocrisy-supporting 
to provide public figures an effective protection for their privacy from media' intrusive 
questions; however, such a view may extremely provoke an inconsistency within media role 
as a watchdog in a democratic society to reveal illegal or misleading activities.   
One could, however, argue that deliberate hypocrisy (made through fabricated 
versions of celebrities’ private lives in order to conceal illegal behaviours) should be separated 
from the scenario of hypocrisy made in respect of questions about embarrassing private 
information that no legitimate interest could be served in knowing the truth. In hypocrisy 
scenarios that have a genuine public interest, there is a serious motivation to put the record 
straight, for instance, revealing the hypocrisy of Campbell of her drug dependency. 688 
However, the hypocrisy can be justified in other scenarios, such as asking questions about 
embarrassing private information, as this is a protected zone of privacy as there is no 
legitimate public interest knowing the truth. 689 However, there is a ground to argue that 
public interest would be served if details regarding the private life of role models in society 
were revealed. This is because such a disclosure might help the followers of such models to 
identify their immoral and unethical deeds as well as how such behaviours should be avoided. 
690 This argument, however, may exaggerate the influence of immoral behaviours of role 
models on their fans because there is no definitive evidence that the followers would adopt 
 
687 John William Devine, ‘Privacy and Hypocrisy’ (2011) 3(2) Journal of Media Law 169, 175; Paul Wragg, ‘A 
freedom to criticise? Evaluating the public interest in celebrity gossip after Mosley and Terry’ (2010) 2 JOML 295, 
310. Devine explains ‘‘Consider the case of a footballer about whose sexuality there is press speculation. A 
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688 Campbell (n 5) [151]. 
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such socially harmful conducts. 691 Revealing crimes or serious misdeeds represents a 
category of speech that falls within a genuine public interest concept. 692 However, illegal or 
criminal activities do not provide freedom of expression an automatic licence or priority to 
invade or intrude privacy right. Such an invasion should be proportionate with the seriousness 
of illegal allegations. In other words, trivial crimes should not be given an automatic licence 
or carte blanche to invade the right to privacy. 693 Furthermore, reporting on a criminal 
investigation may not justify an invasion of privacy right if innocence was the outcome of such 
investigations. In Cliff Richard v BBC, Mann J made difference between reporting a matter of 
public interest such as police investigation and revealing the identity of the person under such 
investigation. While the former represents a genuine contribution to a debate of general 
public interest, Mann J that found the latter did not make such a contribution. 694  
5.  3: The impact of the overlap on defences in defamation and privacy 
This section critically tackles the research questions related to the impact of the 
overlap on defences in defamation and privacy. It seeks to clarify the undesirability of 
borrowing certain defences, such as POMOPI and qualified privileges, from the law of 
defamation to privacy territory on one hand; and it provides an analytical ground to 
harmonise certain other defences, such as truth and freedom to criticize, to achieve a 
coherent protection concerning the freedom of expression on the other hand. The first 
subsection, therefore, explores and critically examines the judicial receptivity to apply 
defences of defamation in privacy cases from two perspectives: distributive justice and 
 
691 Phillipson, (n 16) 155; Gavin Phillipson and Helen Fenwick, 'National Irish Bank v RTE and finding the 
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coherence of law. The second subsection explores the impact of the overlap on harmonising 
the defences in defamation and privacy law. 
A- Critical analysis of applying defamation defences in privacy law 
The Court of Appeal in Campbell v MGN refused to apply defamation defence of public 
interest in privacy law because such torts are very different.695 However, this judicial refusal 
turned into an obvious receptivity in Mosley and Terry cases due to the obvious analogy 
between the defences of public interest which may represent the commonplace defence in 
defamation and privacy torts. In Mosley v MGN, Eady J identified that privacy and reputational 
interests were harmed by the unauthorised disclosure of private information related to 
Mosley’s sexual activities. The judge was clear that Mosley’s claim is one of privacy and not 
defamation, even though his Justice admitted there could be a harm to Mosley’s reputation 
caused by the false allegations related to the Nazi-style and death camp uniform. 696 The judge 
identified that obvious reason for the claimant bringing a claim of privacy, not defamation 
proceedings, was to avoid the defence of truth available in defamation. 697 Eady J concluded 
that false allegations cannot support any legitimate public interest justifying either the secret 
filming or the subsequent intrusive publications. 698 However, the recognition of reputational 
injury and the obvious analogy between subject matters of public interest invited the judge 
to reconsider the defence of responsible journalism (Reynolds) in defamation, even though 
 
695 Campbell, (n 167) [61]. 
696 Mosley (n 33) [3& 26]. 
697 Ibid. [144]. 
698 One might question whether it was proportionate to put the record straight had the Nazi theme, and mockery 
of the Holocaust were true? Eady J did not discuss such an issue since his justice was convinced about the falsity 
of the Nazi theme and Holocaust mockery. Nonetheless, one could argue that proportionality test in privacy 
context requires the court to balance the public interest whether to maintain the privacy or to favour the 
disclosure because the mere existence of a public interest in the disclosure such as Nazi theme could not justify 
the disclosure of sexual details and secret video. Such sexual disclosure might hardly provide further support to 
public interest concept, if any, rather it made a serious intrusion into Mosley private life and his family in a life-
ruining manner.  
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his justice acknowledged that tests of public interest applied in defamation and privacy are 
completely different. 699 Nonetheless, the judge concluded that the false allegations of Nazi 
elements and mockery of Holocaust victims were reached with unreasonable belief in their 
truth, because the journalist did not follow the rules required by the factors of responsible 
journalism. 700  
The judge analysed the steps taken by the defendant to verify the information as one 
of the factors of Lord Nicholls list. 701 The journalist’s belief of such false allegations was a 
made with a casual, cavalier, slipshod or careless manner because the journalist’s belief was 
based only on what they had been told – rather than on a serious and responsible 
investigation of truth. 702 Moreover, Eady J found that the purpose of the secret video was 
only to record the sadomasochistic activities in order to plead the defence of truth if libellous 
action was brought. 703 There might be a question whether the decision of publication of 
secret filming and details of sexual activities may meet the requirements of responsible 
journalism, had the steps of verification been responsibly conducted. The answer would be 
negative, since there are other factors that also should be considered to assess the standard 
of responsible journalism. 704 One of the main factors, that the defendant failed to satisfy, is 
whether the defendant sought to obtain and publish the claimant’s comment on the subject-
matter of the publication. 705 Eady J did not discuss this factor, because it is needless once the 
judge was satisfied that the publication was of irresponsible. The publisher neglected to get 
the claimant’s comment, simply because the latter would definitively seek an injunctive relief 
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to prevent any publication until the judiciary allows it. This factor is consistent with 
defamation law, because it is extremely difficult to obtain such a relief. 706 Eady J also 
mentioned the potential to borrow qualified privilege defence (from defamation to privacy 
territory) if a limited disclosure had been made to ‘those in the FIA to whom he is 
accountable’, who have an interest in knowing the information of the Nazi theme in order to 
assess Mosley's suitability as ahead of FIA. 707 Nonetheless, Eady J receptivity to borrow 
defences from defamation to privacy law was only obiter because his Justice did not rule and 
argue the point of law. 708 The judge left open the question of importing defences from 
defamation to privacy based on their analogy or overlap, and a future court reconsidered such 
an issue two years later by Tugendhat J in Terry v Persons Unknowns. 709  
In this case, Tugendhat J reconsidered the potential applicability of POMOPI into 
privacy law, if it overlaps with defamation law, to assess whether the applicant would satisfy 
the requirement of granting injunctive relief. 710 The court found that the uncertainty of 
privacy law and its relationship with defamation may require consideration of the editorial 
attitude or belief on assessing the public interest defence. 711 Tugendhat J believed that the 
gist of an injunctive application was to protect the claimant’s commercial reputation rather 
than his private life. The reason to choose privacy law to seek an injunctive relief was to avoid 
the restrictive rule of Bonnard v Perryman applied in defamation. 712 This finding led the court 
to consider the relationship between privacy and defamation law and explore how the 
 
706 It might be interesting to indicate that Mosley unsuccessfully brought an application to the Strasbourg court 
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707 Mosley, ibid. [17 & 122]. 
708 Warby & Shore, (n 598) 531. 
709 Reid, (n 31) 120. 
710 LNS, (n 28) [70]. 
711 Ibid. [70 & 78]. 
712 Ibid. [95 & 149]; The interim injunction rules in privacy and defamation will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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overlap between them in respect of voluntary, discreditable, and personal information. 
Therefore, this allowed the court to take into account that the ‘belief of a person threatening 
to make a publication in the media is relevant on the issue of public interest’ if the claimant 
chooses only privacy rather than defamation to proceed her claim. 713 
Tugendhat J, like Eady J, did not argue the point of law because the Terry case was 
concerned with an unsuccessful application of super-injunction. A further case, ZXC v 
Bloomberg L.P., undertook the judicial task of considering the potential applicability of 
defences of defamation in privacy law. In this case, Nicklin J stated that the application of any 
defence available in defamation law should be allowed within privacy law if the claimant seeks 
a monetary remedy to recompense reputational harm. 714 In this case, the claimant brought 
a claim of misuse of private information in respect of a publication of an article disclosing his 
name as a potential suspect of a criminal investigation into his business. Nicklin J found such 
unauthorised disclosure of private information successfully engaged the first test of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, due to its high-level of confidentiality as well as the factors 
in Murray list. 715  The court, according to proportionality test, found that the defendant failed 
to prove a sufficient public interest in revealing such private information; rather there is a 
strong public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information. 716 Nicklin J 
consequently held that the defendant was liable for unjustifiably breaching the claimant’s 
right to privacy, and granted the claimant a permanent injunction, as well as an award of 
damages, amounted to £25,000. 717 In assessing the damages, the court ruled that damages 
for harm to reputation and vindication should not be awarded in respect of the publication 
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of true information, and any award on such a basis would be an unjustified interference with 
freedom of expression in Article 10 ECHR. 718 Based on such an approach, defences of 
defamation should be applied in privacy law if the claimant sought to include an element of 
reputation within the awarded damages irrespective whether such defences were 
inconsistent with privacy law. Nicklin J was obliged to reinterpret the meaning of ‘esteem’ as 
protected by misuse of private information in Campbell v MGN that should refer to the 
standing of an individual rather than an individual’s reputational aspect. 719  
Distributive justice  
It would be imperative to analyse the differences, if any, between the defence of 
public interest applied in defamation and privacy before analysing the impact of applying 
POMOPI in privacy law from distributive justice perspective. The scope of POMOPI is mainly 
focused on political speech related to matters to public life that may raise public concern. 720 
This scope generally excludes matters related to private life, even though it is related to 
politicians, because the Reynolds defence gives priority to political speech concerning 
discussions on public life and its participants. 721 There are many subject-matters that fall 
within the public interest concept in defamation law, such as governmental conducts, 
corruption, safety, administration of justice, police conduct, and other conducts related to 
public bodies. 722 In Reynolds v. Times Newspapers,  Lord Nicholls emphasised that 
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reputational aspect within privacy law because this case is permitted to an Appeal decision. 
720 Reynolds (n 603); Flood (n 647) [33]; Serafin v Malkiewicz [2019] EWCA Civ 852. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 645. 
172 
 
information within the field of political discussion is likely to fall within the public interest 
arena, as the press utilises vital functions as a watchdog and a bloodhound: 723 
‘The court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the public interest and, 
therefore, the public had no right to know, especially when the information is in the field of 
political discussion. Any lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication’. 
Lord Nicholls emphasised the importance of political speech, in that media and the 
public should have ‘freedom to disseminate and receive information on political matters is 
essential to the proper functioning of the system of parliamentary democracy cherished in 
this country’. 724 To achieve such a goal, the truth or falsity of defamatory statements is a 
neutral circumstance, because there are social benefits related to promoting democracy and 
truth-finding in risky publications containing falsehoods related to political matters. 725 The 
statutory defence of POMOPI shifts the standard of liability from prima facia strict liability to 
negligence-based liability. 726 The defendant would be liable if the publication does not meet 
the standard of responsible journalism. 727 The test of reasonable belief in the truth of the 
statement complained of depends on the judicial assessment of what should be the standard 
of responsible journalism. This may not be restricted to only the ten factors set by Lord 
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Nicholls in Reynolds defence, but also judicial authorities and the codes of Press Complaints 
Commission. 728  
Defamation law provides freedom of expression with a breathing space to engage in 
political speech without fear of such a strict liability. There are several benefits for the 
democratic society in the flow of political speech in order to improve effectively the citizens' 
ability to self-govern. By contrast, applying strict liability in defamation law over publications 
on political speech would not only reduce such benefits but it might allow more corrupt 
officials to be unchecked and let them use defamation law as a weapon to suppress criticism 
and facilitate the politicians' misconducts. 729 Lord Nicholls, in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 
emphasised on the importance of political speech that media and the public should have 
‘freedom to disseminate and receive information on political matters is essential to the 
proper functioning of the system of parliamentary democracy cherished in this country’. 730 
However, such a priority to freedom of expression applied in defamation law may be 
inconsistent with the methodology followed in privacy law that requires to treat the 
competing rights of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR with equal weight. Freedom of expression may 
outweigh the right to privacy, only if the benefits of the publication are proportionate to the 
harms caused to the right to privacy. 731  Privacy law also gives the issue of truth and falsity a 
significant role in establishing the defence of public interest which requires the publication of 
private information to be true in order to justify the curtailment of privacy rights because the 
publication of false information may undermine the public interest defence. 732  
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However, the scope of defamation and privacy cannot be divided into black and white 
dichotomy because there could be information of serious public interest such as Nazi theme 
and Mockery of Holocaust victims accompanied with the publication of truly private 
information like sexual encounters of Mosley. In such case, there would be unavoidable to 
take into account the role of journalist’s belief, and how such belief could be reasonable in 
light of the criteria of POMOPI (Reynolds defence). Distributive justice theory, as this thesis 
emphasises, may provide a crucial insight to decide whether the defendant’s belief is 
reasonable as required by Article 4 (1) Defamation Act 2013. The author argues that the 
defendant’s belief cannot be reasonable if it leads to unfair outcomes in respect of the 
distribution of benefits and burdens of a given activity. If the publisher reasonably but 
mistakenly believed that the publication of private information serves the public interest, 
such as a Nazi theme and the mockery or humiliation of Holocaust victims, 733 it would be 
unfair to leave only the victims such as Mosley and the five female participants bearing the 
negative consequences of such an intrusive publication.  
Fairness demands that the public who benefit from such harmful activity should bear 
its costs and the publisher, such as the media, should be liable because they are able to spread 
such costs on the public who reap the benefits of harmful publications of private information. 
734 Media intrusive activities should not be considered as reasonable if only the victims bared 
the costs of such activities because it is unfair to ask a group of individuals such as celebrities 
to bear costs of activities of the press that serve the benefit of society in general. Distributive 
justice, via the fairness criterion, imposes on those who reap the benefits of press activities 
to bear their costs. Rebecca Moosavian, however, advances a controversial argument to 
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justify invading the private life of people under media lights who should bear the costs of 
survival of media enterprises.  She argues that the media industry, in order to commercially 
survive in the market, must enjoy an extent of freedom to publish salacious and prurient 
contents or celebrities’ gossips that interest the public. 735 Such types of information help to 
sell newspapers in the market, which significantly provides the press financial means to keep 
its watchdog function in a democratic society. 736  
However, Moosavian’s argument is highly objectionable from the fairness perspective 
for the following reasons. First, if the intrusive publications are in fact only for the financial 
sake of the media to ensure their economic survival, then fairness imposes strict liability to 
the media because it is grossly unfair to require victims to subsidise the costs of intrusions 
while the media reap the benefits. 737 Secondly, if the economic survival may justify the 
sacrifice of the private life of celebrities in order to keep the watchdog function of the press 
that is for the interest of the whole public, it is unjust, as Phillipson rightly argues, to put the 
price of such social good on the shoulders of a small group of people. 738 Based on this 
analysis, the society at large should subside the burdens of the survival of the press as a public 
good via the liability of the media who are able to spread such burdens as fairness imposes. 
Therefore, the judicial attempts to bring negligence standard of liability based on Reynolds 
defence into privacy law should take into account the distribution of burdens and benefits 
between participants in order to assess the reasonableness the defendant’s belief. One could 
argue that media, as well as the public, are often interested in so-called kiss and tell stories 
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that concern celebrities’ love lives, friendship, or infidelity. 739  High-profile stars are wealthy 
celebrities and they are so financially powerful to bear the price of the media’s survival, this, 
therefore, would reduce the strength of the fairness argument.740. However, the question of 
privacy disclosures of celebrities is often concerned with sexual and intimate information that 
involve female partners like in the Mosley and Terry cases.  
In Mosley v MGN, Eady J identified an element of blackmail or threat against five 
women with whom Mosley had sexual relationships to reveal their identities to the public at 
large if these females refused to cooperate with the defendant. 741 Such blackmail reveals, in 
fact, the vulnerability of women in society, in which sexual double standards may be 
reinforced or employed as an aspect of socio-cultural injustice. 742 Such socially disadvantaged 
groups would be highly harmed if they unfairly bear the costs of media activities based on a 
negligence standard. The reasonable standard would not only make the position of such 
powerful media better off, but it would also render the disadvantaged group worse off.743 
Furthermore, there might be another undesirable distribution from the loss-spreading 
perspective if the burdens of harmful publications are borne only by the victims instead of 
being spread across many participants or individuals. 744 If only victims bore the costs of media 
intrusions in their private life, there would be a crushing and debilitating effect on the 
individuals' autonomous choices and personality development since the standard of liability 
in POMOPI defence focuses on loss-shifting rather loss-spreading. 745 In other words, shifting 
the costs of privacy invasion only on the shoulder of victims would discourage them from 
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engaging in autonomous and different experiments or behaviours. 746 The media, therefore, 
should bear the invasion of privacy costs that could be spread over a section of society who 
benefits from media publications in order to encourage individuals in certain autonomous 
modes of activities. In addition, loss spreading may ensure the compensation of privacy harms 
– which is evidentially socially-beneficial – without financially ruining the defendant (media), 
since the latter is able to distribute such financial losses over a section of society who reap 
the benefits of media activities. 747  
The local coherence  
The first issue of applying the local coherence lens is whether the rules of a specific 
law are consistent and reflect a strong unity or internal interdependency between them. 748 
To begin with, privacy law, unlike defamation, does not recognise truth as a defence since it 
is inconsistent with justifications of recognising a right to privacy in the first place. 749 
Furthermore, defences of honest opinion and qualified privileges are implicitly based on the 
absence of malice, which the law initially presumed if it is established that the statements 
were defamatory. 750 The role of such defences is to dislodge the presumption of malice, 
meaning that the defendant knows or recklessly disregards the falsity or truth of the 
defamatory statement – however, the claimant may defeat such defences and positively 
prove the existence of malice. 751 One might argue that an honest opinion defence has a 
narrow application in privacy law, since it applies to a statement of opinion rather than a 
statement of fact. However, there might be an overlap between such statements that are 
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regarded as statements of fact that could be presented as expressions of opinion, or vice 
versa. 752 If that is right, there could be an argument to attain a global coherence between 
defamation and privacy law, by requiring an element of public interest in the matter on which 
the defendant exercises her freedom of expression. 753 In other words, privacy could be 
indirectly protected if defamation law reintroduces the previous requirement of public 
interest on the subject matter of honest opinion abolished in the Defamation Act 2013. 754   
Based on this analysis, however, applying such defences into privacy would undermine 
the consistency of privacy law itself. If truth itself cannot justify the interference with the 
claimant’s privacy, believing in the truth of private information should not exempt the 
defendant from liability.  It is highly inconsistent in bringing defences built on the absence of 
malice into privacy law where the defendant’s state of mind has no role to play in justifying 
the wrongful interference with privacy right. In addition, if privacy recognises such defences, 
the claimant must prove the defendant’s malice in order to refute them. Malice, as previously 
explained, refers to the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity, or her reckless disregard 
towards the truth or falsity of the information.  This matter can add a further intrusion into 
the claimant's privacy, because she or he would discuss the truth or falsity of private 
information. 755 Furthermore, such an approach would render privacy law internally 
fragmented and structurally unsupported, because privacy law, unlike defamation, makes no 
initial presumptions of falsity or malice that could be defeated by defences of truth, honest 
opinion or qualified privileges. Such defences are coherent and consistent with the initial 
presumptions of falsity and malice made in defamation law, and it makes sense to allow the 
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defendant to establish defences of truth, honest opinion and qualified privileges in order to 
defeat the legal presumptions of falsity and malice for the sake of claimant. 756 Moreover, 
such defences, if applied in privacy law, would consequently conflict with the methodology 
applied in the proportionality stage that requires the court to take into account the 
importance of both rights because no right should have precedence over the other. 757 The 
judicial approach applied in Mosley in regard of applying a qualified privilege in privacy may 
entail a significant change in the methodology of Article 8 and 10 ECHR, because there would 
be no proportionality test between the competing interests, as rather there would be 
anticipated precedence of freedom of expression over privacy interest.  
There is a ground to advance an argument to reach a strong coherence of protecting 
freedom of expression on one hand, and to achieve a strong consistency between defamation 
and privacy defences on the other hand. This argument relates to follow the methodology of 
balancing (proportionality) between the claim of privacy or reputation and the claim of 
freedom of expression without precedence to one right over the other. In other words, the 
harmonisation between defences in defamation and privacy to achieve a coherent protection 
to freedom of expression may support unifying the methodology applied in such torts. It 
might be time to adapt the methodology of  proportionality applied in privacy tort to be 
applied as well in defamation tort so that establishing of the defences of defamation are not 
conclusive  to relieve the defendant of liability; but the defendant must prove the value of 
revealing the information outweigh the value of concealing it. Based on this argument, truth 
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would not automatically relieve the defendant of liability if there is not sufficient public 
interest served by the publication of defamatory and private information.  
B-  The impact of the overlap on harmonising the defences in defamation and privacy  
Eric Barendt rightly argues that the overlap between defamation and privacy may 
support the claim to harmonise the defences of such torts. 758 The harmonising process, as 
this thesis emphasises, seeks to make consistency and compatibility between defences of 
defamation and privacy that must be, logically speaking, inconsistent and incompatible. This 
requires determining which defences are inconsistent, and which are consistent. This thesis 
argues that a potential harmonisation could be achieved between the defence of public 
interest and the defences of truth and honest opinion, whereas there is a clear consistency 
between the defences of public interest and absolute privileges.  
Truth and Public interest defences 
The relationship between the truth and public interest as separate defences may 
provoke a significant debate in respect of the overlap between defamation and privacy. To 
begin with, truth is a complete defence in defamation because speaking the truth is non-
wrongful, not only because such speech is self-evident, but also because a reputation built on 
a false basis is undeserved of legal protection. Furthermore, truth coheres with the legal 
presumption of falsity once the claimant establishes the defamatory meaning of the 
allegations. 759 By contrast, privacy law is based on a methodology of proportionality and truth 
cannot be a justification to restrict privacy rights unless the public interest served by the 
dissemination of private information justifies curtailment. 760 This means that truth in and by 
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itself cannot justify an invasion of privacy, because such a defence may deny the reason why 
a right to privacy should be protected in the first place. 761 Furthermore, private life and 
freedom of expression rights have equal weights in light of Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
domestic authorities, so the truth cannot be a complete defence in privacy law because there 
would presume precedence to freedom of expression over private life rights.  
The tension between such conflicting approaches in respect of truth becomes acute 
in relation to the substantive overlap between defamation and privacy, since reputation is 
one of the protected aspects of private life under Article 8 ECHR. 762 The fact that both 
reputation and privacy are aspects of Article 8 ECHR would shed light on the justification of 
truth as a complete defence in defamation. It might be time to reconsider truth as a defence, 
because it is no longer absolute that the truth should prevail in English law. 763  
This is why David Eady J extra-judicially wondered to what extent the dichotomy of 
truth and falsity should be sustained as a black and white distinction in English law. 764 Alastair 
Mullis and Andrew Scott argue that this distinction should be kept, because there is a very 
strong public policy interest to allow a publication of true but not personal information, and, 
little could be gained to bring defamation action alongside an action of misuse of private 
information if the information was true and personal. 765 This, however, may be untenable if 
the information were private and defamatory because it would be logical to bring both actions 
to protect privacy and reputation rights caused by a single harmful publication. Since there 
are privacy considerations within defamation tests (such as tests of 'ridicule’ and ‘shun and 
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avoid’) this may render the use of the truth defence problematic, because revealing the truth 
would harm the disguised privacy interest. 766 This tension, however, could be significantly 
assuaged if the exception of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 had been used as a rule, 
since it implies a consideration of public interest to justify the publication. Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974 states that ‘A defendant in any such action shall not by virtue of 
subsection (3) above be entitled to rely upon [the defence of justification [a defence under 
section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013] if the publication is proved to have been made with 
malice’. 767 This exception fits with the proposition that truth should be a defence if it was 
made for the public benefit. In other words, truth as a defence, instead of being a complete 
one, should be complemented by an element of benefit to the community. 768  
It may be useful to expand the exception of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
to add the condition of public interest, in order to restrict the truth defence to 'truth in the 
public interest’. This solution is not strange in the commonwealth jurisdictions. The South 
African law of defamation, for instance, decides that the mere truth of defamatory 
statements cannot exempt the defendant from liability, unless the publication of such words 
serves the community benefit. 769 This suggestion might also reconcile with the recent 
categorisation of defamation cases made by Tugendhat J in Sarah Thornton vs. Telegraph 
Media Group Limited, when his Justice separated personal defamation related to ‘imputations 
as to the character or attributes of an individual’ and business defamation related to ‘an 
imputation as to an attribute of an individual, a corporation, a trade union, a charity, or similar 
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body, and that imputation is as to the way the profession or business is conducted’. 770 In 
personal defamation, defamatory words related to misfortune and involuntary imputation 
such as disease, or an imputation makes her ridiculous, violate not only the claimant’s 
reputation but also her privacy. 771 Such a suggestion would keep the coherence of the law of 
defamation and privacy because a restriction of privacy could be justified if dissemination of 
private information serves the public interest. Put differently, truth in a public interest 
defence in defamation coheres with a public interest defence in privacy, because the truth of 
private information should be approved in order establish that its publication serves the 
public interest, whereas the falsity, as Lord Justice Buxton emphasised, undermines such a 
defence.772 This means that truth in and by itself cannot justify an invasion of privacy because 
such a defence may deny the reason why a right to privacy should be protected in the first 
place. 773  Consequently, if a public interest element is included within truth defence in 
defamation law, as this thesis argues, there would be meaningful harmonisation between 
defences of defamation and privacy since such actions could substantively overlap if regard 
of private and defamatory information. 
Honest opinion and public interest defences (Freedom to criticize) 
Another aspect of the interaction between defamation and privacy defences may be 
observed in the similarity between honest opinion and the freedom to criticise. The rationale 
of an honest opinion defence in defamation law is to allow the public to comment freely (and 
sometimes harshly) but always honestly. 774 Freedom of expression could be truly promoted 
if honest statements made in good faith, despite their defamatory meanings, are 
 
770  (n 619) [33] i. Tugendhat J also mentioned that both imputations could be carried in the same words. 
771 Ibid; Descheemaeker, (n 756). 
772 McKennitt, (n 12) [79]. 
773 Descheemaeker, ibid. 
774 Mullis and Parkes, (n 26) 424. 
184 
 
protected.775 Such a defence seeks to provide an individual a solid ground to protect her 
ability or freedom to reason since the opinion represents the understating of such individual 
towards the factual publications. 776  
Privacy law could restrict privacy rights on the basis of a similar justification applied in 
honest opinion in defamation law. In Terry v Persons Unknowns, 777 Tugendhat J emphasised 
that freedom to criticize may justify the revelation of information about private conducts 
which are socially or morally harmful; such as exploitations that occurred in private places and 
are made by powerful people against weaker people. The judge considered that public debate 
in a pluralistic society may leave limited space for the public to critique such harmful 
behaviours.  Such a concept is an aspect of freedom of expression, as Tugendhat J suggested, 
that has similar importance with individual freedom to live as one chooses. Such importance 
explains, for instance, the willingness of sponsors to keep the public image of celebrities like 
John Terry away from social criticism in order to promote their products. 778 The flexible 
approach of Tugendhat J suggests that a public interest exception implies the right or freedom 
to criticise socially harmful behaviour. Social criticism of unacceptable but legal behaviours is 
a mechanism of paramount importance that has achieved successful results to engage the 
public in debate on many issues. 779 Freedom to criticise was supported by subsequent 
authorities that held that such freedom ought to be taken into account when assessing the 
public interest exception in the publication complained of. In Hutcheson v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd, the Court of Appeal upheld a refusal of the injunction to restrain publishing 
private information regarding the applicant's second family due to a strong public interest in 
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publishing such information 'to authenticate the allegation of diversion of corporate funds for 
private purposes'. 780 The Court supported the Tugendhat J approach in Terry's decision that 
the freedom to criticise should be taken into account in assessing public interest justification 
to grant or refuse interim injunction application. 781 However, freedom to criticize is 
inconsistent with Eady J approach of neutral morality of free speech claim. Neutral morality 
approach excludes immorality from the scope of public interest justification. In CC v. AB, 782 
an injunction was granted to prevent a husband from selling details of the sexual relationship 
between his wife and a well-known married footballer. Eady J opined that tittle-tattle stories 
that reveal sexual information about public figures or celebrities may interest the public but 
would scarcely be of genuine public interest. His justice stated that sexual morality has to be 
excluded from standards based on which the judiciary exercise discretion. 783 This approach 
was replicated in Mosley v News Group Newspapers, Eady J rejected the defendant’s plea that 
depraved and adulterous activities are matters of public interest, because religious or moral 
disapproval should not be criteria to undermine human rights. Judges or journalists should be 
neutral in evaluating the sexual behaviour of others even they find them immoral and 
distasteful. 784 Eady J refused to outweigh the freedom of expression over the right to privacy, 
only because of the immorality and adultery of the claimant’s private conducts. 785 Such a 
neutral approach submits that immoral behaviour provides no weight – neither to undermine 
the participants’ right to privacy, nor to strengthen the claim of free speech. Eady J considered 
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that privacy itself protects private beliefs or conducts, even if they are socially harmful, unless 
its disclosure exposes illegality or hypocrisy. 786 
In PJS v News Group Newspapers, 787 the Supreme Court rejected the plea that the 
freedom to criticise represents a limited public interest. The court held that sexual infidelity 
cannot constitute a matter of genuine public interest if no illegal activities occurred within 
such individual behaviour. Freedom to criticize may provide anyone with a carte blanch to 
invade an individual right to privacy, simply because the disclosure of private information was 
made to criticise improper behaviours. 788 Such a justification leads to a deeper problem 
because it is incompatible with the justifications of privacy itself. Privacy is crucial to allow an 
individual to exercise free and autonomous choices and to develop certain controversial 
modes, whereas the absence of privacy would not only lead to penalisation of autonomous 
choices by others’ criticisms, but also a deterrent to everyone from engaging in such 
choices.789  Freedom to criticise, from a practical perspective, would require a court to decide 
if the claimant’s private conducts are reasonably immoral, instead of identifying a particular 
benefit to the public gained by disclosing private information. This would provide a licence 
for individuals to breach privacy rights, because it is easy to assume that some sexual 
behaviours, such as homosexuality, are disapproved of in Abrahamic faiths, even though this 
is acceptable in a liberal society790. In other words, the concept of public interest exception 
would be so broad because the freedom to criticize may lower the threshold of public interest 
to encompass an excessive amount of private activities based on their potential immortality. 
 
786 Ibid. [131] 
787 (n 154) [21 & 22]. 
788 Phillipson, (n 16) 159. 
789 Ibid. 160. 
790 Ibid. 161. 
187 
 
791 If such function is allowed, privacy as a fundamental right will be put under the mercy of 
editors because they would have the final word to decide which private conduct is immoral 
and then should be publicly disclosed. 792  
Shedding lights on the concepts of honest opinion in defamation and freedom to 
criticize in privacy may indicate that both share an identical aspect of freedom of expression. 
However, freedom to criticize, as Phillipson rightly argues, protects the revelation of private 
information in order to let others express their critical opinions towards socially harmful 
behaviours; whereas an honest opinion defence protects the evaluative statements made in 
respect of factual or privileged allegations. 793 If the real purpose of the freedom to criticize is 
to protect public opinions made in respect of socially controversial behaviours, there may be 
an argument to say that criticism in privacy law, like defamation, should be based only on 
factual or privileged assertions. In other words, the analogy between a basis of honest opinion 
and a basis of freedom to criticize may push further the argument that freedom to criticize in 
privacy law should be made only in respect of facts or privileged statements as applied in 
honest opinion in defamation law. This means that the freedom to criticize should protect 
and enhance the public debate, rather than reveal private information. Freedom to criticize, 
therefore, must not be by itself a reason to invade a right to privacy, because such approach 
is inconsistent and incoherent with the justifications of the protection of privacy in the first 
place. Rather, there might be a benefit in concealing such information instead of disclosing 
and criticizing it, because the disclosure of celebrities’ immoral behaviours might be harmful 
not only to these famous people and their relatives; but it could also create harms to society 
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in general because the celebrities’ fans like teenagers might also think to live such immoral 
experiences.794 
Absolute privileges and public interest defences 
 
There is a judicial ground to argue a strong consistency between absolute privileges in 
defamation and public interest defence in privacy. 795 For instance, in White v Withers Llp and 
Another, 796 the court of appeal rejected the appellant’s claim of breach of confidence or 
misuse of private information in respect of the respondent’s ‘wrongful interference with 
property by possessing, taking or intercepting the claimant's correspondence and documents 
including personal family letters, private and confidential letters concerning business 
opportunities and documents containing financial information’. Ward LJ upheld the decision 
of first instance court that the communication of the appellant’s private information between 
his former wife and her solicitors to be used in the litigation cannot be misused for the 
purpose of privacy invasion. 797 There is a public policy in immunizing statements made in 
respect of a litigation from any legal liability whether in defamation or privacy law. 798 The 
Supreme Court for instance, in Khuja (formerly known as PNM) v Times Newspapers Ltd, 799 
rejected any attempt to strip the protection of freedom of expression under absolute privilege 
(of publication of a fair and accurate report of proceedings) in open court by granting an 
injunction based on privacy law. The main reason for this rejection relates to the coherence 
of the legal system in defamation and privacy rules. The coherence of law may require an 
equal application of absolute privileges whether in defamation or privacy law, because such 
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798 Warby & Shore, (n 598) 495. 
799 (n 320) [34] 3. 
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privileges reflect a public policy that should not be circumvented by bringing privacy 
proceedings. 800 On that understanding, it is logical to apply the defamation defence of 
absolute privileges in privacy law, because the public policy behind such privileges may be 
consistent with public interest exception that overrides the freedom of expression over any 
competing interest in privacy. However, English privacy law is under development, and its 
rules emerge from common law cases, future cases may bring to life the potential application 
of absolute privileges in privacy law. 801  
5. 4: Concluding remarks 
 
This Chapter has explored the challenges of the overlap when applying the defences 
of defamation within privacy law, and the potential harmonisation between defamation and 
privacy defences. In order to map a clear picture of these challenges, the chapter has at the 
outset identified those main defences in defamation that could be applied in privacy law due 
to this overlap. These include truth, honest opinion, qualified privileges, absolute privileges 
and publication on matter of public interest. In parallel with this mapping, the chapter has 
also considered the defences of privacy such as public domain and public interest. This 
potentially precipitates an understanding of the differences between such defences;  it also 
provides a basis for assessing the potential implications of applying the defences of 
defamation in privacy law due to their unavoidable overlap. A deep analysis from distributive 
justice and local coherence perspectives has been applied towards assessing those judicial 
receptive approaches which sought to transpose some of the defences applied within 
 
800 It is interesting to mention that the Supreme Court ruled that no reasonable expectation could be raised in 
respect of the information disclosed in open court proceedings. Khuja, (n 320) [34]; Warby & Shore, ibid. 495-6. 
801 The American Restatement (second) of Torts in § 652F equally allows applying absolute privileges in 
defamation and privacy law ‘The rules on absolute privileges to publish defamatory matter in § § 583 to 592A 
apply to the publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy’. 
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defamation tort into the territory of privacy tort based upon the previously elucidated tort 
overlap. In this respect, this thesis has examined the judicial receptivity of borrowing defences 
of qualified privileges and POMOPI from the defamation to privacy territory if both torts 
overlap. Distributive justice theory added a significant insight to the question of applicability 
of POMOPI defence in privacy cases since it examined the distribution of benefits and burdens 
of applying such defence that would change the standard of liability in privacy from strict 
liability to negligence. By applying fairness and loss spreading criteria, there would be 
undesirable outcomes towards disadvantaged groups in the society who become worse off 
because of the unfair distribution of burdens and benefits resulting from the application of 
POMOPI in privacy law. It is unfair to ask a group of individuals such as celebrities or women 
to bear the costs of the activities of the press that serve the benefit of society in general. 
Distributive justice via the fairness factor requires those who reap the benefits of press 
activities to bear their costs. This unfair distribution of costs and benefits should be taken into 
account in assessing the reasonableness of the publisher’s belief that the publication of 
private information genuinely serves public interest (such as revealing details about a Nazi-
themed party and the mockery of Holocaust victims). 802 Such belief should not be considered 
as reasonable because it would leave only the victims (such as Mosley and the other five 
female participants) bearing the negative consequences of the intrusive publication. The 
fairness demands that the public who benefit from such harmful activity should bear its costs 
as well as the publisher. The media who are the most powerful entities should be strictly liable 
because they are able to spread such costs on the public who reap the benefits of harmful 
publications of private information. If the burdens of harmful publications were borne only 
 
802 Campbell (n 105) at 117; Mosley (n 118) at 122. 
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by the victims instead of being spread across many participants, this would be an 
objectionable outcome from distributive justice. Distributive justice theory also takes the loss 
spreading as a criterion to assess the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. The 
standard of liability in POMOPI defence focuses on loss-shifting rather loss-spreading because 
the costs of media intrusions were only carried by victims. This loss-shifting would be a 
crushing and debilitating effect on the individuals’ autonomous choices and personality 
development since the costs of privacy invasion were exclusively borne by a specific 
participant rather than spread over the whole society. Based on this criterion, it would be 
unreasonable, as this thesis concluded, to leave only the victim to bear the costs of the media 
intrusive publications.  Media as economically powerful entities occupy the strategic positions 
to spread the costs of harmful publications/damages in the fairest manner. The loss-spreading 
criterion may ensure the compensation of privacy harms without financially ruining the 
defendant (media) since the latter is able to distribute such financial losses over their 
business, and therefore indirectly towards a particular section of society invested in the media 
outlet – both of whom reap the benefits of media activities. From the local coherence 
perspective, there would be undesirable inconsistency if privacy law allowed the application 
of defences which initially require the defendant not to have malicious intent behind 
publishing the information. This means that the defendant must believe in the truth of the 
information to plead successfully the defences of honest opinion, qualified privileges and 
POMOPI. The undesirable inconsistency caused by applying such defences in privacy law 
derives from contradictorily bringing together the requirement of belief in truth alongside the 
fact that truth itself is not a defence in privacy. 
Regarding the potential harmonisation between the defences of defamation and 
privacy law, this chapter has articulated how examination of the overlap potentially sheds 
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further light on the reliability of truth as a complete defence in English defamation law, given 
that reputation (a protected interest in defamation) constitutes part of the private life 
concept. In the latter case, this can be extrapolated from Strasbourg jurisprudence or from 
an examination of theoretical perspectives. This thesis concluded that the overlap between 
defamation and privacy strongly calls for harmonising certain defences such as truth/public 
interest, honest opinion/freedom to criticize to achieve a coherent protection to freedom of 
expression, if the reputation and privacy ought to be always protected under two 
independent and distinct causes of action. The harmonisation between such defences, 
attained by adding the element of public interest, would be a necessary and justified step to 
achieve a coherence between defamation and privacy since both torts should equally protect 
































Chapter 6: The impact of the overlap on interim injunction rules 
6. 1: Introduction 
 
The impact of the overlap on interim injunction rules represents the fundamental 
challenge raised from such overlap. This relates to the longstanding rule of interim injunction 
applied in defamation law ruled in the historical judgment of Bonnard v Perryman in 1891. 
Keeping loyal to this historical authority represents a real challenge to adapt a unified rule 
concerning the applications of interim injunction in defamation and privacy law. The purpose 
of this chapter is to address the challenge of maintaining two (inconsistent) rules and identify 
the right applicable rule if defamation and privacy overlap. This chapter, therefore, explores 
defamation and privacy rules of interim injunction in the first section. In doing so, the chapter 
critically analyses the implications of applying defamation rule in the overlap and 
subsequently the consequences of applying privacy rule, as this thesis argues, in the 
overlapping cases.  
6. 2: Interim injunction rules of defamation and privacy  
In this section, I explain the concept of interim injunction. This is a essential 
prerequisite to understand the rules of interim injunction in defamation and privacy which 
are the tasks of the subsequent subsections.  
A- Overview of interim injunction  
According to the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive 
relief at the interlocutory stage if it is 'just and convenient to do so'. 803 The term of interim 
injunction refers to the restraining order in the introductory stage of judicial proceedings by 
 
803 S. 37(1) & (2) Senior Courts Act 1981. 
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which the harmful activities are suspended until the settlement of legal proceedings. 804 Such 
temporary order seeks to restrain initial harms that have not yet occurred or prevent further 
harms if the harmful activities had already occurred. The landmark case of American 
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd identified the governing principles to grant or refuse the 
applications of injunctive relief. 805 In this case, the claimant successfully sought an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing the applicant’s right to a 
patent; but the defendant appealed to challenge the validity of the license. The court of 
Appeal rejected the injunctive relief for two reasons: firstly, there was no prima facia case of 
patent infringement, and secondly, the conflict of evidence is a matter for trial proceedings 
rather than at the introductory stage.  
To grant an injunctive order, the court tests two matters; firstly, the seriousness of the 
litigious issue and whether it is frivolous or vexatious, and secondly, whether damages are an 
adequate or inadequate remedy to equally compensate the claimant and the defendant.806 
This means that no interim injunction should be granted if the damages awarded at trial were 
adequate to compensate the claimant’ losses caused by the defendant (who must also be 
able to pay them). Such injunctive order, if granted, would necessarily curtail the defendant’s 
competing rights unless the claimant has a real prospect to obtain a permanent injunction at 
trial. 807 
 
804 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 2 WLR 316, [1975] AC 396, [1975] UKHL 1; The court may rarely 
grant a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant to take positive steps to protect the claimant’s 
entitlement. Normann Witzleb, ‘Equity does not act in vain: an analysis of futility arguments in claims for 
injunctions’ (2010) 32 S. L. R. 503, 505. 
805 American Cyanamid Co. ibid. per Lord Diplock. 
806 Ibid. 
807 Deakin & al. (n 623) 876. 
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The nature of the litigants’ rights is the main element in determining the adequacy or 
inadequacy of monetary remedy. However, the court should consider other factors to decide 
where the balance of convenience lies if damages might potentially be an inadequate remedy 
to each party. 808 The court must balance the disadvantages to each party who might succeed 
at trial and the extent to which monetary recovery is sufficient to compensate for the loss. 
The court considers the effects of an interlocutory injunction on defendant' interest(s) if any, 
and whether it would cause much higher inconvenience than merely a temporary delay of the 
defendant’s course of action. 809 
An interim injunction has a significant role to play in the context of the defamation 
and privacy torts due to the sensitivity of competing interest of freedom of expression that 
would be significantly affected if an interlocutory injunction was easily granted. For example, 
the media (who are often the main defendants in cases of defamation and privacy) are 
unlikely to publish information due to the perishability of some information if this information 
was subject to a temporary order. 810 Furthermore, privacy and reputation as protected 
interests under such torts are dignitary interests, which could be unlikely restored only by an 
award of damages at trial if an interlocutory injunction avoided or denied.811 The applications 
of an interlocutory injunction are subject to two rules in defamation and privacy torts, which 
might produce two inconsistent outcomes as explained in the next paragraphs. 
 
808 American Cyanamid Co. (n 811) 
809 Ibid. 
810 Sophie Matthiesson,’who’s afraid of the limelight? The Trafigura and Terry super injunctions’ (2010) 2 J. M. 
L. 153, 154. 
811 Mosley, (n 33) [209]; Reynolds, (n 603) per Lord Nicholls. 
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B- Interim injunction rule in defamation (Bonnard v Perryman) 
English defamation law applies the defendant-friendly rule which makes the grant of 
interim injunction extremely difficult because of the principle of the landmark case Bonnard 
v Perryman the (B v P) test. 812 In this case, the Court of Appeal rejected the grant of an 
injunction that restrained further publications of plainly defamatory matters because such 
grant was unreasonable. 813 Lord Coleridge CJ, with whom the majority of Lords agreed, 
expressed his doubts on the ability of the court at the interlocutory stage to determine what 
should be done at trial unless it is exercised in clear cases. It is ruled that the matters of 
determining the meaning of words, the defence of justification and assessment of damages 
should be considered at trial proceedings, and each grant of injunctive relief would cause 
unreasonable interference with the jury function if such order was found to be unjustified. 814 
The majority of Lords found that the judicial rejection of the defendant’s willingness to justify 
the publication led to an early assessment of the defence, which represents an unjustified 
interference with the defendant’ rights to freedom of expression if the jury had disagreed 
with the assessment. 815 Kay LJ disagreed with the majority, arguing that it is insufficient to 
rely upon the defendant’s willingness to defend her publication to refuse an application of 
injunctive relief in defamation law. The judge should have discretion on granting injunctive 
relief if there was a strong plea of falsity because, as Kay LJ emphasised, there should be 
genuine grounds for any defence the defendant wants to advance at trial. 816 The Court of 
Appeal, however, unanimously agreed that the discretion of granting an injunction at the 
 
812 David Rolph, ‘Bonnard v Perryman (1891)’ in David Rolph (eds.), Landmark Cases in Defamation Law (Hart 
Publishing 2019) 27. 
813 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 284 per Lord Coleridge CJ.  
814 Ibid. 
815 Ibid.  
816 His lordship upheld the grant of an interlocutory injunction because of the evidence of the falsity of 
statements complained of. Bonnard, (n 810) 288.  
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interlocutory stage should be highly strict, unless it is evident that no defence could be 
successfully established at trial. 817  
This means that the (B v P) test implies a possibility to grant an interlocutory injunction 
if the court found no defence at trial may succeed as applied in Farrall v Kordowski.818 In this 
case, Tugendhat J granted an interim injunction prohibiting the defendant from publishing 
defamatory words on a website known as “solicitorsfromhell.co.uk”. The judge found that no 
doubt could arise in respect of the defamatory meaning of the words complained of that 
adversely affect the applicant’s business reputation as a competent solicitor. 819 The court 
justified such grant on two grounds: first, there was no indication from the defendant 
regarding any willingness to defend the words complained of. 820 Secondly, the applicant is 
likely to establish in the trial that such a publication should not be allowed because of its plain 
falsity. 821 The court considered the requirements of common law and the Human Rights Act 
1998 before granting interim injunction because the (B v P) test rule represents only one side 
of the coin. Tugendhat J was convinced that the reputational harms might not be fully 
compensated by an award of damages. 822 In ZAM v CFW and Anor, 823 Tugendhat J also 
granted another interim injunction under defamation law. In this case, Tugendhat J allowed 
an interim injunction to protect the claimant’s reputational interest that may be significantly 
tarnished in a way no damages could fully compensate it. 824 Furthermore, the defendant did 
 
817 Ibid.  
818 [2010] EWHC 2436 (QB)  
819 Ibid. [3 & 12]. 
820 Ibid. [8]. 
821 Ibid. [6 & 12]. 
822 Ibid. [11-2]. The requirements of the interim injunction based on HRA 1998 will be discussed in detail in the 
next paragraph.   
823 [2011] EWHC 476 (QB) [23]. 
824 Ibid. [24]. 
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not state any intention to defend the libellous publications - if the defendant did state this, 
this could be an obstacle in ordering an interlocutory injunction as ruled in the (B v P) test. 825  
The restrictive approach of the interim injunction ruled in the (B v P) test was 
predicated upon three correlated rationales. The first rationale of the restrictive approach to 
granting an interim injunction is linked to the value of freedom of expression that should be 
exercised without impediment as long as the publication was not wrongful. 826 As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, truth is a complete defence in defamation and publishing true 
statements cannot defame a deserved reputation irrespective of such statements made with 
improper motives.827 Defamation law provides freedom of expression significant protection 
through a variety of defences. 828 A prior restraint order in the interlocutory stage of 
defamation action might impose a chilling effect on freedom of expression if the defendant 
decided to establish the plea of justification (truth) which requires an in-depth examination 
at trial. 829 Since truth-finding is one of the primary justifications of free speech rights, 
expressing truth and commenting on it are essential aspects of freedom of expression that 
serves itself a genuine public interest.830 Truth justification, however, is an irrelevant issue in 
the arena of privacy and it is not lawful to let the truth out if it is concerned with an individual’s 
private life (unless such revelation serves a real public interest). 831 The plea of justification 
may require a reconsideration, not only because the interest of reputation is one of the 
 
825 Ibid.  
826 Bonnard, (n 810). 
827 Holly v Smyth [1998] QB 726. 
828 Martin H. Redish, ‘the value of free speech, (1982) 130 university of Pennsylvania Law Review, 591, 640. 
829 Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1462 [78]. 
830 Fraser v Evans [1968] F. No. 1896, 360-3; Kent Greenawalt, ‘Free speech justifications’ (1989) 89 Colum. L. 
Rev. 119, 130; Paul Wragg, ‘Enhancing press freedom through greater privacy law: a UK perspective on an 
Australian privacy tort’ (2014) 36 The Sydney Law Review 619, 638. 
831 Julian Petley, 'on privacy: from Mill to Mosley' in Julian Petley (eds.) Media and public shaming: Drawing the 
boundaries of disclosure, (I. B. Tauris 2013) 59.  
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aspects of private life rights protected under Article 8 ECHR; but also, because freedom of 
expression and private life rights should be treated equally. 832 The (B v P) test prioritises the 
public policy of speaking the truth over the competing interest of reputation. However, such 
a public policy regarding speaking the truth is decisively changed because speaking truth, as 
much as privacy law concerns, could be actionable if the disclosure serves no public 
interest.833 The uncertainty of the claimant’s interest in the interlocutory stage represents the 
second rationale of the (B v P) test rule. It is difficult to confirm or deny the violation of 
reputational interests until the trial decides where the truth lies through a close examining of 
the credibility of witnesses and documents. 834 These two rationales are traditionally and 
constitutionally reserved to the jury at trial. This reservation provides the third rationale to 
keep the (B v P) test rule, since the judge would breach the jury’s right to decide whether the 
statements were defamatory or not, and whether the defendant can successfully establish 
one of the defences in defamation. 835 The second and third rationales were reaffirmed in 
Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd which sought to challenge the (B v P) test rule in light of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 and the jurisprudence of the right to privacy in Article 8 ECHR. 
In this case, the appellant challenged the refusal of a prior restraint application 
regarding an article declaring that a convicted criminal, Peter Foster, had a business 
relationship with the claimant. 836 The rejection of the injunctive application was based on 
the applicant's failure to satisfy the (B v P) test. 837 The appellant claimed that the likelihood 
test ruled by s. 12 (3) HRA 1998 represents a general test that should be applied in all cases 
 
832 See chapter 5:  s. 2.  
833 Rolph, (n 819) 57. 
834 Greene (n 836) [57]. 
835 Ibid. [57 & 76]. 
836 Greene (n 836) [3-19]. 
837 Ibid. [20-1]. 
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including defamation actions. 838 Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the (B v P) test 
rule imposed an automatic priority to freedom of expression over reputation, and such 
imposition conflicts with the methodology ruled by House of Lords in Campbell v MGN 839 that 
imposes no automatic priority or presumption to one right over another. Furthermore, it was 
argued that the (B v P) test represented an incompatible rule with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, because it accords an inappropriate weight to the freedom of expression right 
over the reputation right. 840 However, the Court of Appeal found that the (B v P) rule may 
still be a good law since its protected interest of reputation is entirely different from the 
interest of confidentiality, which requires a flexible approach to grant an interim injunction. 
841 The Court of Appeal also observed that an attentive reading of s. 12 HRA calls for an 
enhancement of the protection of freedom of expression, rather than restricting it. 842 The 
Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the rationale of the (B v P) rule based on the role of jury and 
trial proceedings. 843 
However, this thesis argues that the restrictive rule of the (B v P) test needs a 
reconsideration and a revisit in light of the domestic authorities and the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence concerning the relationship between the competing rights of Articles 8 and 10 
ECHR. Despite the recognition of reputation within the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR, 844 
the Court of Appeal failed to examine the practical effects of granting and refusing an interim 
injunction on the conflicting rights. Instead, it applied the restrictive test mechanically 
without assessing how damages can effectively vindicate the tarnished reputation, and it did 
 
838 Ibid. [25]. 
839 Ibid. [27]. 
840 Ibid. [26] 
841 Ibid. [60]. 
842 Ibid. [61]. 
843 Ibid. [57 & 78]. 
844 Ibid. [68]. 
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not evaluate the impact on freedom of expression if the injunctive relief had been granted.845 
This represents a failure to consider the comparative importance of values of rights in conflict, 
since the methodology implied in the (B v P) test would give freedom of expression 
precedence over the right to reputation. 846 The need for reconsideration of the (B v P) test 
on the basis that the methodology of Article 8 ECHR may be necessary and logical with the 
provision of s. 11 Defamation Act 2013, which removed the jury from defamation trials unless 
the court orders it. Thus, this is the time to revisit the restrictive rule of interim injunction in 
defamation law, since its rationales could not be any more reliable. Such a view might be 
strengthened with the fact that the (B v P) rule has never been considered in the highest 
Courts like the Supreme Court or the House of Lords. 847   
These anti-Bonnard v Perryman arguments have been recently endorsed in Taveta 
Investments Ltd v FRC. 848 In this case, Nicklin J refused an injunctive relief sought by Taveta 
against Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to stop the publication of ‘sanction documents’ 
which may be capable of being defamatory since the threatened publication implies criticisms 
against Taveta personnel. The rejection of such injunctive application was imperative, 
because the applicant did not meet the threshold of ‘exceptional’ required to grant an 
injunctive relief to restrain publication against a public body which the authorities impose a 
higher threshold to grant injunctions in public law than those applied in private law. 849 Nicklin 
J expressed his reservations in respect of the rationales of the (B v P) test. Firstly, the 
 
845 Witzleb, (n 35) 421; The factor of the adequacy of damages will be discussed in the next paragraph.    
846 Re S, (n 5) [17] Lord Steyn; Rolph, (n 819) 43; Godwin Busuttil and Patrick McCafferty, 'Interim Injunctions 
and the Overlap between Privacy and Libel' (2010) 2(1) Journal of Media Law 1, 9. 
847 David Eady, ‘A public talk about how free speech should be protected in light of the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ 10th March 2010 at City University, London. https://www.scribd.com/doc/28195800/Justice-
Eady-Speech-City-University-London-March-201012  
848 Taveta Investments Ltd v The Financial Reporting Council & Ors [2018] EWHC 1662 [22]. 
849 Ibid. [95, 99]. 
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constitutional role of the jury is no more reliable to justify the survival of this rule, since a 
judge should resolve defamation proceedings unless it is ordered otherwise. 850 Secondly, the 
Strasbourg’s jurisprudence gives equal weight for the rights as outlined in Articles 8 and 10 
ECHR. In contrast, the (B v P) test presumes a priority for freedom of expression over the right 
to private life. 851 Based on this analysis, there is a solid ground to reconsider the reliability of 
the rationales behind the (B v P) test, since reputational interest involves aspects of human 
dignity and autonomy. David Eady J extra-judicially pointed out that public policy, which 
considers an award of damages in defamation as an adequate remedy, may play a crucial role 
in the survival of the (B v P) test. 852 This public policy, by contrast, provides a ground to adopt 
a flexible approach to grant injunctive relief in privacy law as will be discussed below.   
C- Interim injunction rule in privacy (likelihood test) 
In the pre- Human Rights Act 1998 period, granting or refusing an interim injunction 
application generally depended on the common law principles ruled in American Cyanamid 
Co v Ethicon. 853 Based on this authority, it was easy to obtain a temporary injunction to 
protect privacy value protected under the equitable action of breach of confidence, which 
was the most important action to protect privacy value before the recognition of misuse of 
private information tort in Campbell v MGN. 854 Based on the balance of convenience, it was 
likely to grant an interim injunction under the equitable action of confidence because 
confidentiality is like an ice cube - if gone an award of damages could never fully restore it. 855  
 
850 Ibid. [97] ii. 
851 Ibid. [97] iii. 
852 Mr. Eady, (n 854).  
853 See the first paragraph of this section.   
854 Witzleb, (n 35) 412. 
855 American Cyanamid Co (n 811) 
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However, mere confidentiality cannot give a guarantee to obtain injunctive relief if 
the publication of such confidential information serves a genuine public interest. 856 This 
approach, nonetheless, represented a challenge to the exercise of freedom of expression if 
the grant of an interim injunction depends only on showing an arguable issue of 
confidentiality. 857 Such a pro-claimant test, therefore, provoked media hostility because 
some information is perishable commodities that could lose their value once postponed.   
The Human Rights Act 1998 adopted a new approach that seeks to assuage and 
mitigate the chilling impact on the exercise of freedom of expression right based on the prior 
restraint guidelines ruled in Cyanamid Co v Ethicon authority. The HRA 1998 focused on the 
importance of freedom of expression, which should get a particular regard before granting 
any prior restraint order. 858 Section 12 (3) of HRA states that the grant of interim injunction 
should satisfy a higher threshold of the ‘likelihood of success at trial’ rather than the threshold 
of a ‘serious question to be tried’ as ruled in American Cyanamid Co. 859 
In Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee, 860 the House of Lords utilised the ‘likelihood’ test 
ruled in S. 12(3) HRA 1998. In this case, the court granted an interim injunction to the 
applicant against the disclosure of confidential information of corrupt business practices 
obtained by Banerjee, an ex-employee of accountability employed by the applicant, because 
 
856 In Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v BBC [1990] 3 A11 E.R. 523 (C.A.).  The Court of Appeal found that the grant of 
injunctive relief was groundless because the balance of convenience requires the court to take into account the 
competing interests of both parties and assess the relative strength of both parties' claims. In this case, injunctive 
relief was granted prohibiting the BBC from disseminating a program that deals critically with Cambridge 
Nutrition low-calorie diet since the company agreed with BBC to postpone the publication of such a program. 
Lord Kerr rejected this basis to grant a prior restraint because the function of giving injunctive relief is to hold 
the balance as justly as possible in situations where a trial can only resolve the substantial issues between the 
parties.   The Court of Appeal found there was a real public interest to inform the public an important matter of 
health, which was also a timely subject matter that damages can hardly compensate the national broadcaster. 
857 Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, privacy and freedom of expression (2001 OUP) at para. [15.18]. 
858 S. 12 (4) HRA 1998. 
859 Witzleb, (n 35) 413. 
860 Cream Holdings Ltd. & Ors v Banerjee & Anor [2003] EWCA Civ 103 [51 & 54] per Lord J Simon Brown. 
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the threshold test of 'real prospect of success' at trial was convincingly established. In the 
Court of Appeal, the defendants contended that s. 12 (3) of HRA 1998 imposes a higher 
threshold than those applied in American Cyanamid Co guidelines, and no interim injunction 
should be issued unless the applicant is more likely than not to succeed at trial. This appeal 
was dismissed, since the defendants’ interpretation of the likelihood test would give freedom 
of expression a higher rank over other competing interests. 861 The Court of Appeal upheld 
the grant of the injunctive relief that had been made on the threshold outlined in American 
Cyanamid of ‘real prospect of success’.  
The House of Lords, however, unanimously rejected such a grant since the banned 
disclosure involves a serious public interest; and the applicant was more likely to fail rather 
succeed at trial. 862 It is ruled that the court must equally accord appropriate weight to the 
competing convention rights in article 8 and 10 ECHR. 863 Lord Nicholls, with whom all other 
Lords agreed, identified the essential element based on which an interim order should be 
issued according to section 12 (3) HRA 1998. This element predicates upon the test of 
‘likelihood of success at trial’ that requires the court to be satisfied that the prospects of 
success at trial are sufficiently favourable before ordering any interim injunction. 864 In other 
words, the likelihood test requires not only a successful expectation of privacy in respect of 
the subject matter of the application; but also requires no prospect of success of the 
defendant article 10 ECHR rights in the balancing test. 865 However, s. 12 (4) HRA 1998 
indicates that the uncertainty in the applicant's prospects of success must be resolved in 
 
861 Ibid.  
862 Cream Holdings Ltd, (n 37) [25]. 
863 Cream Holdings Ltd, (n 37) [23]. 
864 Ibid. [22]. 
865 Ibid. [23]; Witzleb, (n 35) 414. 
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favour of freedom of expression.866 The particular regard on freedom of expression imposes 
on the court a duty to consider to what extent the materials in proceedings are in the public 
domain or public interest. 867 If the information has reached the public domain, the court 
should refuse to grant an injunction because such injunctive relief would be futile and 
helpless. 868 However, the development of English privacy law provided an exception to such 
a duty, because injunctive relief would be useful to prevent further intrusions into private life 
rights - even if the private information has reached a broad public domain.869 
The role of damages in the defamation and privacy law plays a crucial role to keep the 
sustainability of the (conflicting) tests of injunctive relief. The restrictive approach of 
defamation law may find a justificatory basis in the effectiveness and adequacy of monetary 
remedy to compensate, restore and vindicate the tarnished reputation interest. 870 In 
contrast, it would be impossible to reach a similar outcome if privacy had been wrongfully 
breached because personal information may not be restored to its previous position by such 
an award. 871 This premise, however, may be doubted if recent judicial and academic views 
on the role of damages awarded in defamation and privacy were considered. The fact that 
both values of privacy and reputation are derived from Article 8 ECHR may bring into question 
the soundness of the role of damages argument to justify the tests used in obtaining an 
interim injunction. The adequacy of damages to compensate for the loss of reputation should 
 
866 Andrew Scott, ‘Prior notification in privacy cases: A reply to Professor Phillipson’ (2010) 2 J. M. L. 49, 54. 
867 S. 12 (4) a & b HRA 1998. 
868 In Mosley, (n 33) [32] Eady J declined an injunction to restrain the publication of private information and 
video materials on the defendant’s website since the private materials were available on other sites and viewed 
multi-thousands of times as well; Witzleb, ibid. 412; Witzleb, (n 811). 
869 In PJS, (n 154) the Supreme Court emphasised on the importance of interim injunction relief restraining an 
initial or further unauthorised publication of private information because there would be a difference between 
confidentiality (secrecy) and intrusion into private life.  In the former scenario, an interim injunction will lose its 
purpose if such details were publicly available; whereas such order would still be useful to prevent further 
intrusions into private life right. 
870 Green (n 836) [78]; LNS, (n 28) [149] ii. 
871 Mosley (n33) [231]. 
207 
 
not be a reason to refuse injunctive relief, because the interests of reputation and privacy are 
inextricably linked. 872  
This would require a reconsideration of the judicial view expressed by Eady J in Mosely 
v MGN about the difference between defamation and privacy, because it is not evident that 
damages can restore completely and effectively the tarnished reputation. It is suggested that 
the differentiation between defamation and privacy law upon the role of damages might be 
overstated, because reputation and privacy harms are ineradicable by an award of 
damages.873 The inadequacy of monetary award in defamation was used in many cases to 
support the decision of granting injunctive relief. 874  
The role of damages in privacy is also a debatable matter because harms of privacy 
law and negligence law may similarly be ineradicable since damages can never restore the 
protected interests such as physical integrity in negligence law to their previous positions. 875. 
In other words, despite the inability of damages to restore an individual's physical integrity 
lost because of negligent conduct, it is undebatable that monetary awards are the most 
effective remedy in negligence law; and privacy, therefore, should be similarly treated. It may 
be right that an award of damages given their particular nature cannot restore privacy and 
physical integrity. Avoiding harms would be the best option, not only in privacy, but in all 
other torts; injunctive relief cannot be possible in negligence law because it is hard to assume 
and prevent negligent harms.  Arguably, the existence of the tort of privacy is to tell us not to 
 
872 GYH v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 3360 (QB) [39]. 
873 David Rolph, ‘vindicating reputation and privacy’ in Andrew T. Kenyon (eds) Comparative defamation and 
privacy law (CUP 2016) 295-9. 
874 Farrall (n 818) [11-12]; ZAM, (n 830) at 24. The judge found the interim injunction would be equally granted 
based on Bonnard v Perryman test or likelihood test [24-26]. The judge also found a motivation of blackmail in 
publishing the information, which weakens the claim of freedom of expression. 
875 Scott, (n 873) 56. 
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behave in a particular way whereas negligence is about setting standards. This is why 
monetary relief represents the unique option in negligence law. 876 However, English privacy 
law seems also incoherent in respect to the inadequacy of damages to remedy privacy 
invasions. 877 In Spelman v Express Newspapers, for instance, Tugendhat J decided that 
damages could never be an effective remedy if privacy is based on a secret, because once a 
secret is discovered, it can never be covered-up; however such damages can be an effective 
remedy to assuage hurting feelings caused by wrongful intrusions into private life. 878 In PJS v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd, however, Lord Mance implicitly rejected the Tugendhat J 
approach in Spelman v Express Newspapers, because an award of substantial or even 
exemplary damages can never adequately remedy losses caused by a disclosure of highly 
private information. 879 The Supreme Court found an interim injunction has a significant role 
to prevent further wrongful intrusions into private life regardless to what extent the private 
information was out in the public domain. 880 However, Lord Toulson, who disagreed with the 
majority of Lords, said that it would be principally wrong to grant an injunctive relief on the 
basis of inadequacy of damages even though it could be right to refuse such injunction on the 
basis of the adequacy of damages. 881  
 
876 Kirsty Hughes,’ Privacy Injunctions: No Obligation to Notify Pre-Publication’ (2011) 3(2) Journal of Media Law 
179, 186; Rolph, ibid. 
877 Scott, ibid. 52-4. 
878 Ibid. [111]; in YXB v TNO [2015] EWHC 826 (QB) Wardy J also followed the same approach because of 1- the 
claimant's failure to respond positively to his duty of full and frank disclosure of materials to the court. 2- The 
fact that the sexual relationship between the consented parties was only a single act and did not involve other 
forms of intimacy. 3- The claimant's attitude towards his privacy claim did not indicate any kind of personal 
distress resulted from the disclosure; this has been reaffirmed by the absence of any personal witness to the 
court and the intervention of his solicitors on his behalf. 4- The court was convinced that protecting the claimant’ 
commercial interests was the real motive to apply a prior restraint application. 
879 (n 154) [43]. 
880 Ibid. [54 & 71]. 
881 Ibid. [92]. 
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The inadequacy of damages should not be a carte blanche to allow an interim 
injunction; rather it should be an incentive to grant a prior restraint if the claimant is more 
likely than not to establish at trial disallowance of publication in the suit. This view seems to 
be convincing and logical, since the first main factor to grant or refuse injunctive relief is 
whether the applicant can successfully pass the likelihood test in s. 12 (3) HRA 1998. Then the 
court turns to the factor of the adequacy of damages before moving to the balance of 
convenience. 882 The importance of the interim injunction in privacy is linked to the further 
and memorable intrusions into private life caused by the judicial proceeding itself. Trial 
proceedings in privacy cases may expose victims to further intrusions into their private life, 
and they may consequently augment their distress and embarrassment. Moreover, an interim 
injunction might represent a lesser challenge to the freedom of expression, because the prior 
restraint order cannot do more than a temporary delay of the publication. Therefore, the 
defendant would be able to publish the restrained information if the court at trial found such 
an injunction was unjustified. 883 
The claimant in pure defamation cases, however, seeks to obtain a remedy through 
such public proceedings, which declare a public finding of the falsity of defamatory 
allegations. 884 Such a difference is one of the relevant elements that make an interim 
injunction the most effective remedy in privacy, since even successful trials cannot erase 
private materials from the public’ memories, but it might help to keep such information 
memorable forever as the case of Mosley. 885 This fact might make a refusal of injunctive relief 
 
882 Cream Holdings Ltd. (n 37) [63]. 
883 Gavin Phillipson & Helen Fenwick, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ 
(2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 660, 692.  
884 Gavin Phillipson, ‘Max Mosley goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant Notification and interim injunction’ 
(2009) 1 J. M. L. 73, 74. 
885 Mosley (n 33) [230];  
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amounted to a final decision from the applicant’s point of view because the continuation of 
judicial proceedings would be futile and harmful. 886 Therefore, the distinction between the 
tests of interim injunction in the defamation and privacy, based on the adequacy or 
inadequacy of damages, may lose its justificatory weight since the values underneath the 
protected interests of privacy and reputation are identical. Damages are a significantly 
inadequate remedy if the publication in suit adversely touches the individual's dignity and 
autonomy. Privacy and personal reputation may share roots in dignity and autonomy values 
in a way that the violations of privacy or reputation interests may cause a devastating effect 
on the reputational interest, similarly how an adverse effect on private life can be caused by 
defaming personal reputation. 887 If this is correct, it would be unjustified to refuse granting 
an interim injunction based on the adequacy of damages if reputation interest is linked to 
personal character, since dignity and autonomy values are primarily engaged in cases of 
personal defamation. 888  
6. 3: The impact of the overlap on the application of the interim injunction   
In this section, I outline the judicial approaches regarding the application of temporary 
order in cases that equally involve defamation and privacy torts. I identify and critically 
examine the scenarios in which the overlap between libel and privacy becomes problematic. 
This thesis argues that prioritising the (B v P) test over likelihood test in the overlapping cases 
may cause undesirable consequences, whereas applying the likelihood test in such cases may 
 
886 Privacy and press freedom (Blackstone Press 1995) 156 cited in Phillipson, ibid. 75.  
887 Cheer, (n 15) 318; The Leveson inquiry into the culture practices and ethics of the press: witness statement 
of Max Mosley/2011 para. 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122165317/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Max-Mosley.pdf  
888 Tugendhat J differentiates between personal and professional defamation. Thornton, (n 63) [33]. 
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achieve desirable outcomes from the coherence, efficiency and feminist analysis 
perspectives.  
A- Critical Analysis of English judicial approaches towards the application of Bonnard v 
Perryman in the overlap between defamation and privacy.  
The restriction of the (B v P) test, and the flexibility of likelihoods test are not 
definitively conclusive because the restrictive rule of defamation law may provide the 
applicant with a grant of the interim injunction if it is clear to the court that no defence would 
succeed at trial. Similarly, the flexible rule used in privacy may provide the applicant with a 
refusal of temporary order if the court identifies a genuine public interest in publishing the 
information. 889 These different tests, therefore, may produce consistent outcomes because 
there could equally be a grant or a refusal of an interim injunction under both rules in 
defamation and privacy. 890 In such a scenario, the overlap between defamation and privacy 
would be unproblematic because the outcomes would not be different, whether under a 
defamation or a privacy rule. The truth and falsity of the information in suit may have strong 
relevance in the question of an interim injunction and the applicable rule in the overlap 
between defamation and privacy. If the private and defamatory information were definitively 
false, there could be no inconsistency or tension between the rules of interim injunction since 
an interlocutory order may be granted under each test. For instance, In LJY v Persons 
Unknown, 891 the applicant, a well-known person, working in the entertainment business, 
obtained an interim injunction to prohibit the disclosure of false allegations of criminal 
activities. 892 The court found the present case had involved a clear blackmail attempt to gain 
 
889 Mr. Eady, (n 847) 12. 
890 ZAM (n 830) [24-6]; LNS (n 28) [123-5]. 
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financial profits. 893 The injunctive application has relied on three causes of action: misuse of 
private information, defamation and tort of harassment. 894 In regard of MOPI, the court was 
satisfied that the applicant meets the threshold required by s. 12 (3) since such allegations 
fall within the protective scope of private life in Article 8 ECHR. 895 Besides, the improper 
motive of blackmail has weakened the potential claim of freedom of expression and made 
further justification of prior restraint order. 896 The restrictions of the (B v P) test may not 
prevent the grant because the allegations were definitively false and irreparable by damages: 
897   
'The allegation is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant's reputation, and damages 
could not be an adequate remedy. There is nothing in the material before me to indicate 
any sufficient basis for a defence of truth or public interest'. 
In GYH v Persons Unknown, Warby J, granted another interim injunction on the same 
basis applied in LJY v Persons Unknown. 898 His Honour found no tension between the 
defamation and privacy rules in respect of granting an interim injunction to restrain false, 
private and defamatory information. The applicant has provided the court credible and 
contradicted evidence to prove the falsehood of threatened allegations related to the 
applicant's sexual health. The court granted an injunctive relief under privacy rule since the 
falsity could undermine the public interest, if any, justifying the distribution of this kind of 
information. 899 Warby J also examined the application from defamation law since the 
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allegations in question may adversely affect the applicant's commercial reputation. The court 
concluded that the prior restraint order is justified given no defence in defamation may 
succeed at trial. 900   
The real tension between these two tests starts with the scenario of private and 
defamatory information that either the claimant makes no declaration about the truth or 
falsity of the information or the defendant pleads its truth. Under the likelihood test, there 
might be a grant of injunctive relief order if the court found no public interest in such 
publication, whereas no prior restraint order may issue under the (B v P) test. The privacy test, 
therefore, would create an incentive to dress up a truly defamation claim in privacy frame to 
attract the more favourable test for obtaining injunctive relief. To solve this problem, English 
courts have used objective and subjective criteria to determine the right applicable rule of an 
interim injunction. The objective test seeks to examine the genuine nature of a privacy claim, 
if the subject matter of information were not private but only defamatory, there would be no 
overlap between defamation and privacy since such information should not truly engage 
privacy rights. The applicant’s attempt to avoid the restrictive rule of defamation was an 
abuse of process because she seeks to prevent the defendant from the legal protection of her 
rights by circumventing the provisions of defamation. 901  
The term of abuse of process refers to unlimited circumstances where the litigant 
unfairly misuses the judicial procedures against the other party of litigation; or if such misuse 
adversely affects the administration of justice.902 The courts have used an objective test to 
decide the real nub of the applicant's claim, whether it was truly private information or 
 
900 GYH (n 879) [37]. 
901 Witzleb, (n 35) 430. 
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defamatory information in disguise. In Tillery Valley Foods Ltd v Channel Four Television Corpn 
and Another, Mann J applied an objective test to determine the gist of the interim injunction 
application. 903 The applicant, a food manufacturing company, sought injunctive relief to 
restrain the broadcast of the program containing confidential information appeared in secret 
footages showing many examples of unhygienic practices. The purpose of such an injunction, 
as the applicant claimed, was to have adequate opportunity to check the footage and make 
appropriate comments. Mann J refused the application since its real subject matter was not 
the confidentiality; rather, the real basis of the claim was to protect the applicant’s 
reputation. 904 The judge found the alleged confidentiality was a disguised claim of 
defamation and the purpose of such dressing up was to get around the restrictive test of the 
(B v P) test. The applicant’s choice of confidentiality is, in fact, an abuse of process since there 
was no basis of confidential quality in that information in the first place: 905  
'This is a defamation action in disguise.  It is not surprising that it cannot be squashed 
into the law of confidence.   And even if it could, since the reality would still be that of 
a defamation action with parallel claims based on other wrongs, it would have been 
appropriate to apply the rule in Bonnard v Perryman to any claim for an interlocutory 
injunction’. 
The reason for giving priority to defamation rules is to protect the freedom of 
expression from the attempt of circumvention. However, this approach could not be 
supported in light of the domestic authorities and the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Firstly, the 
common law authorities admitted that the claimant is freely entitled to choose any cause of 
 
903 [2004] EWHC 1075 (Ch) 




action other than defamation in order to use the most advantageous rules available in the 
alternative action. In Joyce v Sengupta, the defendant argued that an abuse of process had 
been committed since the claimant had pursued under malicious falsehood action instead of 
a defamation action to get benefits from legal aid available in the former. 906 Sir Donald 
Nicholls explained this principle in the following paragraph: 907 
'English law has marked out causes of action on which plaintiffs may rely. Many causes 
of action overlap…... When more than one cause of action is available to him, a plaintiff 
may choose which he will pursue. Usually, he pursues all possible causes of action, but 
he is not obliged to do so. He may pursue one to the exclusion of another, even though 
a defence available in one cause of action is not available in another. Indeed, the 
availability of defence in one cause of action but not another may be the very reason 
why a plaintiff eschews the one and prefers the other. …. I have never heard it suggested 
before that a plaintiff is not entitled to proceed in this way, and take full advantage of 
the various remedies English law provides for the wrong of which he complains. I have 
never heard it suggested that he must pursue the most appropriate remedy, and if he 
does not do so, he is at risk of having his proceedings struck out as a misuse of the 
court's procedures. In my view, those suggestions are as unfounded as they are novel'. 
Secondly, the implicit priority given to the freedom of expression right in this approach 
would be inconsistent with the jurisprudence of Article 8 and 10 ECHR because the Strasbourg 
Court emphasises that the rights of the European Convention should be equally treated. 908 
This approach would also be contrary to the English domestic authorities since the right to 
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freedom of expression would have an automatic precedence over privacy without any 
intensive focus on the importance of parallel rights in conflict. 909  The objective test, however, 
may be unhelpful if the information is objectively defamatory and private. English courts have 
used a subjective test to determine the real nub of the claimant's action since the objective 
test would be illogical if both claims of defamation and privacy were substantively engaged. 
The importance of the nub approach, as many scholars argue, is to close doors of 
circumventing binding authorities by merely framing the claim in misuse of private 
information instead of defamation. 910 In such cases, the overlap between defamation and 
privacy is acute because the information in the suit is equally private and defamatory.  
In Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd, Eady J challenged the Joyce v Sengupta 
authority and refused to consider the claimant's choice of action as the main factor to 
determine the applicable rule of interim injunction. 911Even though an injunctive relief had 
been granted on the basis of likelihood test in s. 12 (3) HRA 1998, Eady J gave priority to the 
(B v P) test over the likelihood test if the information were defamatory, and the defendant 
decided to defend the publication under defences in defamation. The reason for such priority, 
as Eady J elaborated, was related to the policy underlying the restrictive test in defamation, 
which should not be circumvented by the claimant’s choice. 912. Such an approach takes into 
account the historical development of defamation law and its longstanding rule of the (B v P) 
test that should not be restricted by the development of privacy rules. 913 This approach, 
however, would not only be inconsistent with the claimant’s freedom to choose the most 
suitable cause of action to protect her rights; but it would also be illogical because the 
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applicant to restrain only private information would be in a better-off position than if she 
wants to restrain the disclosure of private and defamatory information.  
The applicable rule of interim injunction in cases involving equally private and 
defamatory information was determined on the basis of the defendant's decision to defend 
the publication in the suit. The subjective test could also depend on the claimant's motivation 
behind the application of the interim injunction. This approach was applied in Terry 
(previously LNS) v Persons Unknown when Tugendhat J identified that protecting the 
applicant’s commercial reputation was the real nub of super-injunction application. 914 In this 
case, the judicial rejection of Terry's application was reasoned under privacy and defamation 
rules. Based on the privacy, Tugendhat J was unsatisfied that the applicant may successfully 
establish that he is more likely than not to succeed at trial Art. 12(3) HRA due to the public 
interest justifying the potential intrusion into the applicant’s private life. 915  
This reasoning, however, amounted to guesswork because the court might be unable 
to evaluate reasonably the free speech claim with the fact that no respondent had been 
notified.916 Moreover, the concept of potential public interest might be an easier threshold 
given it would be easy for media to argue that there would be a potential public interest in 
every publication. Rather, there should be, as Wragg rightly observes, a real public interest 
outweighing privacy claim. 917 Tugendhat J was convinced that the restrictive test of the (B v 
P) test should be applied in this case because the applicant’s real claim was a defamation 
 
914 LNS, (n 28); This approach has been also applied in Viagogo Ltd v Myles & Others [2012] EWHC 433 (Ch) 
[81]; Shakil Khan (formerly JMO) v Tanweer Khan (formerly KTA) [2018] EWHC 241 (QB) [71-2]; such approach 
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claim dressed up in misuse of private information. 918 The judge was also certain that the 
defendant would have a successful defence to plead at trial, if libel action had been 
brought.919 The applicant’ powerful personality and the applicant’s failure to mention the 
potential distress caused by the threatened intrusion had reinforced the judge's view that the 
claim's nub was to protect his reputation. 920 If this was right, the (B v P) test precludes 
granting an interlocutory order because of the potential success to defend the publication at 
trial and the adequacy of damages to compensate effectively and adequately the harmed 
party. 921 Such a conclusion, however, could arguably be illogical because the mere fact of 
applying an injunction may indicate, whether implicitly or explicitly, the potentially 
troublesome and distress that may result from the threatening intrusion into his private life. 
922 Secondly, there could be truly exaggeration when Tugendhat J interpreted the absence of 
the applicant at trial to be an indicator of a hidden motivation exists underneath the 
proceedings of privacy claim, which presupposes, as Tugendhat viewed, the presence of 
potential victims who have concerns about their dignity and autonomy values. 923  
One may argue that the absence of victims could be justified in this case since the 
mere presence of victims, a super football player like John Terry and a model like Vanessa 
Perroncel, could shed intense light on their private life and provide media with an excellent 
incentive to discover the reason of such presence. Furthermore, their presence might be 
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inconsistent with the application of super-injunction itself since the applicant sought to 
restrain any threatening publications concerning their secret relationship. 
The impracticality, uncertainty and unpredictability are the main concerns raised from 
the nub approach since it gives the priority of the (B v P) test over likelihood test in overlapping 
cases.   The nub approach is impractical since it is hard to identify the nub of the claimant's 
action when the separating line between private life and reputation is highly 
indeterminable.924 Such an approach would make judicial decisions like guesswork since 
reputational issues may likely arise from most of the publications on private matters. For 
instance, an element of reputation may exist in each privacy action, especially in cases of 
public figures who may lose legal protection of their private life if the court applies the nub 
approach. 925 Furthermore, the concept of commercial reputation, which Tugendhat J 
identified as the nub of Terry claim, may be an integral part of private life as ruled in GYH v 
Persons Unknown. 926  
In this case, Mr Justice Warby granted an interim injunction based on harassment and 
misuse of private information. The non-disclosure orders temporarily prohibited the 
publication of sexual, physical and mental health information concerning a female sex-
worker. 927 Warby J found the false information related to sexual conduct and sexual health 
may not only affect an individual's privacy and reputation interests, but such harms are also 
irreparable by an award of damages. 928 The court made a logical remark that, as this thesis 
agrees with, a reputational element should not undermine the private character of 
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information; instead, it could strengthen it by adding another factor to support the 
inadequacy of money to compensate the harms in overlapping cases.  
The nub approach could also increase the uncertainty and consequently, the 
unpredictability of the judicial decision because such a task would be practically tricky with 
the conceptual overlap between dignitary interests of privacy and reputation. 929 This 
provides a strong impetus to adopt a unified approach to obtain an interim injunction that 
considers the dignitary interests of reputation and privacy equally with the countervailing 
right of freedom of expression. 930 This thesis argues that the likelihood test may achieve such 
a goal not only because it takes into account the considerations of rights in conflict; but also, 
because it could find a convincing support within the local coherence, efficiency and feminist 
analysis perspectives.  
B- The supportive arguments of applying the likelihood test in the overlap between 
defamation and privacy  
Against the judicial approaches, previously analysed, which prioritise the application 
of the (B v P) test in the overlap between defamation and privacy, it is argued that the 
application of likelihood test ruled by s. 12 (3) HRA 1998 in the overlapping cases may increase 
the practicality, certainty and predictability of judicial outcomes since the conflicting 
considerations of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR are equally engaged under this test. 931 The likelihood 
test may provide the claimant and the defendant an equal opportunity to protect effectively 
their interests since granting or rejecting an interlocutory injunction could be fairly 
considered. This test, practically speaking, takes into consideration the fact that privacy and 
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reputation interests may be inseparably breached concerning the unauthorised publication 
of voluntary, discreditable and private information, and cannot be restored and vindicated by 
a monetary award. 932 The likelihood test would also prevent uncertainty and increase 
predictability because there would be no need to decide what is the nub of the claimant’s 
application whether to protect privacy or reputation; this task becomes elusive with the fact 
of substantive overlap between the concepts of privacy and reputation. 933  While this thesis 
agrees with applying the likelihood test in the overlapping cases due to its desirable outcomes 
previously outlined, this thesis advances other supportive arguments emphasising on the 
desirable consequences of applying likelihood test from local coherence, efficiency and 
feminist analysis perspectives.  
The Coherence perspective  
The underlying claim of coherence in law refers to the absence of contradiction or 
inconsistency between legal rules, which belong to the same branch of law on the same set 
of facts. 934 The regulations of contacts can explain a simple example of a contradiction in 
legal rules. If the law prohibits a particular kind of contracts, any consensual undertakings 
under such agreements should be unenforceable even though the law imposes a general rule 
that 'parties to contracts shall perform those contracts'. There will be an apparent 
contradiction between legal provisions if the law requires people to perform the undertakings 
of enforceable contracts. 935 The nub of the claim that priorities the (B v P) test over likelihood 
test could be objectionable from local coherence lens since the fundamental justifications of 
the (B v P) test are objectionably inconsistent and contradictory with the justifications of 
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privacy protection in the first place. The contradiction between the (B v P) test rule and privacy 
law is attributed to the role of truth that is the primary rationale of restricting the applications 
of interim injunction in defamation because it is non-wrongfulness to speak the truth. 936 By 
contrast, privacy law protects private information, regardless of whether it is true or false, 
from unauthorised dissemination unless there is a real contribution to a debate of public 
interest. 937 If truth itself cannot be a defence in privacy since it is inconsistent with the 
protection of privacy, 938 how we can apply the (B v P) test rule, which depends mainly on 
truth defence, in privacy law? It would be inconsistent and contradictory if the law allows 
using a test which brings its justification from the principle of truth, whereas truth itself has 
no role in the law to privacy in the first place.  
One could argue that the reason of applying the (B v P) test rule in the overlapping 
cases is the willingness of claimant to protect indirectly her reputation via privacy proceedings 
in order to circumvent the restrictive rule of interim injunction. Such a question may be 
answered via common law authorities and Strasbourg jurisprudence of privacy, which 
recognise reputation within the scope of privacy. In Khuja (Previously PNM) v Times 
Newspapers Ltd, The Supreme Court found the broad scope of privacy may provide an 
alternative means to protect the right to reputation even though it is the primary function of 
the law of defamation. 939 In this case, Tugendhat J refused to grant injunctive relief to prohibit 
the defendant from identifying the applicant's police investigations in the report of criminal 
proceedings made in open court, even though the applicant was released without charge in 
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respect of the accusations of serious sexual abuses against children for which he had been 
arrested. 940 The injunctive application has relied on the misuse of private information to 
protect reputation, private and family life rights recognised by Article 8 ECHR. 941  
The rejection of such injunction was due to judicial belief that the applicant was 
unlikely to succeed at trial because there would be a serious public interest to know such 
proceedings and the administration of justice.942 Furthermore, Tugendhat J also found that 
the continuation of previous injunction might only provide the applicant and his family, if any, 
a little benefit incomparable with the benefits of the public to know the fact of the applicant’s 
arrest. 943 The Court of appeal upheld Tugendhat J judgement in the first instance and rejected 
the appellant ‘s argument that the identity of people under arrest or suspicion should be kept 
secret since the considerations of presumption of innocence as a matter of public policy do 
override the public interest considerations in open court. 944 However, the Court of Appeal 
ordered to keep the anonymity of the applicant and the injunction made under s. 4 (2) of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 until the determination of the application for permission to 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 945 
The Supreme Court upheld the conclusion of Tugendhat J because there would be 
difficult to justify any restrictions on the reporting of proceedings in open court. 946  The Court 
also revoked the anonymity order made under s. 4 (2) of the Contempt Court Act 1981. 947 
 
940 Khuja (Previously PNM) v Times Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 3177 (QB)  
941 Ibid. [37 & 74].  
942 Ibid. [83]. 
943 Ibid. [79]. 
944 PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd and Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1132 [37], [38] Lady Justice Sharp reasoned her 
rejection as it is well settled that most the pubic differentiates between being arrested and being convicted of 
criminal acts  
945 PNM, ibid [47]. 
946 Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2017] UKSC 49 [35]. 
947 Ibid. [36]. 
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However, the majority of Lords found that the failure of the application of injunction under 
privacy law caused by the absence of any reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the 
matters discussed at a public trial. 948 This was the reason to conclude that the real motivation 
of the applicant is to protect his reputation at the first place even though the Supreme Court 
did not ignore the possibility of reputational loss to make an indirectly adverse impact of the 
applicant's private life. 949 Lord Sumption, with whom the majority of Lords agree, 
distinguished between two scenarios that involve privacy and reputation issues. Firstly, if the 
subject matter of claim genuinely engages a reasonable expectation of privacy, there would 
be no objection to protect reputational issue under privacy since its ambit is wider to the 
extent that may provide an alternative means to protect the right of reputation, principally 
protected by defamation law, from harmful publications. 950 Secondly, if the subject matter 
of claim concerns mainly the protection of reputation that has a collateral impact on private 
life indirectly, defamation restrictions must be applied, and no injunction should be issued in 
case of pleading justification based on the (B v P) test rule. 951 The defence of absolute 
privilege of a fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings may provide a strong reason to 
reject the injunctive relief because 'it would be incoherent for the law to refuse an injunction 
to prevent direct damage to PNM's reputation, while granting it to prevent the collateral 
impact on his family life in precisely the same circumstances'. 952   
Based on this authority, one may argue that the privacy rule of the interim injunction 
should be applied if the privacy claim was genuinely engaged regardless of whether 
reputational issues were collaterally raised in such a claim. The coherence of privacy law may 
 
948 Ibid. [34] (1). 
949 Ibid. [34] (2). 
950 Ibid. [21]. 
951 Ibid, [19]. 
952 Khuja (n 953) [34] (3). 
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provide further support to apply the general test of likelihood in s. 12 (3) HRA 1998 if the 
applicant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the materials in suit 
irrespective such materials are also defamatory. This approach rightly challenges the nub 
approach because the protection of reputation within privacy must not cause the disregard 
of privacy rights since the concepts of privacy and reputation may substantively overlap. 
Furthermore, Strasbourg jurisprudence may also strengthen the approach of the Supreme 
Court in Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd. the (B v P) test rule may be incoherent with Strasbourg 
jurisprudence of the article 8 ECHR since it gives priority to the protection of freedom of 
expression in article 10 over private life in article 8 ECHR. The restrictive rule in defamation 
law may deprive the victims of adequate protection to their private life rights for the sake of 
freedom of expression simply because the information in suit was private and defamatory. 953 
The incoherence would be acute with the fact that reputation interest is one of the protected 
aspects in article 8 ECHR. 954 The fact that privacy is the core value explicitly protected in 
Article 8 ECHR, may provide a reason to prioritise privacy rules over reputation implicitly 
protected under this article. 955  
The mere engagement of article 8 ECHR may require the court to accord an intensive 
focus of the important values inherent in such right. The likelihood test in s, 12 (3) HRA may 
provide the right methodology that takes into account both sides of rights in conflict to 
achieve a proportionate balance between private life and freedom of expression rights.  The 
likelihood test may provide an appropriate assessment of the strength of not only the claim 
of freedom of expression, but also the claim of privacy.  However, the preference of applying 
 
953 Ibid. 429. 
954 See chapter 2. 
955 Reputational harms may engage article 8 ECHR if the subject matter of publication was defamatory and 
private, or if the subject matter is seriously defamatory, that affects the victim's private life significantly. Witzelb, 
(n 35) 427-9.  
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likelihood test over the (B v P) test in the overlapping cases should not necessarily provide the 
courts with a free licence to grant prior restraint orders. The court should consider the 
probability to succeed in trial equally from the applicant or the defendant sides since no 
interim injunction should be granted if its subject matter contributes to a debate of genuine 
public interest. 956  
The Efficiency perspective  
The erroneous outcomes of actions are not only objectionable since the courts had 
failed to give effect to the goals of substantive law, but it would also be objectionable from 
the economic analysis perspective because such results may inefficiently increase the social 
costs of judicial activities. 957 Richard Posner argues that the economic analysis of civil 
procedure system seeks to minimize the social costs of the adjudication system. That is, a 
mistaken denial or imposition of legal liability may inefficiently increase the social costs, which 
may take two types: firstly, the social cost of erroneous judicial decisions that may result in 
an inefficient allocation of loss on the injured party, it may deter others from engaging 
inefficient (unlawful) conducts or it may reduce the incentives to adopt efficient 
behaviours.958 Secondly, the social cost of operating the procedural system incurred by the 
state and the litigants. 959 On this basis, this thesis argues that the efficiency of procedural law 
may give the priority to the likelihood test over the (B v P) test since the grant of interim 
injunction may be more efficient than the denial of the injunctive application in the cases 
involve genuinely private and defamatory information. The rejection of a temporary order in 
 
956 Hughes, (n 873) 187; Witzleb, (n 35) 432. 
957 Anna Olijnyk, Justice and Efficiency in Mega-Litigation (Hart Publishing 2019) 57. 
958 Richard A. Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’ (1973) 2 Journal 
of legal studies 399, 399; Olijnyk, ibid. 58. 
959 Posner, ibid.  
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privacy may inefficiently increase the social costs resulting from an erroneous judgement or 
procedural operation. 
If the (B v P) test rule was applied in the overlapping cases, the mistaken rejection of 
interim injunction to prevent the publication of private materials may amount to a definitive 
deprivation to the claimant of her legal rights because not only privacy can never be restored, 
but also the trial proceedings themselves can augment the personal distress and 
embarrassment. 960 The social costs of such mistaken judgement cannot be only limited to 
personal suffering, frustration, disappointment and feelings of anger caused by undermining 
the intrinsic values of privacy invasion; but it can also undermine the individual's emotional 
well-being, the promotion of human flourishing and freedom of expression. 961 Such social 
costs might not be conceived in pure defamation cases since the claimant may find an 
effective remedy through the trial proceeding itself that publicly declares the falsity of 
defamatory allegations. 962  
The application of the (B v P) test rule in the overlapping cases may also inefficiently 
increase the social costs of operating of a procedural system equally born by the state and 
the litigants. The mere awarding of damages after a successful trial may not adequately 
remedy the claimant’ harms simply because her distress may be renewed with each view of 
private materials available in the public domain. Each new reading or viewing of the private 
materials regardless of the form of the publication such as video, photo or private information 
 
960 Mosley, (n 33) 230. 
961 Chris D. L. Hunt, ‘from right to wrong: grounding a right to privacy in the wrongs of tort’ (2015) 52 Alberta 
Law Review, 635, 638-641. 
962 Phillipson, (n 891) 74. 
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represents a new intrusion in the claimant private life that consequently increases the 
emotional distress of the victims. 963  
This might increase legal actions in the courts since the removal of private materials 
from the public domain seems the appropriate remedy that may prevent further distress of 
wrongfully invading private life. Max Mosley, for instance, brought legal proceedings against 
Google to remove the images of his private sexual activities on websites accessible by search 
engines on the internet. 964 Due to the limitation of public resources on which the courts rely, 
the subsequent claims of privacy, like Mosley v Google, 965 may create inefficiency in the 
allocation of courts resources. An efficient procedural system may require the judiciary to 
prevent any waste of public money and time, which are factually finite. Based on such 
analysis, the potential augmentation of privacy cases caused by the denial of injunctive 
applications may not only make a delay in the judicial system caused by the increase of 
actions, but it might also prevent some citizens from accessing justice due to the limitation of 
public resources. 966 The costs of further litigations incurred by the litigants are also part of 
the social costs, which could be efficiently avoided if an interlocutory injunction had been 
granted in the first place. The fact that privacy litigations may reach six-digit numbers may 
exacerbate the inefficiency of the (B v P) test rule if applied in the overlapping cases.967 
Accordingly, we can argue that the right grant of interlocutory injunctions based on likelihood 
test could increase access to justice since the costs of obtaining such orders are relatively 
affordable. 968 By contrast, the denial of interlocutory injunction applications based on the (B 
 
963 Douglas v Hello! Limited & Others [2005] EWCA Civ 595 [105]; Witzleb, (n 5) 509. 
964 Mosley, (n 596). 
965 Olijnyk, (n 964) 13. 
966 Ibid. 
967 Witzleb, (n 35) 417. 
968 See chapter 3.  
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v P) test rule may decrease access to justice since the high-costly privacy trial proceedings are 
only affordable for the claimants of high profile. 969 
The economic analysis may prioritise avoiding such highly social costs over avoiding 
the costs of granting interlocutory injunctions against freedom of expression. The dangers to 
delay the publication of information represent the main competing costs of prior restraint 
orders; however, some information is perishable commodities that may lose their value or 
interest even by a short delay. 970. The meaning of news as perishable commodity refers to 
the information of constant and continuing topicality and urgent quality such as stories about 
the funding of terrorism. 971 The news could be a perishable commodity if the democracy 
necessities urgently its publication such as the speech about political matters. 972 However, 
privacy matters would unlikely to lose their value and interest if the publication was 
postponed for a short of time because whenever the release takes place, it will feature 
prominently. For instance, a temporary postponement until the trial of the dissemination of 
private information such those in Mosley and Terry cases may unlikely affect its value 
whenever published. Furthermore, most media operators are commercial entities who seek 
to make financial profits in publishing private materials, and such financial loss, if caused by 
interlocutory injunction, may be adequately compensated by an award of damages if the 
court at trial found such order was unjustified. 973 
 
969 Witzleb, ibid. 417. 
970 Mosley, (n 481) [117]. 
971 Ian Cram, ‘Reducing uncertainty in libel law after Reynolds v Times Newspapers? Jameel and the unfolding 
defence of qualified privilege’ (2004) 15 Entertainment Law Review, 147, 150. 
972 Reynolds (n 603) Lord Steyn. 
973 Witzleb, (n 35) 417. 
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The Feminist analysis perspective 
The undesirability of the (B v P) test rule in the overlapping cases may crucially be a 
prominent argument from feminist analysis perspective since the improper motives, as 
blackmails or profit-making, are completely irrelevant matters if the defendant decided to 
defend the publication at trial. The improper motivations such as revenge, humiliation, 
financial gain and blackmail must be decidedly discouraged from feminist analysis perspective 
because they may be predicated upon the employment the sexual double standard in society 
against women. 974 The desirability of injunctive relief from the feminist analysis may prioritise 
the likelihood test over the (B v P) test in the revenge porn cases for the following two reasons. 
Firstly, it could prevent the employment and reinforcement of the sexual double standard in 
society that discriminately humiliates women. Secondly, it may discourage the 
commodification of interest in dignity since allowing a partner to sell the adultery story of the 
other partner may reinforce his inherent property right to exclusive sexual access to that 
partner. 975 According to s. (33) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the unconsented 
disclosure of photograph or film containing a private and sexual material in order to cause 
that individual distress is a criminal offence. This offence refers to the concept of revenge 
porn when one malicious ex-partner discloses without authorisation sexual materials 
whether in form of image, video or information to harm explicitly his or her ex-partner for 
improper motivations of such disclosures could be revenge, humiliation, financial gain and 
blackmail. 976  
 
974 Samantha Pegg, ‘A matter of privacy or abuse? Revenge porn in the law’ (2018) 7 Crim. L.R. 512 
975 Richardson, (n 385) 155-8. 
976 JPH v XYZ & Persons Unknown [2015] EWHC 2871 (QB); Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley & Ruth Houghton, 
‘Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: The Continuum of Image Based Sexual Abuse’ (2017) Fem. Leg. Stud.  25; Pegg, (n 974) 
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Revenge porn is a form of sexual abuse that may be equally committed by men and 
women.977 In JPH v XYZ and Persons Unknown, for instance, Mr Justice Popplewell granted 
the applicant, a professional actor, an interim non-disclosure order prohibiting the defendant, 
the applicant’s female ex-partner, from disclosing sexual images and videos belonging to the 
claimant. 978 The judge identified two motivations behind this revenge porn case: firstly, the 
defendant sought to revenge the claimant because of ending the relationship; and secondly, 
possible blackmail to resume the relationship. 979 The prior restraint order was granted under 
s. 12 (3) HRA since the court was satisfied that the claimant is likely to establish at trial the 
disallowance of publication. 980 The court has implicitly identified the applicant’s motivation, 
as a professional actor, to protect his professional reputation, which, if damaged, may cost 
him financial losses. 981 The judge rightly applied the likelihood test, instead of the (B v P) test 
because applying the latter test would prohibit granting a prior restraint order if the 
defendant had decided to defend the publication despite the presence of the improper 
motives. 982 Revenge porn cases are one of the typical examples of the overlap between 
defamation and privacy since privacy and reputation issues could equally engage in such 
disclosures. 983 In Mosley v MGN, for instance, despite Mosley’s claim was about his privacy 
right, the adverse effect on his reputation and on the reputation of the four female partners 
were evident. 984This could be easily understood by means of the hidden blackmail against 
 
977 McGlynn, ibid. 27. 
978 JPH, ibid.  
979 Ibid. [2 & 8]. 
980 Ibid. [9]. 
981 Ibid. [8]. 
982 Ibid. [8]. 
983 Ibid.  
984 The Leveson inquiry into the culture practices and ethics of the press: witness statement of Max 





those partners in case of refusing the cooperation with the defendant. 985 Such improper 
motives, however, may not weaken the claim of freedom of expression to allow the claimant 
obtaining an interlocutory injunction if the defendant decided to defend and plead at the trial 
on of the defence such as the defence of truth under defamation law.986 
In Holly v Smyth, the Court of Appeal discharged an interim injunction granted by the 
court of the first instant prohibiting the defendant from publishing defamatory allegations of 
fraud despite the defendant expressed his attention to prove the truth of such claims at trial. 
987 Such grant set aside the (B v P) test rule because the defendant was a blackmailer seeking 
to obtain money in return for his silence. The Court of Appeal rejected this reasoning and held 
that the binding authority of the (B v P) test cannot be overridden simply by the improper 
motives of the defendant because such ‘motives in the proposed publication as less high-
minded than the pure desire to let the world know the truth’. 988 By contrast, such improper 
motives, like blackmail, 989 are relevant considerations that may strengthen the application of 
the interlocutory injunction in privacy law. 990 The blackmail may negatively affect the weight 
attached to freedom of expression, and it amounts to a misuse of freedom of expression. 991 
Improper motives may not only reduce the weight of freedom of expression, but it may also 
strengthen the claim of privacy since ‘The public interest in preventing blackmail will generally 
outweigh the public interest in freedom of expression’.992  
 
985 Mosley, (n 33) [82]. 
986 Rolph, (n 879) 41. 
987 Holly, (n 834) 
988 Ibid. per Sir Christopher Slade. 
989 S. 21 (1) of the Theft Act 1968 defines the blackmail as ‘A person is guilty of blackmail if, intending to gain 
for himself or another ...he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces’. 
990 Rolph, ibid. 41. 
991 YXB (n 885) [17]; LJY (n 898) [29]. 
992 YXB, ibid. [34]. 
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Based on this analysis, prioritising the (B v P) test based on the nub's approach would 
encourage motives of revenge and blackmail instead of preventing them since such motives 
are completely irrelevant matters to reduce the strength of free speech claim if the defendant 
decided to prove the truth of the defamatory allegations. This would be a very undesirable 
scenario from the feminist analysis perspective since most disclosures of private information 
may involve reputational effects. 993 The application of likelihood test in revenge porn cases, 
as this thesis emphasises, may achieve desirable outcomes, especially for feminist analysis, 
whether the female partner was a claimant or third party, because the improper motives 
could be taken into account in assessing the claims in conflict. For instance, in CC v AB, 994 
Eady J granted an injunction against a cuckolded husband who wanted to publish details of 
the sexual affair between his wife and CC in the media and over the internet. The judge 
granted the prior restraint order based on likelihood test since privacy claim outweighs the 
freedom of expression claim, which was motivated by a desire to revenge and profit-seeking. 
995 The judge found the defendant interest in revenging and profit-making may lower his right 
to publish adultery story since the claimant did not mislead the public nor moralised publicly 
on family life. 996 The judge took into consideration the effect of publication on third parties 
in balancing privacy and free speech rights. 997 The defendant's desire to revenge the claimant 
would cause serious impacts of his wife and the claimant's wife. 998 However, the impact on 
the defendant’s wife could be exacerbated by the sexual double standard in society. 999 The 
desirability of injunction from feminist analysis perspective may prioritise the likelihood test 
 
993 Richardson, (n 385) 158. 
994 [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB). 
995 Ibid. [36]. 
996 Ibid.  
997 Ibid. [46]. 
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over the (B v P) test in the revenge porn cases for the following two reasons. Firstly, it could 
prevent the employment and reinforcement of the sexual double standard in society that 
discriminately humiliates women. Secondly, it may discourage the commodification of 
interest in dignity since allowing a partner to sell the adultery story of the other partner may 
reinforce his inherent property right to exclusive sexual access to that partner. 1000 
6. 4: Concluding remarks  
 
This Chapter has considered the impact of the overlap when deciding the appropriate 
rules of injunctive relief to be applied in privacy law as and when cases overlap with 
defamation law. The purpose of this chapter has been to examine to what extent the 
restrictive rule of Bonnard v Perryman as applied in defamation cases should also be applied 
in privacy cases should both torts overlap. In order to understand the challenge of the overlap 
around addressing interim injunctions, the chapter has explored in detail the rules of interim 
injunction applied in defamation (Bonnard v Perryman test) and privacy tort (likelihood test) 
and upon what grounds such tests are justified. The chapter has critically analysed the English 
judicial approaches towards the application of Bonnard v Perryman rule in privacy cases which 
also involve reputational considerations. By using the framework of coherence, efficiency, 
and feminist analysis to formulate the lens through which to explore the appropriate rule of 
interim injunction, this chapter has concluded that the mere existence of reputational harms 
within privacy actions should not constitute a reason for applying the Bonnard v Perryman’s 
restrictive rule if there is a genuine basis for a privacy claim in the first place. There remains 
no principled reason to apply the more restrictive rule of defamation law as this seeks to 
prioritize freedom of expression over privacy interests: both rights ought to be treated with 
 
1000 Richardson, ibid. 155-8. 
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equal weight. Three justifications were advanced to support the baselessness of the judiciary 
attention to applying the injunctive test of defamation in privacy cases involving reputational 
harms. Firstly, this thesis addressed the objectionable inconsistency between the 
justifications of the Bonnard v Perryman test and privacy law in respect to the role of truth. If 
truth itself cannot be a defence in privacy law in the first place, there would be an undesirable 
incoherence to apply Bonnard v Perryman that is based on the procedures required to 
establish the defence of truth. The incoherence would be acute taking into account the fact 
that reputational interests are protected under article 8 ECHR.  The fact that privacy is the 
core value explicitly protected in Article 8 ECHR may provide a reason to prioritise privacy 
rules over reputation implicitly protected under this article. There should be an equal weight 
to the claims of privacy and freedom of expression.  Secondly, the application of economic 
analysis, based on costs and benefits criterion, provides an additional argument for 
prioritising the right applicable test of interim injunction. This thesis argued that the 
application of the Bonnard v Perryman rule (that likely ends with a rejection of temporary 
injunction) in privacy cases would inefficiently increase the social costs resulting from an 
erroneous judgement or procedural operation. The social costs of such a mistaken judgement 
cannot only be limited to personal suffering, frustration, disappointment and feelings of anger 
caused by undermining the intrinsic values of privacy invasion; it might also undermine the 
individual's emotional well-being, the promotion of human flourishment and freedom of 
expression. The costs of further litigations incurred by the litigants are also a part of the social 
costs, which could be avoided if an interlocutory injunction had been granted in the first place. 
The fact that privacy litigations may reach six-digit numbers may exacerbate the inefficiency 
of the B v P rule if applied in the overlapping cases. The final insight of the desirability of the 
likelihood test of Article 12 (3) HRA 1998 over the B v P test, as this thesis defends, could be 
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derived from feminist analysis. The feminist analysis argues that cases brought forward 
against women with improper motives (such as blackmail, making profits and revenge porn, 
sought through the social bias against women within the double standard of sexuality) must 
be discouraged. The role of such improper motives could be pivotal, as this thesis maintains, 
to prioritise the likelihood test over the B v P test. The conflicting tests differentiate on 
whether a freedom of expression claim could be weakened if there were improper motives 
behind the publications in question. Whilst the B v P test considers such motives irrelevant if 
the defendant decided to establish the truth of the information, the likelihood test takes into 

































Chapter 7: The impact of the overlap on damages  
7. 1: Introduction 
The overlap between defamation and privacy correlatedly raises three considerable 
questions concerning the damages. This chapter tackles with the eligibility of the privacy law 
to include the reputational harms within its scope of damages. This question raises from the 
fact that privacy right under Article 8 ECHR includes reputational interest within its protective 
scope to an extent that no separating line could be drawn between reputation and privacy. 
1001 This issue remains an open question in the English common law because there are 
different and inconsistent approaches regarding such matter. Given that the reputational 
interest is conceptually and doctrinally considered as an inseparable aspect of the private life 
concept, this thesis argues that it is principally and coherently sound to subsume the harm to 
reputation within the harms of privacy law. The second correlated question relates to the 
concept of vindication applied in defamation; this chapter examines to what extent privacy 
law should take into account the vindicatory purpose of damages awarded in defamation to 
be also applied in privacy if reputational harms, as this thesis argues, could be protected under 
privacy law. The chapter examines the final question concerning to what extent the damages 
of defamation and privacy could be cumulative if these actions were simultaneously brought 
in respect to the harmfully defamatory and private publication; and whether there could be 
a double compensation in accumulating such damages. The answer of this question, as this 
thesis highlights, may vary according to the unipolar or bipolar framework explaining the 
relationship between the wrong and harm in tort law.  These three interrelated questions are 
respectively examined in the second section of this chapter. It is imperative to determine at 
 
1001 See chapter 3. 
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the outset the types of damages that could be awarded in the law of defamation and privacy. 
The first section, therefore, outlines the size, purpose, and types of damages awarded in 
defamation and privacy.  
7. 2: The types of damages awarded in defamation and privacy  
A- Overview of the size and purpose of damages in defamation and privacy law  
The English law of defamation requires the defendant to financially compensate the 
victim in order to repair the interest of reputation wrongfully tarnished. 1002 Awarding 
damages is the principal remedy in defamation law by which the court seeks to correct the 
injustices endured by the harmed party. 1003 The damages awarded in defamation cases are 
described ‘at large’ because they seek to compensate for losses which are otherwise deemed 
formally incalculable. 1004 However, libel damages are presently set at a practical ceiling of 
around £275,000 (allowing for inflation); an amount awarded for the most serious of libels. 
1005 The high compensation of defamation law serves three interlocking purposes; 
compensation, solatium and vindication. The defamed party in a successful action is entitled 
to a monetary sum adjudged sufficient to repair her besmirched reputation, to get solatium 
for the distress and humiliation caused and to vindicate publicly her good name. 1006 The 
weight of each purpose depends on the circumstances of every case. For example, the 
claimant might suffer serious mental distress with very little demonstrable harm to her 
 
1002 Mullis & Parkes, (n 26) 324. However, the defendant may offer to make amends according to s. 2 Defamation 
Act 1996. 
1003 However, according to s. 9 (1) Defamation Act 1996, the court may order a declaration of falsity under the 
summary procedure and it might also order the defendant to publish a correction and apology if the Claimant 
only seeks to vindicate her tarnished reputation rather pecuniary damages. Ibid. 325.    
1004 Rookes v Barnard [1964] UKHL 1, [1964] AC 1129; Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, [1972] UKHL 
3, [1972] 2 WLR 645.  
1005 Cairns v Modi [2012] EWCA Civ 1382 [25]; Anbananden v Eshan Badal [2017] EWHC 2638 (QB) [71]. 
1006 John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586; Cairns, ibid. [21]; Galloway v Telegraph Group [2004] EWHC 2786 (QB) at 
201; Anbananden , ibid. [64] 
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reputation; or, the need for public vindication to clean her name might outweigh the 
emotional distress caused by defamatory allegations. 1007  
The components of compensation and solatium, in addition to serve the 
compensatory purpose of harms to reputation and emotional distress, may serve other 
purposes such as vindication and deterrence. In other words, vindicatory purpose does not 
constitute a discrete component within the general monetary award. 1008  In the writing and 
interpretation of the statute, a claimant's need for vindication remains the main reason 
behind the generosity of the size of damages awarded in defamation, irrespective whether 
these are to be decided by a jury or a judge. 1009 Nonetheless, in The Gleaner Co Ltd v 
Abrahams, the Privy Council identified another purpose behind compensatory damages 
awarded in defamation law; deterrence could be mutually inclusive with compensation. 1010 
The deterrent effect of compensatory damages is broadly proportionate to the size of 
the monetary award, where ‘the higher it is set, the greater the deterrence’. 1011 However, 
Eady J in Mosley v MGN attacked the distinct role of deterrence within compensatory 
damages, on the grounds of the potential chilling effect upon freedom of expression and the 
undeserved windfall for the claimant. 1012 Nonetheless, his Justice did not deny the 
compensatory damages’ incidental deterrent function, observing instead such a role is not 
confined to the awarding of such damages but could be also accomplished through gain-
 
1007 Cairns, (n 1006) [22]. 
1008 John Hartshorne, the Value of Privacy, (2010) 2 Journal of Media Law 67, 72. 
1009 Ibid. 73. 
1010 The Gleaner Co Ltd v Abrahams [2003] UKPC 55; [2004] 1 AC 628 [53]. 
1011 Ibid. at 42. 
1012 Mosley (n 33) at 227-8; This reasoning is consistent with corrective justice premise that considers each award 
of damages exceeding the defendant's gain as an undeserved windfall. Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Restitutionary 
Damages as Corrective Justice’ (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 1.  
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based damages since these share the common feature, along with compensatory damages, 
of penalizing financially the defendant. 1013  
Besides these purposes, there are other decisive factors in assessing the damages 
awarded within libel claims. For example, the wide or narrow extent of libellous 
publications,1014 the seriousness of the libel and to what extent the defamatoriness impugns 
personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage and loyalty, 1015 the relationship 
between the defamed person and the publisher, 1016 the level of authoritative status afforded 
to the publisher by society, the role of the defamed person or claimant within the society, 
family, friends or work colleagues. These are reasonably determinable to the likelihood that 
any defamatory statements will become more widely propagated, especially within the 
Internet era. 1017 By contrast, a survey of cases in the context of privacy law demonstrates two 
distinct judicial approaches towards the issue of privacy damages. Firstly, the conventional 
approach seeks to award a very modest sum of damages chiefly with a view towards 
compensating the claimant for any distress caused to her by an infringement of legally defined 
privacy rights.1018 The second may be characterised as a hybrid approach which seeks to 
merge the conventional approach with the vindicatory approach as applied in defamation 
law. 1019 Eady J applied the latter approach in the course of awarding an unprecedented sum 
 
1013 Weinrib, ibid; Edelman (n 405) 246. 
1014 John, (n 1005) 607 
1015 Ibid.  
1016 Cooper, (n 331) [96]. 
1017 Raj Dhir v Bronte Saddler [2017] EWHC 3155 (QB) [21]; Cooper, ibid. [96-7]. 
1018 Hartshorne (n 1007) 74; Gulati, (n 437) [179]; Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1777 
(QB) [81], in this case, only £2000 has been awarded to compensate the Claimant’s emotional distress; In the 
landmark case of  Campbell v MGN, only £2500 has been awarded; In McKennit v As, only £5000 has been 
awarded in respect of wrongful disclosures about the Claimant’s business and personal life; in Weller v 
Associated Newspapers only £2500 were awarded for Weller’s twin young children and £5000 to a 16 year 
Weller’s old girl for publication of unauthorised photographs; In  AAA v Associated Newspapers, a sum of £15,000 
was awarded for the publication of three photographs of a child.   
1019 Hartshorne (n 1005) 76. 
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of damages (at the time) totalling £60,000 to Mr Mosley in respect of what the court ruled to 
be a very serious invasion of Mosley’s private life. 1020 Eady J here set a precedent for taking 
into account the vindication factor when assessing privacy damages, noting that: 1021 
‘Apart from distress, there is another factor which probably has to be taken into account 
of a less tangible nature.  It is accepted in recent jurisprudence that a legitimate 
consideration is that of vindication to mark the infringement of a right’.  
However, his Justice added that such a vindicatory factor might be rejected should 
other factors lead to the awarding of substantial damages. 1022 Eady J’s ruling, however, did 
not explicitly elucidate the relevant factors that should be taken into account in assessing 
privacy damages. Nonetheless, the general principles or factors underpinning the assessment 
of appropriate compensatory damages in privacy law depend on the circumstances of the 
case in question. 1023 An examination of the most recent cases may help to identify the 
relevant categories of information that determine the sizes of damages in privacy law. The 
first of these categories relate to the nature of the information. Mann J in Gulati v MGN 
provided a set of information types subject to a higher standard of privacy protection, which 
included medical information and financial information, along with details of social 
relationships, and personal relationships. 1024 The second category pertains to the 
consequences of privacy infringement, including distress caused, damage to health, damage 
to autonomy, damage to dignity and damage to reputation. 1025 There are further sub-factors, 
 
1020 Mosley, (n 33). 
1021 Ibid. [216]. 
1022 Eady J explained that: ’If other factors mean that significant damages are to be awarded, in any event, the 
element of vindication does not need to be reflected in an even higher award’.  
1023 Burrell, (n 515) [139]. 
1024 Gulati, (n 437) [229] 
1025 Cliff Richard, (n 312) [350]. 
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which help the court determine the extent and scale of these consequential effects, such as 
the sensitivity of the Claimant; 1026 the identity of the publishees; 1027 the scope of the 
publication. 1028  It seems clear that these factors were present and considered within the 
decision made by Mann J in the recent privacy case law where Mr Cliff Richard was markedly 
awarded for the publication by a major media outlet of allegations pertaining to serious 
criminal conduct the highest compensatory damages of £190,000 and aggravated damages 
of £20,000. 1029 There exists, as defined by the law, legitimate mitigating factors which should 
be considered in the course of a ruling, such as a ‘genuine mistake or a belief in the claimant's 
consent’. 1030  
The purpose of monetary remedy in privacy was clearly explained by Eady J in Mosley 
v MGN.  His honour confined the function of this remedy in ensuring solatium. The 
interpretive touchstone relating to the misuse of private information is the unauthorised 
revelation of personal information which can be never rectified through restoration to its 
original state of privacy once released for general publication. Thus, ‘the only realistic course 
is to select a figure which marks the fact that an unlawful intrusion has taken place while 
affording some degree of solatium to the injured party’. 1031 In Cooper v Turrell, Tugendhat J 
also reaffirmed the limited function of compensatory damages in privacy cases when his 
honour held that compensating the distress and hurt feelings of the breached party is the 
purpose of damages in MOPI. 1032 However, the recent cases have raised the possibility of 
awarding compensatory damages to mark the infringement of privacy rights even though the 
 
1026 Gulati, ibid. 229. 
1027 Burrell, (n 515) 139. 
1028 Cliff, ibid; Burrell, ibid. [139]. 
1029 Cliff, ibid. [358 & 365]. 
1030 Burrell, ibid.  
1031 Mosley, (n 33) at 231. 
1032 Cooper (n 331) at 102. 
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claimant had suffered no quantifiable mental distress. In other words, damages in the context 
of privacy may either constitute an award compensating for the diminution of a right to 
control formerly private information, or for the distress that the Claimant could justifiably 
have suffered because given her private information had been exploited. 1033 Eady J and 
Tugendhat J agreed that the main distinction between defamation and privacy damages lies 
within that vindicatory function, which is one of the key tenets within the determination of 
defamation awards that may restore the tarnished reputation to its previous position.1034  
Conversely, this function remains an impossible objective in privacy since privacy is ‘like an 
ice cube’ and it is gone forever once melted. 1035 
B- Compensatory damages in defamation and privacy  
Compensatory damages could be divided into three categories, which reflect the subject 
matters of compensation. There are compensatory damages in defamation and privacy seek to 
address pure losses, consequential losses caused by the injurious publication and the harms caused 
by the defendant malice.  
Compensatory damages for pure losses 
Defamation law recognises a separated head of damages to redress the loss of reputation 
caused by the defamatory imputations.  This kind of damage has a dual function: it provides the 
victims a compensation and vindication. In Galloway v Telegraph Group, Eady J held that an 
injury to reputation has to be appropriately compensated by monetary damages that also 
serve to vindicate the Claimant’s besmirched reputation. 1036 However, vindication is not an 
independent component of general damages, but it is one of the purposes served by the 
 
1033 Gulati (n 437) at 48.  
1034 The vindicatory function of defamation and privacy damages will be discussed in the next section.  
1035 Mosley, (n 33) at 230; Cooper, ibid. at 102; Hartshorne, (n 322) 103. 
1036 (n 1005) [201]  
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global award of damages. 1037 In this instance, Eady J awarded Mr Galloway, a former Member 
of Parliament, the sum of £150,000 in respect of what were adjudged libellous journalistic 
claims that Galloway had received financial support from the former Iraqi president Saddam 
Hussein.  Such a generous award was justified by the Court for: ‘the purposes of restoring his 
reputation [with Eady adding that] I do not think those purposes would be achieved by any 
award less than £150,000’. 1038  
The English privacy law, like defamation law, provides compensatory damages for the 
loss of privacy itself, irrespective whether or not the Claimant suffers consequential losses. In 
Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, Dingemans J awarded the three Weller children 
compensatory damages of £2500 each for what was adjudged to constitute a misuse of 
private information, irrespective of the existence or non-existence of consequential losses 
related to distress. 1039 Similarly, in AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd, Mrs Justice Nicola 
Davies awarded damages of £15,000 on the basis that the defendant breached the child's 
Article 8 rights by publishing her photo which had been taken in public space without her 
mother’s consent. 1040  The clearest example of recognising the new category of damages 
based on loss of privacy can be found within the Gulati v MGN judgement. Mann J’s damages 
approach is based on upon the principle of right-invasion, where every invasion of a right 
imposes prima facie a right to a remedy. 1041 Privacy as a tort implies the obligation to respect 
an individual’s private life, hence each misuse of such right represents a wrong which itself 
rightfully attracts damages. 1042 Privacy, therefore, is an actionable tort per se, because the 
 
1037 Hartshorne, (n 1007) 72. 
1038 Galloway, ibid. (Summary conclusion)  
1039 Weller, (n 227) [192].  
1040 (n 190) [127]. 
1041 Gulati, (n 437) [115]. 
1042 Ibid. [143]. 
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mere interference with the protected interest of privacy constitutes a pure loss, and it gives 
rise to a separate category of damages. 1043 Mann J emphasised that a separate category of 
compensatory damages ought to be awarded to reflect the fact of privacy invasion because: 
1044 
 ‘If one has lost “the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s 
private life” then I fail to see why that, of itself, should not attract a degree of 
compensation, in an appropriate case.  A right was infringed, and loss of a kind 
recognised by the court as wrongful was caused.  It would seem to me to be contrary to 
principle not to recognise that as a potential route to damages’.  
This approach was judicially reaffirmed in other privacy cases. For instance, in Shakir 
Ali and Shahida Aslam v Channel 5 Broadcast Limited, 1045 Mr Justice Arnold recently 
confirmed that ‘Compensation for misuse of private information may be awarded even if it 
does not cause distress.’ Based upon these precedents, the claimant in a privacy case may 
thus be entitled to claim compensatory damages under three different categories of damage: 
damages for the misuse of private information, damages for distress, and aggravated 
damages.1046 Nevertheless, the judge awarded £10,000 solely and specifically relating to the 
distress caused by the Defendant’s TV programme through its unjustified disclosure of private 
information to 9.65 million viewers, given that the claim of privacy was made upon the basis 
of these specific damages. 1047  
 
1043 Jason N. E. Varuhas, ‘Varieties of Damages for Breach of Privacy’ in Jason N. E.  Varuhas and Nicole A.  
Moreham (eds) Remedies for Breach of Privacy, (Hart Publishing 2018). 
1044 Gulati, ibid. [111]. 
1045 [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch) [213]; see also: Burrell (n 64) [133-4]. 
1046 Shakir Ali, (n 1052) [212]. 
1047 Ibid. [215]. 
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An analysis of relevant cases may indicate that damages for loss of privacy per se could 
be awarded alongside additional compensation in the same instance for loss of dignity, 
autonomy and control over the publication of private information as explained by Lord 
Hoffman in the leading case of Campbell v MGN. 1048 However, in Mosley v MGN, the 
formulation of damages referencing a loss of dignity was used interchangeably or 
synonymously with a loss incurred relating to distress and hurt feelings. The loss of dignity 
may describe the indignity and humiliation caused by the breach of one’s privacy right. 1049  
In Gulati v MGN, the loss of dignity was made explicitly coterminous with a loss of 
privacy within Mann J’s ruling. 1050 The loss of privacy was similarly used with the loss of 
autonomy. Mann J explained this interchangeable use in describing the invasion of privacy as 
depriving the claimant of their autonomy ‘There is compensation for loss of privacy or 
“autonomy” resulting from the hacking or blagging that went on’. 1051 His honour went on to 
explain the parallel use of autonomy and privacy by saying: 1052  
‘Those awards include compensation for the acts of invasion of privacy (hacking and 
private investigator blagging) which led to the publication of the articles and the 
acquisition of the information on which those articles were based.  In addition, she is 
 
1048 (n 5) [51]. 
1049 (n 33) [216]; Shakir Ali, ibid. [148]; Eric Descheemaeker, ‘The Harms of Privacy’ (2016) 8 Journal of Media 
Law, 278, 285. 
1050 Mann J explained: ‘I have already found that the damages should compensate not merely for distress …, but 
should also compensate (if appropriate) for the loss of privacy… This may include, if appropriate, a sum to 
compensate for damage to dignity or standing, so far as that is meaningful in this context and is not already 
within the distress element’. Gulati (n 437) [168]. 
1051 Ibid. [108]. 
1052 Ibid. [287]. The loss of autonomy comprises three constitutive elements: the deprivation of a meaningful 
choice that the Claimant had the right and capability to exercise; an injury to the Claimant’s interest; and 
irreversibility. Tsachi Keren-Paz, ‘compensating injury to autonomy: a conceptual and normative analysis’ in Kit 
Barker, Karen Fairweather, Ross Grantham (eds) Private Law in the 21st century (Hart Publishing 2017) 421-2.  
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entitled to compensation for the commission of the wrongs (depriving her of her 
autonomy)’.  
Accordingly, a loss of privacy is indeed a loss of autonomy because the claimant is 
deprived of control over the dissemination of her personal information and such a loss is 
irreversible and can never be completely rectified. 1053 The Court of Appeal in Gulati v MGN, 
furthermore, described the loss of privacy by a loss or diminution of a right to control formerly 
private information. 1054 It is worth clarifying here that such loss of privacy should not be 
distinguished from the above concepts within any legal judgement, because this would 
formally duplicate the same injury when evaluating damages. 1055 However, the courts in 
recent cases have considered the loss of privacy as one of the myriad factors upon which the 
sum of overall damages should be assessed, rather than making a separate award in respect 
of this type of loss. For example, in TLT and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, 1056 it was held that damages can be principally awarded in respect of the loss of 
control over personal and confidential information. Mitting J, unlike Mann J in Gulati v MGN, 
refused to allocate a separate set or category of damages to reflect this loss since ‘it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to make a separate award in respect of this head of damage’. 1057 This 
approach was also followed within Cliff v BBC, where Mann J considered the loss of control 
over the use of private information (loss of privacy), emotional distress, the loss of dignity and 
the loss of reputation as relevant factors to be taken into account in assessing the general 
compensatory damages relating to the privacy suit. 1058 It would be interesting to conclude in 
 
1053 Erika Chamberlain, ‘how should damages be assessed for harmless breach of privacy?’ in Kit Barker, Karen 
Fairweather, Ross Grantham (eds) Private Law in the 21st century (Hart Publishing 2017) 402. 
1054 MGN v Gulati & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 [148]. 
1055 Descheemaeker (n 1056) 284. 
1056 [2016] EWHC 2217 (QB) [17]. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 TLT and others (n 1057) 
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this paragraph that there would be, practically speaking, no implication to treat the harm to 
privacy under an independent head of damages or merge it with other elements under one 
global award since such harm will be financially redressed in any way.   
Compensatory damages for consequential losses  
Defamation law recognises the second category of damage that seeks to redress the 
distress, hurt and humiliation caused by the defamatory publication. 1059 In Monroe v 
Hopkins,1060 Warby J clarified the function of this category by describing it as ‘parasitic on 
proof of harm to reputation and needs to bear some relationship to that harm’. Eric 
Descheemaeker explains parasitic interests as those stemming from a violation of the 
primarily protected interest (reputation), and therefore this is eligible to be taken into 
consideration and redressed by defamation law within the scope of damages. 1061 For 
example, a loss of employment following an injury to reputation falls within the protective 
scope of defamation; whereas a loss of employment without an injury to reputation does not. 
If defamation law protects parasitic interests as the mental wellbeing interest (subject to 
general rules of causation and remoteness), there should be, principally speaking, no reason 
to exclude other pecuniary or non-pecuniary interests when they constitute consequential 
losses stemming from the primary injury to reputation1062. It is argued that the legally 
protected right to freedom of expression might be disproportionally interfered within the 
course of facilitating such a recovery of pecuniary losses (special damages) in addition to 
seeking redress in relation to core loss of reputation within defamation law.  Ergo, since 
reputation interest is the central axis of protection within defamation law, the injured party 
 
1059 John (n 1007)  
1060 [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) [76]. 
1061 Descheemaeker, (n 91) 616. 
1062 Descheemaeker, (n 91) 615; Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Three Keys to Defamation: Media 24 in a Comparative 
Perspective’ (2013) 130 South African Law Journal, 435. 
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should be only permitted to vindicate her tarnished reputation through recourse to general 
compensatory damages.1063 This view might be supported by Lonrho v Fayed when the court 
of appeal ruled that a loss of reputation and injury to feelings should be only redressed 
through defamation law. 1064 However, Tugendhat J in Thornton made a distinction between 
personal reputation as part of the right to private life in Article 8 ECHR, and professional 
reputation in respect of commercial or property rights in Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR. 
This distinction might open the doors in English courts to recover special damages through 
defamation law. 1065 
Privacy law approach, similar to that applied within defamation, provides a 
compensatory remedy for the consequential losses. The main award in privacy action seeks 
to remedy mental distress caused by the unauthorised disclosure of private information. In 
Mosley v MGN, Eady J awarded an unprecedented (at the time) financial remedy of £60,000 
for ‘the purpose of acknowledging the infringement and compensating … for the injury to 
feelings, the embarrassment and distress caused’. 1066 The term ‘mental distress, as deployed 
and defined within rulings,’ encompasses an expansive and ever supplementary variety of 
harmful effects or disruptions affecting emotional tranquillity or wellbeing (including mental 
harm, loss of happiness, and emotional harm). 1067 However, it is a practically contentious and 
theoretically unsettled issue, judicially speaking, as to whether damages for emotional 
distress should constitute a separate category of damages or remain defined as one of the 
factors underpinning the assessment of compensatory damages. 
 
1063 John Campbell, ‘An Anomaly: Special Damages for Libel’ (2011) 3(2) Journal of Media Law 193, 196. 
1064 (No.5) [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1489 
1065 Campbell, ibid. 197. 
1066 (n 33) [235]. 
1067 Descheemaeker, (n 1056) 283. 
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In the leading case of Gulati v MGN, Mann J awarded the claimants significant 
amounts of damages under three grounds: (1) the instance of hacking itself, by implication 
intrusive and contravening the Claimants legal rights to privacy; (2) the publication of private 
information obtained by the hacking; and (3) the emotional distress resulting from the 
hacking. 1068 Lady Justice Arden rejected the Defendant's argument that damages in the 
misuse of private information should be awarded only with regards to the distress caused. 
1069 However, this approach was deemed unnecessary and undesirable when assessing 
damages to be awarded in respect of a loss of control around personal information resulting 
from the Defendant’s conduct. For example, in TLT v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Mitting J held that the loss of control should be taken into account when 
assessing the distress experienced by the Claimant relating to the unauthorised disclosure of 
private information rather than constituting an independent category of damages. 1070 The 
majority of consequential losses rulings within privacy cases are predicated upon a 
determination of emotional distress caused by a breach of privacy; nevertheless, 
consequential losses could also include pecuniary loss. In order to recover such losses under 
privacy law, it becomes necessary to formulate a claim specifically subject upon the grounds 
of determining causation and remoteness. 1071 Nonetheless, an economic loss might be 
absent within the context of a specifically privacy-based claim, since a claim made for such 
losses could be brought to court on alternative grounds, including breach of confidence and 
breach of contract. 1072 The pecuniary loss might nevertheless be conceivably recovered 
within a privacy suit. Should the latter overlap with defamation law, in such a hypothetical 
 
1068 MGN v Gulati & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 1291 [8]. 
1069 Ibid. [48-9]. 
1070 (n 1055) [17]. 
1071 Varuhas, (n 1044).  
1072 Descheemaeker (n 1056) 281-2. 
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overlap, economic loss consequentially caused by defamatory allegations might be recovered 
under what would be a termed a 'disguised privacy cause of action' by the Claimant, should 
the defamatory allegations also be private. 1073  
Compensatory aggravated damages  
The court may increase the compensatory damages by awarding aggravated damages 
that are ordered and assessed according to the defendant’s malicious conduct and her state 
of mind. 1074 There are several factors taken into account when assessing these damages:  a 
determination of malice aforethought by the Defendant, malicious repetition of statements 
deemed defamatory, exacerbating the injured feelings of the claimant, the defendant’s 
failure to withdraw the defamatory statements and the Defendant’s conduct in litigation such 
as malicious use of the defence of truth. 1075 Aggravated damages are equally recognised 
within defamation and privacy torts. For example, in Barron and Anor v Vines, 1076 Warby J 
held that the defendant’s malice constituted one factor where aggravate damages would be 
deemed appropriate1077. Furthermore, King J in Woodward v Grice, 1078 awarded £8000 in 
aggravated damages as part of a libel ruling based upon the Defendant’s state of mind in 
publishing the libellous statements. This was due to, firstly, a determination of the 
Defendant’s recklessness with regards to whether the statements complained of were true 
or false. Secondly, the Defendant’s motivation hostile animus towards the Claimant. Thirdly, 
the Defendant’s persistence in maintaining his allegation until it was proven he was wrong. 
 
1073 Ibid. 383.  
1074 Mullis & Parkers (n 26) 353; Andrew Kenyon, Problems with Defamation Damages (1998) 24 Monash 
University Law Review, 70, 73-4. 
1075 Mullis & Parkers, Ibid.  
1076 [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB) 
1077 Ibid. at 21 (4). 
1078 [2017] EWHC 1292 (QB) [82] 
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Finally, the Defendant was directing several damaging slurs against the integrity of the 
Claimant during legal proceedings. 1079 
The claimant in privacy law, as in the case of defamation, is entitled to claim 
aggravated damages where the claimant’s proper feelings of dignity and pride are injured by 
the defendant’s injurious conducts during the course of legal proceedings themselves. 1080 
Mann J in Cliff v BBC asserted unequivocally the existence and applicability of such damages 
relating to privacy within English law. 1081 His justice awarded £20,000 as aggravated damages 
for the additional distress caused by the BBC’s conduct after the initial infringement of Sir 
Cliff’s privacy when the defendant submitted the broadcast in question for a Royal Television 
Society award. This conduct, reflecting the defendant’s extreme pride in repeating and 
promoting the invasive activity with metaphorical fanfare, therefore formally aggravated the 
claimant’s damage caused by the initial invasion. 1082   
C- Non-compensatory damages in defamation and privacy 
Exemplary damages and gain-based damages are both non-compensatory damages 
predicated upon a similar deterrence rationale function; in each case, they strip the 
defendant of those undeserved gains obtained by the deliberate wrong. 1083 The purpose of 
such damages in a libel action, therefore, is to punish and deter the defendant, especially 
those of greater resources (such as media conglomerates), from continuing to publish 
 
1079 Aggravated damages raise a controversial debate about the protected interest under this category of 
damages. P. Birks, ‘Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect’ (1997) 32 IJ 1–45, 30 cited in 
Descheemaeker (n 91) 614; John Murphy, ‘The nature and domain of aggravated damages’ (2010) 69 Cambridge 
Law Journal, 353, 366. 
1080 Mosley, (n 33) [222-3]; Varuhas, (n 1044). 
1081 Cliff, (n 312) [360]; Gulati, (n 437)) [203] however, Mann J in Gulati case did not award aggravated damages 
under a separate head; rather, he merged a modest sum of aggravated damages in respect of the manner and 
content of the cross-examination with the general damages awarded to Mr Yentob. Gulati, ibid. [251 ii] & [252]. 
1082 Cliff, ibid. [365]. 
1083 Normann Witzleb, ‘Exemplary Damages for Invasions of Privacy’ (2014) 6(1) JML 69, 72. 
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libellous publications. English law allows the award of exemplary damages in only three 
instances: if damages are expressly authorised by statute; damages are in regard of 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by servants of the government; or the 
wrongdoer is adjudged to have attempted an intentional gaining of economic advantage in 
excess of her payable compensation as determined by a liability ruling. 1084  
The nature of the cause of action plays a role in the applicability or non-applicability 
of an award. In other words, tort law such as torts of trespass and malicious falsehood are the 
territory of exemplary damages, whereas gain-based damages are available for equitable 
wrongs or breaches of contract. 1085 In John v MGN, the court of appeal amended an award 
of exemplary damages from £275,000 to £50,000. 1086 It was ruled that exemplary damages 
may be awarded in libel action if the defendant had no genuine belief in the truth of her 
defamatory publication, or she acted to gain an economic advantage by cynical calculation of 
likely outcomes arising from the publication and dissemination of the libel (namely she would 
make herself financially better off). 1087 However, exemplary damages in English privacy law 
were the subject of gradual change based on the development of privacy-protection 
precedents. Initially, in Mosley v MGN, Eady J refused to recognise exemplary damages as 
falling within the scope of privacy based on two grounds: firstly, such damages were 
permissible within the scope of the tort and there was no authority allowing the extension of 
these damages into the domain of equitable wrongs; secondly, exemplary damages were 
inconsistent with Strasbourg jurisprudence. 1088  The first reason is no longer tenable since it 
is now well settled within English law that the infringement of privacy right is a tortious wrong 
 
1084 Rookes, (n 1011) 
1085 Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122 (HL); Witzleb, ibid. 
1086 John, (n 1005) 626; Broome, (n 1011)  
1087 John, Ibid. 618-9. 
1088 Mosley (n 33) at 196-7. 
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and the misuse of private information constitutes a tort. 1089 The second reason is 
unpersuasive for several reasons. 1090 Firstly, it would be inconsistent for the domestic courts 
to comply with the Strasbourg Court regarding exemplary damages and then go on to 
disregard the Strasbourg Court in respect of aggravated damages. This is because neither 
aggravated nor exemplary damages were recognised by Strasbourg jurisprudence, whereas 
both damages have long been important aspects of the English law. Secondly, the reason 
behind the Strasbourg Court’s reluctance to award exemplary damages against member 
States is based around the ambit of its prescribed role as an international supervisory body. 
1091 Finally, the Strasbourg jurisprudence disallows exemplary damages only when such 
damages disproportionally and adversely affect freedom of expression; thus, exemplary 
damages constitute an objectionable remedy only when they produce chilling effects and 
disproportionate interference with free speech rights. 1092 Witzleb submits that nothing can 
prevent rulings on exemplary damages within a democratic society when such damages seek 
to necessarily redress those most reprehensible forms of press misconducts. 1093 In PJS v NGN, 
The Supreme Court expressed an implicit approval of necessary and proportionate awards 
relating to exemplary damages in order to deter and punish deliberately flagrant breaches of 
privacy and provide adequate protection for the person concerned. 1094 Nonetheless, 
exemplary damages remain an exceptional remedy and a last judicial resort to punish the 
defendant’s outrageous and unjustified conduct. This is in the event of such punishment goals 
remaining unachievable through other available remedies such as compensatory and 
 
1089 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB); NT1 and NT2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB); Cliff, (n 312)  
1090 Varuhas, (n 1044)  
1091 Ibid. 
1092 Ibid. 
1093 Witzleb (n 1090) 92. 
1094 (n 154) [42]; It might be worthy to mention that there is a sharp criticism has been addressed to the 
unjustified discrimination created by the provisions of this Act between regulated and unregulated publishers. 
Witzleb, ibid.90-1.     
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aggravated damages. 1095 This might explain why there is no single case of privacy, presently, 
in which exemplary damages were awarded.  
Gain based damages, also known as ‘account of profit’ or ‘disgorgement damages’, is 
the second form of non-compensatory damages that strip the defendant of those undeserved 
gains acquired by her a deliberate wrong. 1096 However, defamation law differentiates from 
privacy law on the recognition of such a remedy. The absence of gain-based damages in 
defamation law can be explained by the following two reasons. Firstly, there is no need of 
such relief since exemplary damages not only serve the same function of gain-based relief 
(namely stripping the defendant from any unjustified profits gained by the defamatory 
publication), but also fulfil a punitive function. 1097 Secondly, gain-based damages are only 
concerned with reparations pertaining to unjust enrichment. 1098 There may be some 
technical difficulty encountered in assessing the precise profits gained by media outlets in 
respect of the defamatory publication, since the article or entry to which the successful 
defamatory suit relates is not sold in isolation. 1099 Conversely, this goal of reparation could 
be achieved through the function of exemplary damages in addition to the goals relating to 
punishment and deterrence that lie within the court’s purview. Sometimes general damages 
(compensatory and aggravated) are not sufficient or adequate, from the court’s point of view, 
to punish the contumelious or outrageous way in which the wrong was committed. 1100 
 
1095 Ibid. 86. 
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1099 Normann Witzleb, ‘Justifying Gain-Based Remedies for Invasions of Privacy, (2009) 29. Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 325, 354. 
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Privacy law, unlike defamation law, may strip all profits gained by the defendant if an 
‘account of profits’ being opened. 1101 Arguably then, gain-based relief should in principle strip 
gains emerge as the natural outcome of the court ruling that the defendant made 
unauthorised use of the right-holder exclusive entitlement. 1102 Such an account of profits 
may perform a deterrent function within actions where exemplary damages are unknown, as 
with the equitable doctrine pertaining to breach of confidence. 1103 This remedy may be the 
best choice in cases where the claimant suffers no determinable loss and where, 
consequently, no compensatory damages could be awarded on the grounds of loss. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued in turn that each wrongful interference with a protected 
interest causes normative damage; therefore, compensatory damages may be legitimately 
awarded irrespective of whether the claimant suffered any consequential or material 
losses.1104 Furthermore, compensatory damages may avoid an objectionable windfall gain for 
the Claimant that could potentially result from awarding such account of profits. 1105 Varuhas 
argues that an account of profits remedy might exceptionally serve a vindicatory purpose in 
privacy law when wrongful interferences were committed specifically with the intention of 
profiting financially. 1106 Nonetheless, there are arguments challenge the potential benefits of 
applying gain-based damages within the privacy context. Firstly, there are some breaches of 
privacy that produce no discernible material profit for the wrongdoer, including unauthorised 
publications of private information on social media like Facebook or Twitter. 1107 Secondly, 
the account of profits is an ineffective remedy in those instances where the private 
 
1101 Walsh v Shanahan [2013] EWCA Civ 411 [57] 
1102 Sirko Harder, ‘Gain Based Relief for Invasion of Privacy’ (2011) Monash University Research Paper No 
2011/18 
1103 Witzleb (n 1090) 87; Edelman, (n 405); Varuhas (n 1044). 
1104 Varuhas (n 1044)  
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Ibid.  
1107 Hartshorne (n 1005) 82; Applause Store Productions Ltd (n 1025) 
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information in question relates to lower-profile individuals. This inefficiency stems from such 
invasion of ordinary claimants' rights to privacy being unlikely to generate great revenues, in 
contradistinction to those concerning major celebrities, even though the former may suffer 
greater harm than the latter.1108 However, exemplary damages remain more advantageous 
in principle than an account of profits for several reasons. Exemplary damages may achieve a 
greater deterrent effect than those achieved by an account of profits since the former can 
exceed, if any, profits gained in the course of privacy violation. 1109 Additionally, 
compensatory and exemplary damages are cumulative remedies that can be awarded 
together, whereas compensatory damages and account of profits are mutually exclusive 
alternatives and the claimant thus needs to elect one remedy. 1110 Exemplary damages, 
practically speaking, are easier than making an account of profits because it is not only difficult 
to prove and calculate profits derived from the wrong, especially if they are intermingled with 
other profits; but the defendant’s skill and expenses also need to be assessed, taken into 
account and discounted when calculating such profits. 1111 
7. 3: The impact of the overlap on damages in defamation and privacy 
This section addresses respectively the three correlated questions concerning the 
impact of the overlap on damages. Firstly, I examine the question related to the inclusion of 
reputational harm within the harms of privacy law; then the question related to the 
application of the vindication concept in privacy; and finally the question of a potential 
accumulation of damages in defamation and privacy actions raised from a single set of facts.  
 
1108 Hartshorne, ibid. 83. 
1109 Ibid. 87. 




A- The inclusion of the harm of reputation within privacy damages  
This thesis sees it as imperative that MOPI may provide the claimant an indirect 
protection to her reputational interest as part of the private life right under Article 8 ECHR. 
This view has been firstly supported in Cliff Richard v BBC. 1112 In this case, Mann J awarded 
an unprecedented amount of compensatory damages totalling £190,000 for the unauthorised 
publication of the police investigations and the raid of his house in respect to which Sir Cliff 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 1113 In assessing the general damages, the judge took 
into consideration not only the loss of privacy inherent in the loss of control over the 
dissemination of private information, but also the loss of reputation or standing resulting 
from the violation of the Claimant’s right to privacy: 1114  
‘Damages can and should be awarded for distress, damage to health, invasion of Sir 
Cliff’s privacy (or depriving him of the right to control the use of his private information), 
and damage to his dignity, status and reputation’. 
Despite the fact that Sir Cliff's claim was founded upon privacy grounds, Mann J could 
not ignore the factual loss of reputation caused by the breach of privacy where 'some damage 
to reputation is inherent in the facts of the present case, and can fairly be seen as being part 
of the reason why Sir Cliff felt it necessary to lower his public profile after the search'. 1115 The 
reason why Sir Cliff did not bring defamation proceedings to vindicate and remedy his loss of 
reputation in this case caused by the publication of true information, was indubitably 
grounded within the knowledge he or his legal team had of the possible truth defence 
available to defendants within defamation proceedings and consequent anticipation of the 
 
1112 Cliff Richard (n 312)  
1113 Ibid. [261 & 358] 
1114  Ibid. (n 312) [350, A]. 
1115 Ibid. [335]. 
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defendant's having recourse to this line of defence. However, in contradistinction, such a 
defence does not exist within privacy law (as has already been shown) and hence he was able 
to sue under this area of the law on the grounds of harm raised within the scope of privacy, 
in respect of its statues pertaining to the unauthorized dissemination of true matters. 1116  
It is unsettled, judicially speaking, whether Mann J approach, that subsumed 
reputation within the losses caused by privacy invasion, should be the exception rather the 
rule, or whether it is right in principle to include reputational interest within the protective 
scope of MOPI. In ZXC v Bloomberg LP, Mr Justice Nicklin recently objected this approach, 
since extending the scope of damages in privacy to a reputational element may represent an 
unjustifiable interference with freedom of expression. The judge believes that the defences 
of defamation law strike the right balance between Article 8 and 10 ECHR, and any award of 
reputational damages without allowing the defendant to rely on such defences may amount 
to altering the balance between conflicting rights of reputation and freedom of expression 
since the claimant may be entitled to monetary awards for true information. 1117 The law 
protects only the deserved reputations that are built on truth, and therefore no damages 
must be awarded to redress reputational harms built on a false basis. Based on this analysis, 
Nicklin J was bound to reinterpret ‘the right to esteem and respect of other people’ as one of 
the protected values in MOPI from an individual’s reputation to personal standing which 
could be an element of privacy damages. 1118 However, Nicklin J allowed the inclusion of 
reputational harm within the elements of privacy damages, only if the defendant had 
permission to rely on defences applied in defamation (such as truth). 1119 There is a clear 
 
1116 Ibid. [345]. 
1117 ZXC (n 60) [149, iv]; Campbell (n 5) [51].  
1118 Campbell (n 5) [151[]. 
1119 Ibid. [150] iii. 
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inconsistency between Nicklin J and Mann J approaches toward the function of privacy law to 
protect the reputational harm caused by the unjustified invasion of privacy rights.1120 In order 
to determine the right approach, it would be necessary to analyse the conflicting approaches 
from domestically binding authorities.  
If one compares these approaches with the principles ruled by the Supreme Court in 
Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd, it is obvious that the Mann J approach reflects a higher degree 
of coherence with those principles than Nicklin J approach. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
wide ambit of the right to privacy based on Article 8 ECHR could provide the right to 
reputation an alternative means of protection besides the law of defamation.1121 There is no 
wrong in principle to invoke the right to privacy to protect individual reputation from any 
collateral impact if the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy since privacy and 
reputation are interlinked interests. 1122 On this basis, Mann J ruled that the protection of 
reputation is the shared function of the defamation and MOPI tort; however, the judge 
identified the dichotomy of falsity and truth as a distinguishing line between the scope of 
defamation and privacy in which reputational interest could be protected. 1123 In other words, 
reputational harms could be protected within the scope of privacy if the private information 
were true. In this respect, one may ask to what extent such harms should be compensated if 
they arise from the publication of false private information.  
The answer to this question should not be different from the scenario of true private 
information, since the truth or falsity is an irrelevant issue to protect private information from 
 
1120 Cliff Richard (n 312) [345]. 
1121 (n 320) [21]. 
1122 Ibid. [34, 3].  
1123 Cliff Richard (n 312) [345]. 
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wrongful invasion. 1124 It might be interesting to mention that Nicklin J did only discuss the 
possibility to award damages to redress reputational harms caused by the publication of true 
private information, even though his honour acknowledged the potential overlap between 
defamation and privacy raised from the false private information. 1125 In the latter scenario, 
namely false privacy cases, there would be crucial incentives to include reputational harms 
within the elements of damages in privacy law whether from an economic analysis of civil 
procedures or fairness perspective. If the court considers the reputational harms within the 
elements of damages in privacy, opposite to Nicklin J approach, there would be an efficient 
minimisation in the judicial costs of litigations, whether those costs are born by the litigants 
or the costs of operating the judicial system are bared by the State, since the claimant would 
have no interest to bring additional defamation proceedings to redress her loss of reputation 
caused by false private information.1126 The court cannot award damages to redress the loss 
of reputation and emotional distress under defamation action if the claimant brought 
successfully another action of privacy in respect of the same set of facts since such awards 
would amount to double compensation. 1127  
Furthermore, Nicklin J’s approach may cause injustice to the victims who suffer 
reputational harms caused by serious invasions of privacy since not all invasions of privacy 
could satisfy the tests of defamation law. In other words, the publications, which may 
represent a wrongful interference with privacy rights, may not necessarily represent a 
wrongful interference under defamation law since each law has its own tests. For example, 
the allegations of homosexuality, whether true or false, may cause a serious invasion to an 
 
1124 Mckennitt, (n 12) [86]. 
1125 ZXC (n 60) [149, i & iii]  
1126 Posner, (n 965); Olijnyk, (n 964) 57. 
1127 Cooper, (n 331). 
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individual’s right to privacy; but, such allegations might not cause serious harm to the 
reputation interest in order to be actionable under defamation law since the social status of 
homosexuality is a subject of change over time and challenges of significant shifts in social 
mores. 1128 In BVC v EWF, Parkes QC J granted the claimant a summary judgement based on 
MOPI action arising from the disclosure of details of the claimant’s homosexual relationship 
with the defendant. 1129 The judge found the disclosure of sexuality, health and financial 
information published in the defendant’s website represents several breaches to the 
claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, since such information represents the core of 
protection of Article 8 ECHR. 1130 Parkes QC J identified the potential overlap between 
defamation and privacy, as the allegations in suit may have an equally adverse impact on the 
claimant privacy and reputation interests, but the claimant may not be eligible to bring 
defamation proceedings in respect the revelation of his sexuality since such allegation is true 
and non-defamatory. 1131  
'In fact, the matter which most concerns the Claimant (the revelation of his sexuality) is 
both admittedly true and not defamatory of him, so to that most important extent he 
would have no remedy in defamation. I accept that there are reputational aspects to 
the claim, as is very often the case in privacy actions, but I do not agree that the nub of 
the claim is the protection of the Claimant's reputation'. 
 
1128 Rolph, (n 317) 127; Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: 
Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, (2003) 12 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & 
Transgender Legal Issues, 119, 130. 
1129 [2019] EWHC 2506 (QB) 
1130 Ibid. [136-7 & 146] the judge also ruled that no public interest could be established by the defendant to 
outweigh the claimant reasonable expectation of privacy since the story of ex-homosexual lovers was a private 
matter concerning private parties. 
1131 Ibid. [239]. 
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Thus, it would be unfair for the claimant to eliminate the reputational harms from the 
scope of privacy under the pretext that the protection of reputation concerns exclusively the 
law of defamation if the information cannot engage the defamation in the first place. Nicklin 
J's approach may inflict injustice on the victims of privacy invasions, since there would be no 
legal recourse to remedy her reputational harms caused by the unauthorised publication of 
private but non-defamatory information. Since the touchstone of defamation is whether the 
information was defamatory, the truth or falsity of such information is an irrelevant matter if 
it was non-defamatory in the first place. 1132 Based on this analysis, the approach of Nicklin J 
which definitively eliminates the reputational harms from the scope of privacy is undesirable 
and potentially harmful. By contrast, the approach of Mann J is consistent with the binding 
authority in Khuja v Times, since Mann J allowed the recovery of reputational harms within 
privacy law if the information falls within the protective scope of privacy. 1133 
‘The protection of reputation is the primary function of the law of defamation. But 
although the ambit of the right of privacy is wider, it provides an alternative means of 
protecting reputation which is available even when the matters published are true’.  
B- The vindication of the right to privacy 
One of the central purposes of bringing defamation proceedings and subsequently 
awarding damages concerns the claimant’s willingness to vindicate her besmirched 
reputation. 1134 Such purpose, however, has no explicit role within the purposes of damages 
awarded in privacy. 1135 If reputational harms should be recognised in privacy law, as 
 
1132 See chapter 3.  
1133 Khuja, (n 320) [21]. 
1134 McLaughlin v Lambeth BC [2011] EMLR 8 [112], Tugendhat J emphasised; Hartshorne (n 1005) 72; Rolph, (n 
880) 303. 
1135 See previous section.  
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previously argued, then it needs to be explored whether privacy law should recognise the 
vindicatory purpose within the damages awarded as applied in defamation law. The basic 
concept of vindication is referred to by Kit Barker as the legal recognition of the claimant’s 
rights affirmed by the provision of legal remedies such as awarding remedies, legal 
proceedings, striking out or ordering interlocutory applications and awarding costs, serve the 
vindicatory function of tort law. 1136 This basic sense, therefore, provides that all torts serve a 
vindicatory function and defamation and privacy torts may vindicate the protected interests 
of reputation and privacy through their legal provisions whether injunctive reliefs or 
monetary awards. 1137 An interlocutory injunction is an example of how the court vindicates 
the rights of the Claimant since such injunction prevents either the initial violation or further 
violations. 1138 In addition, monetary awards may vindicate the violated rights by reversing 
the effects of wrongdoing. The vindicatory reversing process could be achieved by 
compensatory damages that repair actual and future losses; or by a restitutive award that 
strips the undeserved gains from the defendant, who is then required to pay them to the 
wronged party, irrespective of whether a quantifiable loss or no loss was suffered by the 
latter. 1139  The specific nature or character of the loss suffered may largely determine the 
vindicatory effect of monetary awards. 1140 For example, if the claimant suffers an economic 
loss resulting from the defendant's breach of contractual obligation, a monetary award is an 
adequate remedy to compensate such loss and vindicate the claimant's interest. 
 
1136 Kit Barker, Private and public: the mixed concept of vindication in Stephen G.A. Pitel, Jason W. Neyers and 
Erika Chamberlain (eds) Torts and private law in Orthodoxy (Hart publishing 2013) 69; JNE Varuhas, ‘the Concept 
of Vindication in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and Damages’ (2014) 34 OJLS 253, 258; Normann Witzleb 
and Robyn Carroll, ‘The Role of Vindication in Torts Damages’ (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 16, 18 
1137 Witzleb & Carroll, ibid. 20. 
1138 Barker, ibid. 69.  
1139 Ibid. 74-5. 
1140 Witzleb and Carroll, ibid. 
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Conversely, the efficacy of such a remedy becomes questionable when the nature of 
loss relates to non-pecuniary losses, such as loss of dignity and reputation, since intangible 
harms are incommensurable with monetary awards. In this situation, vindication 
consequently becomes a dominant consideration in the assessment of damages.  An award 
of nominal damages thus serves a primarily vindicatory purpose because it constitutes a 
publicly declaratory remedy considering the defendant to be a wrongdoer who acted in 
contravention of the claimant as right-holder. 1141  
Substantive damages may not only represent solatium measures, which provide the 
victim with appropriate consolation; but they may also be able to compensate economic 
losses as well as an appropriate declaratory judgement, which can achieve the primary 
vindicatory aim.1142 This is why the vindicatory purpose within defamation is largely related 
to the size of substantive damages awarded in order to convince a bystander of the 
baselessness of the charge. 1143 In Raj Dhir v Bronte Saddler, Mr Justice Nicklin rejected 
unhesitatingly the defendant’s plea that nominal damages were enough to vindicate the 
plaintiff’s tarnished reputation, doing so on the grounds that such an award could send the 
wrong message to the public.  Put bluntly, instead of informing bystanders that there was 
‘nothing in it’, namely the falsity of defamatory allegations, they might indeed conclude that 
there was ‘something in it’. 1144 The majority of observers, furthermore, would be more 
interested to know how much the claimant received, and drawn to this detail, rather than 
reading about the finer details relating to the court’s judgment. 1145 Furthermore, the 
impossibility of knowing how extensive the impact of defamation has affected the plaintiff is 
 
1141 Witzleb and Carroll, (n 1137) 21-2. 
1142 Ibid.  23. 
1143 Broome (n 1005); Easeman v Ford [2016] EWHC 1576 (QB) [19]. 
1144 (n 26) [111]. 
1145 Cairns (n 1012) at 31 
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also one reason to preclude the nominal damages in defamation. 1146 However, there are 
some necessary caveats to be borne in mind when in assessing the scale of damages awarded 
for the declared purposes of vindication with regards to defamation. For example, in Rahman 
v Ary Network Limited and ANR, Eady J awarded damages of £185,000 in respect of libellous 
broadcasts on UK television made over the course of several years against the claimant, who 
was the chief executive of a group of media companies operating in Pakistan and the UK1147. 
Such large award sought largely ‘to convince any fair-minded bystander of the baselessness 
of the charge’. 1148 However, Eady J affirmed that a published apology, a withdrawal, and/or 
a report in the newspaper drawing attention to the issues might constitute mitigating factors 
within the final decision around damages awarded, since such factors could achieve the chief 
objective of vindicating the claimant's reputation. 1149 Furthermore, the vindication purpose 
of damages may also be a less significant factor when the defendant makes an offer of 
amends which includes adequately demonstrating to the court and the interested public that 
the defendant has never contended that the allegations are true. 1150 
This vindicatory function of damages applied in defamation is a debatable subject in 
privacy law, since the monetary awards can never restore the lost privacy to its previous 
position as the case in defamation law. The first judicial attempt to situate the vindication 
concept within privacy law occurred in Mosley v MGN. There, Eady J recognised the need to 
 
1146 Cooper (n 331) [98]; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd. [2013] EWHC 4075 (QB) [52]. 
1147 [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB) 
1148 Ibid. [20]. 
1149 Ibid. [18]. 
1150 Lisle-Mainwaring v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2017] EWHC 543 (QB) in this case, Mr Parkes QC reduced 
general damages from £90 000 to a sum of £54 000 on the basis of the defendant’s qualified offer of public 
amends.  It was concerning the defendant’s previous newspaper articles alleging that the claimant had reneged 
on commitments to make financial provision to the family of her late husband and had thereby betrayed her 
husband's trust.  
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vindicate the right to privacy in Article 8 ECHR. 1151 The vindication of privacy is achieved, from 
Eady J's perspective, by marking the infringement of privacy via identifying the defendant as 
the wrongdoer and the claimant as to the right holder. The right holder is entitled to adequate 
damages whose terms may include, but are not confined to, financial redress. However, 
unlike in defamation, there is no correlation between the vindication and the size of damages 
in privacy cases: 'If other factors mean that significant damages are to be awarded, in any 
event, the element of vindication does not need to be reflected in an even higher award'. 1152 
The reasoning behind the judicial distinction made between privacy and defamation tort in 
respect of vindication is predicated upon a widespread judicial belief in the effectiveness of 
damages in vindicating a besmirched reputation and restoring it to its previous position, 
contrary to a keenly perceived absence of restorative efficacy relating to any awarding of 
damages within a privacy case damages. 1153 It is, therefore, logical to connect Eady J's 
application of vindication to Barker's conception of vindication that asserts the legal fact of a 
concrete right being violated and describes the status of litigants as right-holder(s) and 
wrongdoer(s) respectively. 1154 
Such distinction between defamation and privacy, however, was challenged since 
reputation and privacy share dignitary roots and nothing can restore them to the previous 
position.  Rolph argues that it is baseless to apply different concepts of vindication in privacy 
and defamation contexts. 1155 He challenges the distinction of damages’ objectives (as applied 
in Mosley v MGN) between privacy and defamation, which holds that damages are a strong 
vindictive form of a remedy capable of restoring, previously held esteem for the claimant. 
 
1151 Mosley (n 33) at 131. 
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Defamation tort is thus indistinguishable, in its generic restorative capacities and limitations, 
from other torts that are actionable per se. For example, there are false imprisonment or 
battery torts within which there is no need to prove the claimant’s damage in order to 
establish a defendant’s liability. These torts also share the fact that damages serve a remedial, 
rather than preventive, purpose. An award of damages can never prevent the infringement, 
nor can it restore the protected interest to its previous pre-defamatory position. 1156  
According to this analysis, neither reputation nor privacy could be restored to their previous 
positions held prior to the wrongful publications. Damages, therefore, constitute in 
themselves an inadequate remedy for the vindication of protected interests, whether in 
defamation or privacy law.  
Rolph consequently argues that the same considerations should be applied in 
awarding damages whether in defamation or privacy in respect to their shared vindicatory 
purpose. Firstly, defamation and privacy are actionable torts per se in which substantial 
damages should be awarded in order to reflect the importance and underlying values of these 
causes of action.1157 Secondly, both torts protect non-economic interests in nature (dignitary 
interests) which are incommensurable with money. 1158 However, two challenges may face 
Rolph’s argument that defamation and privacy as actionable torts per se. Firstly, the 
defamation tort is no more actionable per se since the defendant has to prove the impact of 
serious harm on her reputation in order to establish the defamatory meaning of allegation.1159 
Secondly, Jojo Mo challenges the recent judicial development of misuse of private 
information being recognised as a tort despite its equitable origin. Such a challenge is 
 
1156 Rolph (n 880) 301. 
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predicated upon the inconsistency between the general constitutive elements of tort and the 
constitutive elements of misuse of private information. 1160 Mo argues that MOPI is based 
upon a test-exercise, the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the proportionality test, 
that may determine the outcome of the claim. However, a tort action is based on specific 
elements which the claimant needs to prove in order to compensate for that specified loss is 
within the suit. 1161 Mo believes that applying such a test would make the scope of MOPI 
open-ended to the extent that any private information could be misused even without 
publication.1162 Mo thus argues the judicial expansion of torts realm to include the MOPI may 
result in bringing the uncertainty of these constitutive elements, as well as leading to 
overlapping with other actions once such a reasonable expectation test was satisfied. 1163   
Nevertheless, Mo’s challenge of the tortious nature of MOPI may be deemed 
untenable for the following reasons: firstly, the mere existence of tests could not create a 
basis to deny the tortious nature of any wrongful interference with the Claimant’s privacy. 
For example, defamation also includes different tests such as defamatory meaning tests 1164 
and the proportionality test. 1165 Such tests in themselves did not challenge the tortious 
nature of defamation. Secondly, the most recent developments around privacy protection 
within English law may demonstrate the birth of a general tort of privacy or tort of misuse of 
private information, including the formulation of disclosure and intrusion conducts. 1166 
Finally, MOPI constitutes an actionable tort per se, since a loss of privacy itself constitutes a 
 
1160 Mo, (n 5) 92. 
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real loss and the claimant suffers a real diminution of the right as a ‘good thing’ caused by the 
wrongful interference. 1167 In other words, every violation of a protected interest, irrespective 
of its financial or emotional consequences, may be counted as a real loss that should be 
consequently be redressed by those substantial damages that retain a dual function in all such 
cases. In other words, substantial damages seek to compensate for the real loss of privacy as 
well as indirectly serve a vindicatory purpose. 1168 Thus, it is well argued that the primary 
purpose of damages awarded in torts actionable per se is to vindicate the protected interest. 
1169  
Besides the size of damages awarded in defamation, the verdict in the claimant's 
favour clearly retains a crucial role in vindicating their reputation as Lord Bingham explained 
in Jameel and Another v Wall Street Journal Europe ‘By a successful action the injured 
reputation is vindicated.  The ordinary means of vindication is by the verdict of a judge or jury 
and an award of damages’. 1170 The real injury in defamation, as Varuhas argues, is not the 
reputational injury, but the objective fact of being publicly defamed. This explains the 
palpable increase in damages awarded within defamation suits to vindicate the claimant’s 
good name, as ‘quantum must be sufficient to convince a reasonable bystander that the 
statements made about him were baseless’. 1171 The publicity of the judgement could also 
vindicate the claimant's reputation since such publicity attracted by the judge's reasoning 
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could modify the perception of the defamed person held by the public. 1172 The vindication 
concept in defamation law aims to clear the claimant’s besmirched public reputation and the 
unfounded pejorative associations pertaining to their character that the defendant’s own 
defamatory conduct has temporarily produced. The adherence to the vindication concept 
plays a central role in ensuring that judicial assessment of compensatory damages continues 
to adequately fulfil that aspect of its overall function involving the drawing of the public 
community’s attention towards the wrongfulness and falsity of the defamatory imputations 
in order to restore the claimant’s reputation. 1173  
Clearly, however, an award of damages may not always effectively fulfil this latter 
function. Witzleb and Carroll argue that alternative remedies could correct more quickly and 
directly the public record such as retracting false statements, publishing corrections or issuing 
an apology. 1174 In other words, the predominant judicial belief pertaining to the efficacy of 
monetary awards with functions including the vindication of tarnished reputations is clearly 
grounded within what might be characterised as the historical residue of monetary awards’ 
traditional primacy within common law actions. 1175  The non-monetary awards such as a swift 
correction of the public record or the libel action itself may frequently constitute the most 
efficacious means of providing victims with justice, through an adequate restoration of their 
social status, public response to defamation, and significant vindication. 1176 In contrast, 
evidence suggests financial gain does not constitute the main concern for a significant number 
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of claimants in matters where their personal interests such as dignity and reputation were 
infringed. 1177 
Based on this analysis, further support for the application of similar considerations 
relating to vindicatory purpose when assessing damages in privacy and defamation might be 
found in a recent case where the right to make a statement in open court in order to vindicate 
the claimant’s rights was upheld and defined as a principle. In Sarah Lynette Webb v Lewis 
Silkin LLP, 1178 Mr Justice Nugee held that the principles governing statements in open court 
should be applied with ‘equal vigour’ to defamation and privacy cases alike. The claimant 
applied to make a statement in open court under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) 
53PD.6.1(4) subsequent to her acceptance of the defendant’s offer to settle her misuse of 
private information action in respect of an unjustified, albeit limited, access to the claimant’s 
email. The claimant's application was made in order to vindicate her position and to explain 
publicly the reason for bringing the action, the hurtful distress suffered by the violation and 
her perception of the settlement. This was upheld as serving the same purpose, and 
pertaining to a consideration of equivalent claimant rights, as the established right to make a 
statement in open court is already applied within defamation proceedings. 1179 The defendant 
objected to the establishment of such a similarity on the grounds that the claimant's right to 
make a public statement in defamation seeks to correct the falsity of the defamatory 
allegations against her; whereas the right to privacy cannot be vindicated in an analogous 
manner by making a public statement in open court, since very few people have accessed to 
the private information. 1180 The judge nevertheless accepted the claimant’s argument that 
 
1177 Ibid. 225. 
1178 [2016] EWHC 1225 (Ch) 
1179 Ibid, [34]. 
1180 Sarah Lynette Webb (n 1183) [35]. 
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the same considerations applied in defamation should also be applied in privacy law, because 
such statements enable more publicity to vindicate the claimant’s privacy. 1181 The court 
found the different nature of protected interests in defamation and privacy and the wide 
publicity of information in question are irrelevant factors or considerations when ordering a 
public statement to vindicate the claimant’s rights. The key concern was the fact of 
infringement of her rights and its hurtful effects, for which infringement the right to court 
testimony would serve as partial, if not full, vindication. 1182  
C- The impact of overlap on accumulating damages awarded in defamation and privacy law 
As explained in the previous section, there are different types of damages that can be 
awarded in the defamation and privacy torts. The task of this subsection is to examine to what 
extent such damages could be cumulative or alternative. An election between alternative 
remedies seeks to avoid double compensation for the same loss since the aim of remedies is 
to make the harmed party whole no more and no less. 1183 This rationale should prevail not 
only in respect of alternative remedies triggered by the same wrong under one cause of action 
but, also in respect of two causes of action triggered by the same wrong even though both 
causes of action have different constitutive elements. 1184 There would be a double recovery 
if a claimant was awarded compensatory damages for a breach of duty of reasonable care 
under a negligence claim, and a breach of reasonable care and skill under a contract for 
services, since such awards redress the same loss caused by the same wrongful act even the 
constitutive elements of such claims are different. 1185 This rationale solely governs 
cumulative actions based on a single set of facts causing a similar loss to the claimant, or 
 
1181 Ibid, [38]. 
1182 Ibid, [39]. 
1183 Marshall & Lister (n 406) 294. 
1184 Ibid. 295. 
1185 Marshall & Lister, ibid.  
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similar gain to the Defendant, irrespective of whether there are different evidential 
thresholds to establish liability under each cause of action.  
In English law, the defamation and MOPI are cumulative causes of action, namely both 
actions could be brought simultaneously in respect of the same set of facts. 1186 For example, 
in Cooper v Terrell, Matthew Cooper, an Executive Chairman and a director of Imaginatik Plc 
Company, brought two actions of libel and MOPI against Mark Turrell in respect of Turrell’s 
having published private and defamatory information obtained by means of unauthorised 
and secret audio recording. 1187 Both claims were partly concerned with the publication, 
specifically, of false private and defamatory information related to the claimant’s medical 
conditions. 1188 Such an overlap did not affect the claimant’s right to bring both cumulative 
causes of action of defamation and privacy. Tugendhat J identified the damage addressed by 
compensatory damages to the emotional distress suffered by the claimant in respect of the 
true information disclosed to the claimant’s solicitor, along with the false information related 
to the claimant’s health and his alleged unfitness to conduct his professional duties. 1189  
It is worth mentioning that the judge awarded no damages for the fact that the 
disclosed information had been obtained through unauthorised and secret audio recordings. 
 
1186 Applause Store Productions Ltd (n 26) in this case, two actions (libel and MOPI) were brought in respect of 
the Defendant’s creation of a false profile on social media site Facebook containing defamatory and private 
information; the judge refuses the plea that both actions have to be separately treated because there is no 
overlap between the information in question. Richard Parkes QC assessed privacy damages on the light of 
damages awarded in libel action because 'It is likely in reality that most publishees will have seen both 
publications - probably the profile first, followed by the group page, after clicking on the link to the group. I do 
not think it would be right for me to treat the privacy claim as if it was entirely free-standing; nor do I believe 
that it would be right for me to award aggravated damages under both heads. It is necessary to take a global 
view'. The judge awarded a modest sum of £2000 for MOPI claim and £15000 for a libel claim. 
1187 (n 331) [2]. 
1188 Ibid. [103]. 
1189 Cooper (n 331) [102]. 
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1190 In the separate libel claim, Tugendhat J also identified those losses recovered through 
general damages awarded in respect of the defamatory publication (in this case, of medical 
information) and the damages of libel were thus awarded specifically to act as reparations for 
the Claimant’s harms to reputation as well as to feelings. 1191 The sum awarded was 
deliberately substantial in what Justice Tugendhat intended to constitute a vindication of the 
Claimant’s besmirched reputation. 1192  
In comparing the harms considered in both claims, one may observe that emotional 
distress is made recoverable in both actions, and hence postulate that such recovery may 
amount to double compensation. This is because such harms were, after all, to feelings caused 
by the publication of the same false, private and defamatory information related to the 
claimant's health.  Therefore, Tugendhat J's reduction of the quantity of privacy damages 
from £40,000 to £30,000 may be thus read as an attempt to avoid double counting with 
regards to redress of loss pertaining to that emotional distress. 1193 However, one may also 
enquire what different measures of judgement might have arisen had Tugendhat J applied 
that new approach to awarding damages.  
Gulati v MGN evidences that the mere unauthorised intrusion into one's private life 
represents a real harm of diminution of the claimant's right to control formerly private 
information. 1194 In this case, Mann J awarded a cumulative total of £1.2m to 9 claimants who 
were subject to a widespread, institutional and longstanding phone-hacking campaign. 1195 
 
1190 Whereas the new approach of privacy damages awards applied by Mann J takes into consideration the mere 
factual intrusion of phone-hacking. Gulati, (n 312). 
1191 Cooper, ibid. [98-9]. 
1192 Ibid. [98]. 
1193 Ibid. [107]. 
1194 Gulati, (n 312) [48]. 
1195 Ibid. [209]. 
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These very substantial damages were awarded under four different categories: 1196 
hacking,1197 private investigators/blagging,1198 published articles containing private 
information. 1199 If Tugendhat J applied Mann J’s approach, that which was evidenced within 
Gulati, Mr Cooper would be awarded three categories of damages: an award for unauthorised 
and secret audio recording; an award for the mere misuse of private information 
(publication); and an award for the general distress caused. In such a hypothetical scenario, 
only the damages of general distress would be non-cumulative, since if they were to be 
awarded in both overlapping claims then this would constitute a double counting of the same 
injury (injury to feelings). By contrast, the awards for the secret recording and the publication 
of private information would be cumulative, with the award pertaining to both separate 
injuries being granted in response to injuries adjudged to were sustained through the same 
wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant. The reason for such accumulation is the fact 
that the claimant suffered two different harms related to two protected interests: an injury 
to reputation, caused by the dissemination of defamatory information, and an injury to 
privacy caused by the secret recording and publication of private information. 1200  
Such an accumulation creates no double counting, simply because the losses covered 
by these awards are distinct (reputation and privacy). However, if Mr Cooper had been 
 
1196 The Court of Appeal held that it is a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion to choose a global award or 
separate awards for invasions of privacy. Ibid. 
1197 ‘Hacking is the process whereby a person, who has no authority to do so, accesses voice messages left on 
another’s phone if the owner of the phone has not protected his voicemail box by a personal identification 
number (“PIN”) or has done so by a PIN which was easy to decode’. Gulati, (n 312) [4]. 
1198 ‘Private investigators were also given the task of finding out the telephone numbers of people whom the 
newspaper had identified as targets for their hacking or their phone and credit card bills and medical 
information.  This information was sometimes obtained by “blagging”: that is, by the investigator pretending to 
be a third party, such as a telephone services supplier, that he was the particular person or was, say, an aide to 
that person and authorised to obtain the desired information, or persuading them to part with the information 
by some other pretence’. Gulati, ibid. [6]. 
1199 Ibid. [234-701]. 
1200 Keren-Paz (n 416) 74; Marshall & Lister (n 406) 293. 
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awarded damages for general distress under both claims, this would clearly be a double 
recovery, since the same distress loss caused by the same wrongful conduct was recovered 
under two different actions. Hence, one may deduce from this breakdown of what constitutes 
legitimate and what constitutes double-counted injury claims, the reasoning behind 
Tugendhat J’s reduction of the MOPI award from £40000 to £30000. By this chapter’s reading 
of the law, Tugendhat judged the distress-related loss caused by the publication of private 
medical information to be already covered under libel action. 1201 However, Eric 
Descheemaeker argues that this current approach of combining damages to reputation or 
privacy harms with emotional distress harms may represent a double recovery whether 
according to the bipolar model and unipolar model. 1202 The Bipolar model requires two 
existing elements constituting a tortious cause of action: an identifiable instance of wrongful 
conduct which violates the Claimant’s right as defined under the law; and a distinct loss 
causatively emergent from this initial wrong. 1203 According to this model, the harm is an 
independent and distinct element from its causative wrong. Such an element assumes a 
pivotal role in providing claimants with valid grounds for a successful tortious claim against 
the wrongdoer, given that the law seeks to redress not the wrong itself but the consequential 
loss of that wrong. 1204 The mere existence of the wrong is insufficient to grant compensatory 
damages unless a subsequent loss, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary, may be identified as 
present and causally linked, in an evidentiary sense, to that wrong. 1205   
 
1201 Cooper (n 331) [107]. 
1202 Descheemaeker (n 1056) 287; Eric Descheemaeke, ‘Claimant-Focused Damages in the Law of Privacy’ in 
Jason Varuhas & Nicole Moreham (eds) Remedies for Breach of Privacy, (Hart Publishing 2018) 150. 
1203 Descheemaeker (n 1056) 288. 
1204 Descheemaeker (n 1005); Descheemaeker (n 1203) 
1205 Ibid. 291. 
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The unipolar model, by contrast, identifies the harm as the violation of the right itself 
that merge and collapse onto another. 1206 In this instance, a wrongful violation of the 
claimant’s right constitutes the claimant’s harm that may thus be technically defined as the 
diminution of the protected interest. This model, unlike the bipolar model, allows for the 
granting of substantial damages even though no factual harms were suffered. 1207 Further 
consequential harms should be compensated under another cause of action, since they 
represent independent wrongs. These wrongs constitute distinct violations of different rights; 
thus, an economic loss represents a violation of wealth interests, whilst mental distress is a 
loss relating to some violation of a Claimant’s well-being. 1208  
Hypothetically, mixing both models simultaneously compensates the pure and 
consequential harms under one cause of action, would amount to an instance of double 
recovery since the same injury would be compensated twice. If the claimant were to receive 
compensation for her pure injury and another set of compensation for consequential losses 
as these emerge directly from the same initial wrong, such recovery would be double-counted 
for the same wrong. 1209 In analysing the current approach of damages awarded in defamation 
law, Descheemaeker believes that compensating the defamed person for her reputational 
injury and her emotional distress amounts to a double counting, because the same injury is 
looked at and compensated twice. In the context of privacy, the pure harm of privacy 
(diminution of privacy rights) according to the bipolar model must be unrecoverable; but only 
those consequential losses, stemming from the wrongful interference being made public 




1208 Ibid. 292-3. 
1209 Ibid. 293-4. 
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award of damages under the law. 1210 The unipolar model, by contrast, allows only for the 
recovery of harms relating to the breach of privacy rights, namely the diminution of the right 
to privacy, and such a recovery may thus indirectly compensate both economic and mental 
losses and injuries. 1211 The combination of both models would constitute an objectionable 
approach since it hypothetically permits the law to double count the harms at the same time. 
The law should compensate either the pure loss of privacy, which indirectly considers the 
consequential losses, or those consequential losses that indirectly blot out the breach of 
privacy itself. 1212 
With respect to Descheemaeker' deeply analytical arguments, it might be, however, 
inappropriate to reduce the actual approach applied in awarding damages in defamation and 
privacy to a double-counting because they constitute not one loss to be compensated twice, 
but two substantially different losses. Analytically, a loss of privacy or a loss of reputation is 
intrinsically distinct and independent from the loss relating to degrees of emotional distress.  
Furthermore, the actual approach followed could be justified by the absence of independent 
causes of action established within English law that directly recognise well-being or happiness 
as protected rights. Therefore, applying one single model might lead the injured party worse-
off without having a legal recourse to achieve satisfaction for her injury.1213 Moreover, 
Descheemaeker’s argument requiring the recognition new causes of action to redress the 
emotional distress harms may increase the inefficiency of civil procedure law, since it would 
increase the costs of adjudicative system caused by bringing two causes of action instead of 
one. Finally, the actual approach applied in defamation and privacy corresponds closely to 
 
1210 Descheemaeker (n 1056) 295.  
1211 Descheemaeker (n 1207). 
1212 Ibid. 
1213 Ibid.; Descheemaeker (n 1056) 297 
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the core aim of tort law seeking to place the wronged party in the nearest position to the 
wrong not having occurred in the first place. 1214 The relationship between compensatory and 
non-compensatory damages awarded in defamation and privacy might be alternative on one 
hand and cumulative on the other hand. English law has a settled rule that compensatory and 
gain-based damages are alternative remedies; that is, no accumulation of such damages is 
permissible should both remedies arise in respect of the same wrongful act, and the claimant 
is therefore required in such circumstances to make an ‘election’ between them. 1215  
There are two rationales explaining why these damages are alternative and 
inconsistent: the ratification principle and balancing principle. 1216 The ratification principle is 
based on a hypothesis that the defendant had acted as an agent to make a profit on behalf of 
the claimant. Thus, the election of an account of profit hypothetically implies a ratification of 
the defendant's wrong in order to ratify that legitimate profit had been made on behalf of, 
and was owed to, the claimant. That is to say, no loss had been caused because no wrong had 
been committed in the first place, and consequently no compensatory damages could be 
awarded in parallel with such an account of profit. 1217 The alternative explanation as to why 
it is inconsistent to award compensatory and gain-based damages in respect of the same 
wrong is based on the theory of Balance. The balancing principle suggests that the 
defendant's gain on one hand and the Claimant's loss, on the other hand, are both fluid and 
correlated concepts; thus, each amount awarded to compensate (and thus reduce) the 
claimant's loss necessarily leads to an equal proportionate reduction of the defendant's gain, 
 
1214 Robert Stevens, Rights and other things in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and Private Law 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 136. 
1215 Edelman, (n 405); Marshall & Lister (n 406) 291.  
1216 Marshall and Lister, ibid. 291. 
1217 This rationale is called also the waiver of tort theory. See: Marshall & Lister (n 406); United Australia Bank v 
Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1; Stephen Watterson, ‘Alternative and cumulative remedies: what is the 
difference? (2003) 11 R.L. R. 10, 1215 
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as it is deemed to have occurred through the same wrong. 1218 However, it may, potentially, 
be conceivable to claim and accumulate alternative and inconsistent remedies of 
compensatory and gain-based damages for each cause of action, since the losses pertaining 
to reputation and privacy in defamation and MOPI each constitute distinct consequences. 
Thus, the claimant might claim an account of profits for the latter and compensatory damages 
for the former even though both causes of action emerge from the same wrongful conduct. 
1219 The accumulation of restitution and compensation plays a significant role in vindicating 
the claimant's protected interests as these are held to be wrongfully and unjustifiably 
breached, and to effectively deter the defendant from future commercial exploitation of 
individuals' personal rights. 1220 
By contrast, the relationship between compensatory and exemplary damages is 
consistent and consequently cumulative, despite exemplary damages being one type of non-
compensatory damage. This is because each remedy has its own legitimate remedial aim, 
consistent with the aim of other remedies; thus, there is no logical reason to prevent the 
claimant from achieving both legitimate aims simultaneously. 1221 It is well established in 
English law that there is no structural contradiction between the award of compensatory and 
exemplary damages since their aims are clearly consistent. They compensate the claimant’s 
loss through the former, whilst punishing and deterring the defendant via the latter. However, 
the identification, by the court, of available compensatory damages as inadequate to the 
fulfilment of their remedial function in punishing and deterring the defendant’s respective 
past and future conduct, and thus constitutes the occasion upon which exemplary damages 
 
1218 Andrew Burrows, Understanding the law of obligations, (Hart Publishing 1998) 43-4; Birks, P, ‘Inconsistency 
between compensation and restitution’ (1996) 112 LQR 375 cited in Marshall & Lister, ibid.  292. 
1219 Marshall & Lister, ibid. 293. 
1220 Keren-Paz (418) 74-5; Hartshorne (1015) 82-3. 
1221 Watterson (n 1222) 15. 
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might be awarded. Such compensatory damages may themselves otherwise indirectly 
achieve the purpose of exemplary damages to punish and deter the defendant. 1222  
7. 4: Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has examined the impact of the overlap on damages in order to assess 
how the relationship between interests in privacy and reputation could affect the relative size 
of damages given in these areas. In the course of doing so, the chapter has examined the 
appropriate measure of damages in overlapping cases within three correlated issues: the 
legitimacy of  including reputational harms within  privacy law’s scope of damages; the 
awarding of damages in order to vindicate any right to privacy; and the accumulation of 
defamation and privacy damages. This procedure naturally requires considerations of the size 
and purpose of compensatory and non-compensatory damages awarded in defamation and 
privacy law respectively, which discussion can be found present here. The chapter has 
classified the compensatory damages under three categories: compensatory damages for 
pure losses; compensatory damages for consequential losses, and compensatory aggravated 
damages. Conversely, the non-compensatory damages are comprised of exemplary damages 
and gain based damages, as discussed within the relevant subsection. Such considerations 
were found to be important: firstly, in terms of explaining the differences of damages 
awarded in defamation and privacy; and secondly, the justifications for such differences.  
Given the protection of reputation is the shared function of defamation and privacy, 
there would be crucial incentives to include reputation within the elements of damages in 
privacy law and these can be found in both an economic analysis of civil procedures 
perspective. If the court considers that reputational harms come within the elements of 
 
1222 Ibid. 16. 
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damages in privacy, this might be an efficient way to minimise the judicial costs of litigations, 
since the claimant, practically speaking, would have little benefits of bring defamation 
proceedings to redress her loss of reputation. Furthermore, there could be unjustified 
injustice towards the victims who suffer reputational harms caused by serious invasions of 
privacy if reputational harms were exclusively protected by defamation law. This is because 
not all invasions of privacy could satisfy the tests of defamation which may change over time– 
such as the changing shift in attitudes towards allegations of homosexuality. Secondly, it is 
the contention of this thesis that the role of vindication in defamation and privacy depends 
on the definition of the concept of vindication itself. In doing so, all remedies of defamation 
and privacy, whether injunctive or monetary, involve vindicatory purpose if the vindication 
means the legal recognition of rights. Defamation and privacy may also share the same 
function of vindication by describing the status of litigants as right holders and wrongdoers. 
Taking into account judicial and academic views, this thesis concluded that the traditional 
primacy of the historical residue of monetary awards within common law actions is the main 
tool to vindicate reputational interest. Thirdly and finally, the thesis provided a detailed 
explanation of the relationship between damages awarded in defamation and privacy and 
how, theoretically speaking, there would be double compensation in accumulating these 
damages. Regarding the compensatory damages, there could be a double compensation if 
emotional harms were compensated under defamation and MOPI actions brought in respect 
to the same set of facts – since they address the same interest. The compensatory damages 
awarded to redress the harms to reputation and privacy are cumulative, since such interests 
























Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has substantively tackled the overlap between defamation and privacy torts, and 
the main implications resulting from such overlap.1223 It has furthered the analysis by using a 
multi-perspectival approach to decide the best solution to the questions examined in this 
study. This incorporated local coherence, efficiency, feminist analysis, access to justice and 
distributive justice perspectives respectively. Its research enquiry was grounded within 
examining this conceptual tort overlap and to what extent it is or can be, as many scholars 
argue, avoidable. In other words, it has critically analysed the arguments advanced to oppose 
the judicial recognition of false privacy which represents the core of such an overlap. This 
thesis has deeply analysed the impacts of this overlap upon defences, interim injunction and 
damages. Regarding the defences, it has examined to what extent the defences of defamation 
could be applied in privacy, and to what extent such defences could be harmonised with 
privacy law. With respect to the impact upon interim injunction, this thesis has analysed to 
what extent the restrictive rule of Bonnard v Perryman as applied within defamation cases 
should also be applied in privacy cases in the case of overlap. Finally, this thesis has examined 
the impact of the overlap upon damages in order to assess how the relationship between 
interests in privacy and reputation ought to affect the relative size of damages given in these 
areas. The following sections provide the outcomes of this research accompanied by the key-





1223 This thesis has also identified further implications which could be a subject matter for future research. 
Please see section 6 in this chapter (Recommendations for future research). 
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8. 1: The conceptualisation of the overlap between defamation and privacy 
 
This thesis found that the overlap between defamation and privacy torts, in contrast 
to many scholars’ arguments, cannot be avoided due to the intertwined relationship between 
the concepts of private life and reputation respectively protected under the English torts of 
privacy and defamation. This conclusion was arrived at in light of its examination of 
theoretical foundations of both torts as well those of the Strasbourg jurisprudence; 
specifically, these concern the conceptual and doctrinal relationships between the interests 
of privacy and reputation. The accounts which have been provided around dignity and general 
personality right potentially provide explanatory justifications for bringing simultaneously 
two different claims in respect to a single harmful publication. Publications in this context 
refer to voluntary, lawful, personal and defamatory information related to sexual, financial, 
or medical matters that may together undermine personal reputation and private life.  
Information relating to involuntary misfortune such as a disease could likely undermine the 
claimant’s privacy more than her reputation because there would be a difficulty in placing 
upon the claimant a direct moral responsibility. Information relating to truly unlawful 
conducts are likely excluded from the scope of the overlap because neither privacy nor 
defamation claims could succeed due to the public interest exception.  
The study has illustrated how determination of those dignitary interests, applied to 
reputation and privacy, may feasibly provide an objective explanation of the correlation 
between defamation and privacy torts. The reputational harms, which undermine the esteem 
held by the society towards an individual may also concomitantly undermine the individual 
self-esteem. Similarly, the general personality account provided explains how harming the 
reputational aspect associated with the personality right may also undermine the privacy 
aspect. Based on this account, the multi-faceted personality right of Article 8 ECHR contains 
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an overlapping relationship between concepts which encompasses privacy, reputation, 
informational self-determination, and one’s own image rights. The sociality-based account, 
by contrast, offers a conceptual basis for explaining how reputational harms may 
consequently undermine the right to private life. The pain of social rejection caused by the 
breaking of social ties (loss of sociality or reputation) constitutes a consequent harm to the 
individual’s integrity (privacy), especially when such social bonds consist of strong ties such 
as family and friends. This account may explain the relationship between the interests of 
reputation and private life within Strasbourg jurisprudence as these require reputational 
harms to demonstrate a certain level of damage towards private life.  
8. 2: False privacy (false private information) 
 
The thesis found that the arguments advanced to preclude falsity from the scope of 
privacy do not stand on solid grounds. It argued that the equitable action of breach of 
confidence may support the protection of false information under the MOPI action on the 
grounds that there is no inconsistency between the confidential/private nature of the 
information in question and the falsity of such information. The factual absence of equitable 
actions of confidence brought in respect of false information may not provide solid grounds 
for definitively excluding falsehoods from its protective remit. There would be no reason in 
principle for preventing the bringing of confidentiality actions concerning unauthorised 
dissemination of false confidential information. On this basis, the legal authority Tchenguiz 
and Ors v Imerman 1224 may support the protection of falsity within the remit of MOPI action 
since confidentiality and privacy claims should be developed consistently and coherently 
irrespective of their different features. Furthermore, the argument behind distinguishing the 
 
1224 [2010] EWCA Civ 908, [2010] WLR (D) 217, [2010] 2 FLR 814 
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claims of defamation and privacy on the basis of the dichotomy of falsity and truth has been 
shown to be potentially untenable and at worst misleading. Falsity, the thesis has 
demonstrated, is not the pivotal point in defamation law, given that the claimant in English 
jurisdiction, contrary to American jurisdiction, is not required to prove the falsity of 
defamatory allegations. The touchstone of defamation law is whether the information is 
libellous, and the issue of falsity is in fact a matter of legal presumption that could be defeated 
by establishing the truth defence. The defendant may not be liable under defamation law, 
even in the event of a publication being defamatory and false, if she could establish other 
defences predicated upon the absence of malice such as POMOPI or qualified privileges. 
Similarly, the nature of the information constitutes the decisive factor when including or 
excluding it from the protective remit of MOPI since the touchstone of privacy is whether the 
information is private and not whether it is true or false. Based on this premise, there is no 
logical reason for distinguishing private information on the basis of the dichotomy of truth 
and falsity when deciding its actionability under MOPI. Thus, it is fundamentally wrong to 
equate the overlap between defamation and privacy merely around the falsity of information 
if such information, objectively speaking, were not simultaneously defamatory and private. 
The overlap between defamation and privacy, as this thesis emphasised, goes beyond the 
issue of falsity because the nature of the information is a subject of objective criteria (tests). 
This means that once the information in question satisfies the tests of defamation and 
privacy, there would be an unavoidable overlap between such torts. Accordingly, the 
arguments advanced by scholars to avoid the overlap are groundless since mere falsity cannot 
satisfy defamatory tests, where similarly the mere truth of information cannot successfully 
engage the reasonable expectation of privacy. Put differently, the fact that a piece of 
information is true cannot prevent it from being defamatory since the defamatory meaning 
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of such information depends on applying objective tests of defamation law. Equivalently, the 
fact that the information is false cannot prevent it from being private since determining the 
private nature of information is predicated upon reasonable expectation of the privacy test. 
Ergo, the overlap may occur if information were private and defamatory at once, irrespective 
of whether such information were true or false. However, this overlap would be accurate only 
in respect to false private and defamatory information since truth is a complete defence in 
defamation but not in privacy.  
This thesis advanced a variety of arguments that support the inclusion of false private 
information within the protective remit of MOPI. It began with the local coherence argument 
that requires a focus on consistency of a specific field of law rather than the whole legal 
system. The coherence of privacy law requires the protection of information irrespective of 
its accuracy or inaccuracy once such information is private.  In addition, the division between 
true and false information could undermine the privacy law itself, because it is, logically 
speaking, methodologically inconsistent to protect an individual’s privacy through  forcing her 
to reveal which information is  true and which false; such forced revelations may cause further 
intrusion and  infringement upon the right to privacy itself. Furthermore, there is no 
principled reason to retain the coherence of the defamation law on the grounds that 
coherence of privacy/MOPI is undermined, especially with the knowledge that MOPI action 
directly addresses the core of privacy protected under the Article 8 ECHR.  
The economic analysis provides a further argument for including falsehood within 
privacy law, since allocating false private information within the remit of defamation law 
would inefficiently increase the social costs of the publication. The claim that defamation law 
should protect false private information potentially incentivizes publication of falsehoods due 
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to the externalisation of liability costs relating to such non-defamatory information under libel 
law. The ensuing increase of falsehoods in the market would not only harm those directly 
subject to the claims made within such publications also the public; that is, it would adversely 
affect public trust in the media in the long term.  As discussed, the reduction of the public's 
confidence in the free press would consequently undermine the media's function to observe 
and expose public figures' wrongdoings.  Relatively few persons would be inclined to trust the 
accuracy of press’ publications, and there might be concomitant incentives for public figures 
to engage in wrongdoing. Such harmful ramifications, whether in respect to the primarily loss 
of privacy caused by the intrusive publication, or the subsequent loss of the public’s 
confidence in the media, that outweigh the short-term benefits of unfettered freedom of 
expression.  Relying on defamation law as the only legal mechanism to mitigate against the 
flow of false information could create an inefficient outcome within the media market in the 
long term because defamation law could increase the flow of false but non-defamatory 
information. The framework of False privacy, by contrast, may have little negative influence, 
and indeed achieve a net positive regard to freedom of expression since the dissemination of 
false information without legal liability adversely affects public trust in the press and its role 
in a democratic society. Based on such analysis, the formulation of false privacy action may 
help to promote freedom of expression because it might lessen the degree of irresponsible, 
unfair, and sensational publications involving inaccurate and harmful information that 
consequently compromise media credibility amongst the public.  
This thesis argues that allocating falsehoods within the scope of defamation law would 
inflict injustice on the victims, since false publications could seriously harm their dignity, 
autonomy and control over the dissemination of private information, but could not be 
actionable under defamation law. The new interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in 
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respect of the requirements underpinning recognition of serious harm is ‘that it not only 
raises the threshold of seriousness …. but requires its application to be determined by 
reference to the actual facts about its impact and not just to the meaning of the words’. 1225 
This means that the victims of unauthorised publication of false private information may not 
be able to get adequate protection from seriously harmful publications if no serious harm to 
their reputation is determinable as having been formally caused. The serious harm 
requirement may, under privacy law, protect individuals from claims that include false 
information since it is difficult to bring defamation action if the information is not deemed 
harmful enough to qualify as breach of reputational interest.  
As discussed, the claim that false private information must be protected only by 
defamation law is highly objectionable from the feminist analysis perspective; defamation law 
may allow the commodification of the individual through harmfully manipulating access to 
their private information – without providing the female victims a legal recourse outside of 
that made available through the limited scope of defamation. The unauthorised publication 
of false private information may undermine the individual’s/woman’s control over their 
private information; such control in turn cannot be separated from the concept of autonomy. 
This thesis argues that the feminist analysis provides additional support to its central claim 
that false private information should be protected by privacy law: defamation law would 
create and reproduce relationships which feminist theory analyses as subordinate because 
only strictly defamatory information may be protected within the scope of defamation law. 
The contention that false private information should be protected by privacy law, as this 
thesis emphasised, would not only provide the victims with a relatively adequate protection 
 
1225 Lachaux (n 61) [12]. 
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from or remedy for the unjustified harms, but could concomitantly provide female victims 
with a real protection of their privacy rights. Concretely speaking, this protection could be 
enacted via granting injunctive relief under privacy law – which would be particularly 
beneficial to female victims because of the limited efficacy of damages in the era of 
technology. Conversely, such relief has limited availability in defamation law. Such  a course 
of redress  would also increase access to justice, since injunctive relief could not only decrease 
the legal costs of bringing actions in order to remove the private material from the public 
domain ( for instance, from internet websites and social media) and prevent dissemination 
via publication,  but  may also reduce further harms that could be caused by the trial 
proceedings.   
US false light tort provides a significant insight in terms of corroborating the 
fundamental claims within this thesis regarding protection of false information within the 
privacy remit. Specifically, the doctrinal or conceptual justifications of US American false light 
tort, as emphasised, provides further arguments to support the current approach of English 
law. Defamation law, doctrinally speaking, is unable to include all harmfully false information 
since its protective scope covers only defamatory materials. The removal of false light and 
false privacy as argued in Chapter 5 in accordance with substantial scholarly literature, 1226 
would end up with two undesirable results. Firstly, it would cause injustice towards the 
victims of false and highly offensive/private publications, especially in the era of technology, 
since there would be no remedy under the defamation law in the event of such publication 
not being defamatory. Secondly and most importantly, it would distort the doctrines of 
defamation law itself because the court, in order to justify remedies for harms caused by 
 
1226 See s. 3 A in chapter 5.  
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highly offensive but non-disparaging falsehoods, might overly-extend the concept of 
defamation.1227 In other words, there would be distorted tests of defamation in the course of  
defamatory allegations around  what in reality constitutes a breach of privacy. In addition to 
this, what is considered defamatory fluctuates over time, as defamatory tests are based on 
social reactions towards the victims of false allegations. 1228 This may further challenge the 
doctrinal capacity of defamation law to cover false private information because the definition 
of defamation changes over time. 
False light may provide, as this thesis argued, convincing explanations for how the 
dissemination of false information potentially undermines the right to privacy. The 
dissemination of false highly offensive/private information may either force people to 
withdraw from society or force the victims of false information to confront misleading images 
of themselves. Under each option, an individual’s self-determination would be undermined, 
which may lead individuals to thwart the free exchange of ideas as well as chilling the 
formulation of decisions and choices taken on the basis of an independent and critical 
thinking that privacy seeks to promote. On such a basis, the dissemination of harmful 
falsehoods may interfere with the right to privacy, given that such falsehoods potentially 
undermine individual desires to withdraw from public observation or to be secluded and free 
from unwelcome scrutiny of their private life. Furthermore, actions falling under false light 
may provide redress for unwanted interferences with rights to privacy on the grounds that 
the unauthorised dissemination of falsehoods undermine an individual's ability to control the 
dissemination of private information, which  may further result in an individual being forced 
 
1227 See s. 2 C & D in chapter 4.  
1228 See chapter 4.  
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to make public  private facts they  would rather keep private in order to refute such 
falsehoods.  
8. 3: Defences 
 
This thesis used different perspectives to examine the consequences of borrowing the 
defamation defences of qualified privileges and POMOPI and transposing these to territory of 
privacy in the event of both torts overlap. From the local coherence perspective, there would 
occur undesirable inconsistency if privacy law were to allow application of defences initially 
requiring the defendant not to have malicious intent behind publishing the information. This 
means that the defendant must believe in the truth of the information to successfully plead 
defences of honest opinion, qualified privileges and POMOPI. This undesirable inconsistency 
caused by applying such defences in privacy law derives from juxtaposing the requirement of 
belief in truth alongside the fact that truth itself is not a defence in privacy. Consideration of 
distributive justice theory provided significant insight with regards to the question of applying 
POMOPI defences in privacy: the section in question it examined the distribution of benefits 
and burdens of applying such defences that would change standards of liability within privacy 
from strict liability to negligence. By applying fairness and the loss spreading criteria, there 
would arise  undesirable outcomes on the part of  the victims of intrusive publications in 
general and in particular those disadvantaged groups in the society made worse off  through 
the unfair distribution of burdens and benefits resulting from the application of POMOPI in 
privacy law. For example, it is categorically unfair to ask a group of individuals such as 
celebrities or women to bear the costs of those press activities that serve the benefit of 
society in general. Applying distributive justice according to the principles underpinning the 
fairness factor requires that those who reap the benefits of press activities equitably bear 
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their costs. If the publisher reasonably but mistakenly believed that the publication of private 
information served public interest (such as revealing details about a Nazi-themed party and 
the mockery of Holocaust victims), 1229 it would be unfair to have  only the victims (such as 
Mosley and the five female participants) bearing the negative consequences of such intrusive 
publication;  fairness demands that the public who collectively benefit from such harmful 
activity should bear its costs in these instances as well as the publisher. The mainstream 
media who arguably constitute the most powerful entities within this sphere of public 
information should be strictly liable because they in turn are able to reasonably spread such 
costs on that consuming public who reap the benefits of harmful publications of private 
information. If the burdens of harmful publications were borne only by the victims instead of 
being spread across many participants, this would be an objectionable outcome from the 
perspective of distributive justice.  
The standard of liability within POMOPI defences focuses on loss-shifting rather than 
loss-spreading, on the grounds that the costs of media intrusions were only incurred and 
carried by victims.  Application of such loss-shifting criteria would exert a crushing and 
debilitating effect upon individuals’ autonomous choices and personality development since 
the costs of privacy invasion were exclusively borne by specific participants rather than spread 
over the whole society. The media as economically powerful entities occupy optimum 
strategic positions for spreading the costs of harmful publications/damages in the fairest 
manner. The loss-spreading criterion may ensure the compensation of privacy harms without 
financially ruining the defendant (media) since the latter is able to redistribute such financial 
losses through and throughout  their business with the latter  partially and indirectly 
 
1229 Campbell (n 105) at 117; Mosley (n 118) at 122. 
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reassigned towards  that particular section of society invested in the media outlet – both 
parties in this regard (media and consumer)  reap the benefits of media activities and thereby 
can legitimately co-bear the  costs.  
The unavoidable overlap between defamation and privacy shed lights, as this thesis 
strongly emphasised, on the possibility to harmonise or unify certain defences to achieve a 
coherent protection of  freedom of expression under the two independent and distinct causes 
of action in English defamation and of privacy as applied in American law. This is not only 
because the interests of reputation and privacy are different aspects of private life rights 
guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR, but also because the freedom of expression guaranteed by 
Article 10 ECHR requires also a unified and consistent protection. The harmonisation between 
defamation and privacy defences could be achieved by adding the element of public interest 
in the defences of truth and honest opinion.  
In respect to the interaction between public interest and truth defences, this thesis 
emphasised that adopting the approach of South African law that requires an element of 
public interest to establish the defence of truth may additionally precipitate harmonisation 
of defamation and privacy since serious reputational harms may undermine also the right to 
respect of private life. For example, the fact that an individual suffers from a severe  disease 
like HIV, contrary to the current legal approach of the Defamation Act 2013, should not be 
enough to justify dissemination of such information based on truth defence; rather, the  
defendant must establish the public interest of such dissemination.  In addition, more 
coherent protections around freedom of expression could be achieved on the basis that under 
both torts the defendant must identify the public interest in disseminating the harmful 
publications. This harmonisation between truth and the public interest would play a pivotal 
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role in reducing the tension between interim injunctions rules applied in defamation and 
privacy since in such instances the court should identify the element of public interest before 
refusing to grant injunctive relief.   
With reference to the interaction between freedom to criticize and honest opinion, 
the overlap in question may serve to precipitate reconsideration of the freedom to criticize 
as a potential justification for encroaching upon the right to privacy in light of the 
requirements around honest opinion defences in defamation. On such basis, there should 
exist information/facts as a prior requirement for private behaviour. The overlap may help to 
reconcile the defences of defamation and privacy as these are based on the right to criticise 
as an aspect of freedom of expression rights. In other words, the analogy between honest 
opinion and freedom to criticize, as similar aspects of exercising freedom of expression, may 
further extend the argument that freedom to criticize in privacy law should be upheld only in 
respect of facts or privileged statements as these are defined and applied within the scope of 
defamation law’s  honest opinion.  
8. 4: Interim Injunction 
 
With reference to the impact of the overlap on interim injunction rules, this thesis 
concluded that the mere existence of reputational harms within the privacy actions should 
not be a reason for applying the restrictive rule of Bonnard v Perryman, 1230 if there is a 
genuine basis for a privacy claim in the first place. Three justifications have been advanced to 
support the groundlessness of judicial attention to applying the injunctive test of defamation 
in privacy cases involving reputational harms. Firstly, this thesis addressed the objectionable 
inconsistency between the justifications of the Bonnard v Perryman test and privacy law with 
 
1230 [1891] 2 Ch 269 
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respect to the role of truth. If truth itself cannot be a defence in privacy law in the first place, 
there would arise undesirable incoherence in applying Bonnard v Perryman and its procedural 
requirements for establishing the defence of truth. The incoherence would be acute taking 
into account the fact that reputational interests are protected under article 8 ECHR.  The fact 
that privacy is the core value explicitly protected in Article 8 ECHR may provide a reason for 
prioritising privacy rules over that reputation implicitly protected under this article. There 
should be equal weight afforded the claims of privacy and freedom of expression. The 
likelihood test in s. 12 (3) HRA 1998 may provide the right methodology for taking into account 
both sides of rights in conflict to achieve a proportionate balance between private life and 
freedom of expression. The mere engagement of Article 8 and 10 ECHR may require the court 
to undertake an intensive focus of the important values inherent in such rights without a 
presumed priority of one right over the other as one may have derived from the restrictive 
rule of Bonnard v Perryman.  
Secondly, the application of economic analysis, based on costs and benefits criterion, 
provides additional grounds for prioritising the correct tests applying to interim injunctions. 
This thesis argued that the application of the Bonnard v Perryman rule (that likely ends with 
a rejection of temporary injunction) in privacy cases would inefficiently increase the social 
costs resulting from an erroneous judgement or procedural operation. The social costs of such 
a mistaken judgement cannot only be limited to personal suffering, frustration, 
disappointment and feelings of anger caused by undermining the intrinsic values of privacy 
invasion; they may also extend to emotional well-being, the promotion of human flourishing 
and freedom of expression. The costs of further litigations incurred by the litigants are also a 
part of those social costs that could be avoidable if an interlocutory injunction had been 
granted in the first place. The fact that privacy litigation costs may reach six-digit numbers 
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strengthens the case for the inefficiency of the B v P rule in the event of this being applied in 
the overlapping cases. Based on these objections, this thesis argues that prioritising the 
application of likelihood tests over Bonnard v Perryman tests could increase access to justice; 
the costs of obtaining such orders are relatively affordable when compared with the costs of 
applying Bonnard v Perryman. The efficiency of procedural law, therefore, may give priority 
to the likelihood test over the B v P test on the grounds that potentially granting interim 
injunctions may be more efficient than denying injunctive relief applications when applied to 
those cases that involve genuinely private and defamatory information.  
As this thesis argues, the final insight, based upon which the likelihood test of Article 
12 (3) HRA 1998 is deemed preferable to the B v P test, is derived from feminist analysis. This 
school of analysis argues that cases brought forward against women with improper motives 
(such as blackmail, making profits and revenge porn, motivated by and predicated upon the 
social bias against women within the double standard of sexuality and broad, historic 
gendered power disequilibrium) must be discouraged. Identifying and taking into account 
such improper motives and concomitant structural inequalities could be pivotal, as this thesis 
maintains, to prioritise the likelihood test over the B v P test. The conflicting tests vary upon 
whether the freedom of expression claim is weakened in the event of discernible improper 
motives behind the publications in question. Whilst the B v P test considers such motives 
irrelevant if the defendant decided to establish the truth of the information, the likelihood 
test takes into account motives that reduce the strength of any public interest claim when 
justify the publication. Based on this analysis, this thesis has argued  that priority must be 
given to the likelihood test over the B v P test in the cases involving improper motives because 
of the desirability that  injunction to achieve at least two key goals  The first goal is to prevent 
use and reinforcement of the sexual double standards in society which disproportionately 
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humiliates women acknowledges that improper motives formally  weaken claims of freedom 
of expression. The second is to discourage the commodification of indignity rights; allowing a 
person to sell the story of their partner's adultery, may falsely establish and reinforce the 
presumption of the former’s de facto property right to exclusive sexual access.1231 
8. 5: Damages 
 
The thesis examined three interrelated issues: awarding reputational harms in privacy; 
vindicating the right to privacy; and accumulating the damages of defamation and privacy in 
the case of the overlap. Firstly, this thesis explained why the inclusion of reputational harms 
within privacy damages is principally right, since the protection of reputation is the shared 
function of defamation and privacy. There would be crucial incentives behind including 
reputation within the elements of damages in privacy law and these can be identified in 
economic analysis of civil procedures perspective. If the court considers that reputational 
harms come within the elements of damages in privacy, this might be an efficient way of 
minimising the judicial costs of litigations, since the claimant, practically speaking, would have 
little benefits for bringing defamation proceedings to redress her loss of reputation. 
Furthermore, there could be unjustified injustice inflicted upon victims of reputational harms 
caused by serious invasions of privacy should reputational harms be exclusively protected by 
defamation law. This is because not all invasions of privacy could satisfy the tests of 
defamation which may change over time– such as the changing shift in attitudes towards 
allegations of homosexuality.   
Secondly, it is the contention of this thesis that the role of vindication in defamation 
and privacy depends on the definition of the concept of vindication itself. In doing so, all 
 
1231 See s. 3/Third of chapter 6.  
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remedies of defamation and privacy, whether injunctive or monetary, involve a vindicatory 
purpose if the vindication means the legal recognition of rights. The law of defamation and 
privacy may also play a role of vindication since they may identify the status of litigants as 
right-holders and wrongdoers. Taking into account the judicial and academic views, this thesis 
identified that the traditional primacy of the historical residue of monetary awards within 
common law actions was the main tool for vindicating the reputational interest. It concluded, 
however, that such primacy needs to be reconsidered given the insights provided by feminist 
analysis and efficiency analysis which conclude that defamation and privacy could vindicate 
their protected interests more effectively by granting, where possible, interlocutory 
injunction rather than by awarding monetary damages. 
Finally, the thesis provided a detailed explanation of the relationship between the 
types of damages awarded in defamation and privacy and identified how, theoretically 
speaking, there would occur a double compensation in accumulating such damages. 
Regarding the compensatory damages, there could be a double compensation if emotional 
harms were compensated under the defamation and MOPI actions in respect of the same set 
of facts – since they address the same interest. The compensatory damages awarded to 
remedy the harms to reputation and privacy under the actions of defamation and MOPI are 
cumulative, since such interests are distinct and independent in the English law. By contrast, 
the American law allows the claimant to have only one recovery, whether under defamation 
or false light action, even though she is afforded the freedom to proceed upon either or both 
causes of action in the case of the overlap between defamation and false light torts. 1232 
 
 
1232 The Restatement of the Law (second) Volume 3 (1977) §.652E, Comment b. 
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8. 6: Recommendations for future research  
 
As previously explained in the introduction, due to the limitations of time and space, 
this research did not cover all the implications arising from the overlap between defamation 
and privacy. There could be, therefore, opportunities for engaging in further academic 
enquiry around the impact of the overlap with regards to potential application of 
defamation’s procedural rules within privacy cases, for instance the summary judgement, 
strike out application and costs management. 1233 The impact of the new provisions of the 
Defamation Act 2013, such as the serious harm requirement, the single rule publication and 
the statutory defence of operators of websites could also be the subject of further research 
around examining their potential applicability within areas of privacy law. There also exists a 
research opportunity for  examining the impacts of the overlap upon damages  (particularly 
in comparison with American law)  for instance that of accumulating defamation and privacy 
damages as this impacts upon the exercise of freedom of expression, and for examining  








1233 Richard Hyde, ‘Procedural control and the proper balance between public and private interests in 
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